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Public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa have been perceived as schizophrenic and 
guided by incompatible ideas deriving from their local norms, colonial histories, and 
development paradigms, which is thought to constrain action and impede 
organizational change.  This study analyzes these tensions using an institutional logics 
perspective in three case studies at public accountability organizations in Zambia: the 
Office of Auditor General, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the ombudsman 
office.  Institutional logics are understood as the different sets of values, principles, 
practices, and social structures that can guide organizational and individual behavior.  
This study shows how alternative logics were introduced in the organizations, and it 
examines the relationships between the different logics and how they affect 
organizational action.  The study also presents a case of change in one of the 
organizations, which came through a process of institutional entrepreneurship and the 
organization’s engagement with a well-established international professional 
community. 
 
The analyses and findings from this study, which are based on qualitative data that 
primarily come from interviews and documentary sources, contribute to theories and 
literature on institutional logics and development.  It develops a typology of logics 
useful for research on public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it demonstrates 
how different types of relationships can exist between these logics, in which some 
relationships are complimentary and can facilitate organizational action, while others 
are competitive and can hinder organizational action.  The study also contributes to 
our understanding of the materiality of logics by showing how a move between office 
buildings was a material expression and enabling condition for the enactment of a 
logic.  Finally, the study contributes to theories on institutional entrepreneurship and 
change and engages in ongoing discussions about the paradox of embedded agency, as 
it shows how an institutional entrepreneur was drawn toward certain courses of action 
through her history of social positioning across organizations, which she then applied 
in her current leadership position where she drove a process of organizational change.  
By using theoretical perspectives normally found in research on organizations in the 
Global North, this study moves the literature further toward theorizing the contexts of 
public organizations in the Global South, while it also leads to a better understanding 
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There are a variety of ideas about how public organizations in the developing 
world (hereafter, the Global South) should work.  These different ideas are related to 
the appropriate roles and forms of public organizations in their communities, the ways 
in which civil servants should behave and be evaluated, and the basic values and 
norms organizational actors should follow while carrying out their work.  These 
different ideas often offer competing frameworks for organizational and individual 
behavior, and they can come from a variety of sources, such as donor and development 
communities, professional associations, the political elites, civil service cadres, and 
not least from the traditional and primordial social structures that have existed long 
before the formal modes of government that exist today (Ekeh, 1975; Hydén, 2012, 
2013b).  The result of the competing ideas and frameworks within organizations is that 
the organizations can often act in “schizophrenic” ways (Masunungure, 2004, p. 68), 
as these underlying norms, values, and practices can shift, leading to situations in 
which civil servants are not sure how to act since the appropriate courses of action can 
change depending on what is happening and which actors are involved at a given point 
in time (Hydén, 2013b).   
These arguments can also be considered regarding public organizations in 
Zambia, which have had their own cultural heritages, historical trajectories, and 
administrative systems that have developed over time.  As administrative reforms and 
other development projects have been introduced in Zambia in recent decades, their 
impact can be limited by the different sets of organizing principles, values, practices, 
and social structures that are guiding Zambian public organizations.  This can lead to 
limited change in the ways that these organizations deliver goods and services, the 
transparency of their financial systems, and their interaction with members of the 
public.  These limitations of reform and development, according to Andrews (2013), 
come from “stubborn contextual constraints” (p. 36) of conflicting norms, values, and 
practices within the organizations, which form “rule-like logics” (p. 47) that shape 
how organizational actors behave and limit opportunities for change (pp. 49-52).   
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Purpose Statement  
The purpose of this study is to contribute to our understanding of how these 
multiple ideas interact within public organizations in Zambia and to what effect.  It 
further develops our understandings of how they can co-exist in relationship to one 
another within an organizational context, and how those different types of 
arrangements can constrain change and development processes in some ways or how 
they can also enable them in other ways (Waldorff, Reay, & Goodrick, 2013).  Theory 
on institutional logics will be useful in this regard, as institutional logics are 
understood as the sets of values, principles, and practices about how a social world 
should work and the social structures that constitute it.  These institutional logics 
“operate, often implicitly, as practical guides for action” (Jones, Boxenbaum, & 
Anthony, 2013, p. 52), as they shape the way organizational actors understand their 
world, what they value as important, and how they plan to act. 
In order to do this, this study develops a typology of institutional logics useful 
for research in Sub-Saharan Africa, which it uses to understand the contexts of 
Zambian public accountability organizations.  It also builds on and develops theory 
about how those logics interact with one another within the organizational contexts as 
the actors within them enact the different logics.  According to this theoretical 
perspective, this can lead to different mixes of multiple institutional logics within a 
single organization, which can impact action in various ways.  This analysis leads to a 
deeper understanding of the complex dynamics and relationships that exist between 
institutional logics and how those dynamics impact the way these public organizations 
and their members interact with the public, political leaders, and with each other.  
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, this study provides an understanding of how 
change can occur within these organizations, which it does through the case narrative 
of one of the organizations that has changed in significant ways as a result of 
institutional entrepreneurship and its engagement with the professional community.  In 
these ways, this study contributes both to research on institutional logics as well as to 
development research, and it allows the analyses of this study to focus on “the micro-
foundations of action” at the organizational level, which has often been overlooked 
within the institutional logics literature (Waldorff et al., 2013).   
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An Empirical Focus on Public Accountability Organizations  
Some of the most significant entities in the development sphere are public 
accountability organizations.  These are organizations that have multiple objectives, 
since they are seen to be the guardians of public resources, watchdogs over powerful 
government officials who might abuse their office and infringe on the rights of the 
public, and as safeguards for ensuring that donor funds are not misused by the 
receiving governments.  Though the term “accountability” tends to be “chameleon-
like” and ambiguous (Dubnick & Justice, 2004; Posner & Schwartz, 2011), one can 
argue that public accountability organizations exist to uphold normative moral 
standards of behavior by creating a social relationship and system through which 
individuals and/or collectives must render an account of their behavior (Dubnick & 
Justice, 2004).  These types of organizations can be national and local audit offices, 
human rights institutions, ombudsman offices, or anti-corruption agencies, for 
example, since each of these types of organizations are thought to call public officials 
and public organizations to an account for their behavior and the ways in which they 
use public resources.     
Accountability organizations often sit on the threshold between traditional 
public organizations that are part of centralized public service commissions and 
autonomous organizations, since they are semi-autonomous and have special 
protections spelled out for them within state laws and constitutions.  These 
organizations might be located under state legislatures or given a status similar to that 
of high courts to help ensure their autonomy and their ability to be impartial in their 
work of holding government officials accountable.  However, in many cases within the 
Global South, these institutions are often more connected to the executive branch of 
government than their counterparts in the Global North.  Public accountability 
organizations in the Global South are likely to operate in unpredictable and 
inhospitable environments that have competing interests and multiple institutional 
logics, and each of these different logics likely espouse conflicting sets of principles 
and ideas about how these organizations should go about their work of holding public 
officials accountable.     
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Public accountability organizations in the Global South have a special task of 
protecting public as well as donor resources, and they are often seen as a check against 
governments and public officials who might abuse their authority and infringe on the 
human rights of the public or misappropriate or misuse public resources.  Therefore, 
public accountability organizations have begun receiving significant attention from 
donors and attracting funds for capacity-building and development projects (Hydén, 
2013b; OECD, 2008, 2013), as the very idea of accountability has risen to iconic status 
within the international community (Dubnick & Justice, 2004).  Because of their 
international status and their mandates, public accountability organizations are in the 
public eye more than other organizations, and this is especially the case when media 
coverage and sensational news stories come out in which these organizations have 
uncovered cases of corruption, embezzlement, or abuse of power.   
 
The Three Cases  
The three empirical cases in this study are based on public accountability 
organizations in Zambia, in which there have been dynamic relationships between 
different institutional logics.  The first case explains how changes among institutional 
logics have taken place within the Office of Auditor General Zambia.  This case 
illustrates how change can occur in the relationships between institutional logics as 
well as how some relationships between the different logics can be complementary, 
with one logic facilitating the enactment of another logic.  The second case focuses on 
the institutional logics within the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission, an 
organization that has been at the center of political power struggles over several 
decades.  The commission has gone through a number of reforms in the laws that are 
meant to empower and protect it and changes in its organizational structure.  Yet, it 
can be argued that the Anti-Corruption Commission has experienced very little change 
among the institutional logics that guide it, particularly as it relates to the issue of 
political independence.  The third case looks at the Zambian ombudsman’s office, 
which has recently begun processes of reform and organizational restructuring.  These 
processes have introduced alternative institutional logics into the organization, and 
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there are ongoing power struggles over which institutional logics will become more 
influential in guiding the organization and which ones will lose their influence.   
These three cases, taken together, use the institutional logics perspective as a 
lens to understand organizational context, and to examine ways in which these 
contexts can constrain or enable action and also how those contexts can be changed 
through agentive and structural processes.  In that way, the cases demonstrate the 
usefulness and applicability of the institutional logics perspective and the typology that 
is introduced in Chapter Two.  In addition, the cases lead to a richer and more detailed 
understanding of these processes within public accountability organizations, which are 
receiving a greater degree of interest and scrutiny in recent years.  The institutional 
logics perspective provides a more nuanced look at how the independence and 
autonomy of these organizations is understood and practiced from within the different 
logics and how the micro-level enactments of the different logics impact action within 
these organizations.  These cases also provide an actor-centric look at political power 
and show the important role of political support and political will for the independent 
operations of these organizations, a claim often made in academic and technical 
literature on accountability in development.   
 
Research Questions 
The study addresses three research questions to achieve its purpose of 
contributing to our understanding of the relationships between multiple institutional 
logics in public accountability organizations in Zambia: 
1. What types of institutional logics provide sets of organizing principles, 
practices, and social structures that constitute the contexts of public 
accountability organizations in Zambia? 
2. How do these institutional logics relate to one another within the three 
organizational contexts, and how does that affect organizational action? 
3. How does change within these contexts occur? 
 
The first question is answered, in part, by drawing on extant theory and data to 
develop a typology of institutional logics, which is presented in Chapter Two.  The 
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typology was developed and further refined through the incoming empirical data as the 
research project was carried out in Zambia (Layder, 1998).  The second research 
question uses the typology of logics to understand and explain the dynamics of how 
the different institutional logics relate to one another in the contexts of the three public 
accountability organizations in Zambia and the social impacts of the institutional 
logics and the relationships between them.  Finally, the third research question also 
uses the typology as it draws from the analytic narratives of the cases to explain how 
change in the contexts can occur, and it does so paying close attention to the 
simultaneous interactions between structure and agency – not privileging either in their 
potential roles in change processes.   
 
Theoretical Contributions and Relevance of the Study 
By using an institutional logics perspective to understand the different 
organizing principles, practices, and structures that guide Zambian public 
accountability organizations, this study links to a vibrant and growing stream of 
research that has been used in a number of contexts (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017).  
The institutional logics perspective was first introduced by Friedland and Alford 
(1991) “as part of their attempt to emphasize the importance of social context” 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 373).  This perspective locates organizational and 
individual behavior within contexts that both regularize behavior as well as provide 
opportunities for change (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  These contexts are 
interinstitutional, since they are comprised of multiple logics, which at times can lead 
to problems when actors are confronted with contradictory courses of action based on 
different logics.   
Research on development often discusses the institutional context of public 
organizations in the Global South and the diverging interests and competing 
frameworks that govern them (Ekeh, 1975; Evans, 2004; Hydén, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; 
Masunungure, 2004).  This is can be seen as a mismatch between development 
reforms, which are often global in character, and the organizational context, which is 
necessarily local in character.  Bergh (2012) argued that “decoupling is endemic” in 
the application of these reforms because they are “modelled on an external culture 
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whose elements may be inconsistent with local practices and requirements and cannot 
simply be imported wholesale as a fully functioning system” (p. 315).  This runs 
parallel to Askvik’s (1993) contention that, “established Western management 
techniques may to a large extent contradict the traditional values systems of the 
developing countries, and hence they may frequently have consequences contrary to 
their intended purposes” (p. 162).  These arguments point to what Evans (2004) has 
referred to as “institutional monocropping” and the wrongheaded presumption that the 
conditions of states in the Global South will improve if they simply follow the same 
path towards development as states from the Global North.  
A recent book by Matt Andrews (2013), The Limits of Institutional Reform in 
Development, examines these issues further from within institutional theory.  It 
contributes to the field of development research by considering how dominant 
institutional logics that guide behavior in the governments of the Global South have a 
significant influence on the outcomes of reforms and development initiatives.  The 
book argues that reform and development initiatives in the Global South often fail 
because they do not take local contexts into account and that these reforms are often 
only implemented in symbolic ways as signals to donors.  As a result, governments in 
the Global South usually only change on the surface – not in the ways they actually 
function.  Andrews’s book takes a novel approach to development research because of 
its use of new institutional theory as its underlying perspective for understanding 
problems and successes in development.  Andrews (2013) described this approach as 
one that “draws from broader work in new institutional theory, applying ideas about 
institutional logics, isomorphism, institutional entrepreneurship, and decoupling.  Such 
ideas… have yet to be applied prominently in the development domain”. (p. 3).  This 
unique approach, according to some reviewers, “crosses boundaries” (Klitgaard, 2013, 
p. 408) and “offers a different—and refreshing—theoretical perspective” while also 
“offering novel ways to think about some of the most pressing policy issues” (de 
Renzio, 2013, p. 463). 
Amidst all the praise, Christopher Pollitt (2013), in his review, also offered a 
critique of the book.  He noted that “the theorization of context” needed to be more 
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extensively elaborated, and that future works could contribute toward that end.  
According to Pollitt,  
One small criticism of the book is that the theorization of context could have 
been taken a little further. Andrews assembles some promising components 
(normative and cultural-cognitive mechanisms, etc.) but does not push too far 
down the road of synthesizing them into a systematic approach. It may be that 
scholars from a number of sub-fields are now converging on ‘context’ as 
worthy of more focused attention… and that subsequent editions of Andrews’ 
book will be able to link up with those wider concerns (p. 585). 
It should be noted that Andrews’s (2013) book did not avoid discussing “context”, as it 
sees it as important for development workers to take into account the contexts for 
which they are designing reform programs.  For example, the book argued that reform 
designers commonly “overlook important aspects of context”, which “leads to cases of 
reforms not fitting into the targeted setting – because the setting is either not ripe for 
change or does not accommodate the change imposed on it” (Ibid, pp. 35-36), and it 
pointed to multiple cases of failed development efforts (and some successes), 
discussing them generally in terms of their institutional logics.  However, the book did 
not provide a typology of institutional logics that could be used for conducting 
research in development contexts, nor did it use a single extant typology throughout it 
to examine the different cases.  Instead, it applied a variety of typologies or dyads of 
competing logics throughout the book, such as the “anti-corruption logic” and “logic 
of corruption” to look at reforms in Malawi (Ibid, p. 54), and the “soft budget 
constraint logic” and “hard budget constraint logic” to look at budget reforms in 
Argentina (Ibid, p. 52).   
If Andrews’s (2013b) book had provided a typology of logics and used it across 
the different cases it discussed, this would have potentially contributed further toward 
the theorization of context.  Then, that typology could again be used in later research 
for systematically comparing empirical cases to a set of institutional logics that one 
would expect to find in governments and government organizations throughout the 
Global South (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 378; Layder, 1998).  This would have 
“facilitate[ed] comparison to other studies” within the Global South and to further 
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elaboration of the theory (Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 443).  The use of typologies allows 
research to “convey a more dynamic understanding of logics, in which actors can 
move between logics depending on the time and organizational issues” and “how 
actors drawing on different logics work together in the same organization” (Johansen 
& Waldorff, 2017, p. 64;  see also Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 442).   
In fairness, however, the task of developing a typology of logics lies outside the 
general premise of The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development and its unique 
contributions to both theory and practice.  The book moves development research 
forward in two significant ways.  It does so first by discussing how reforms fail when 
reform designers do not take context into account and providing a framework that 
enables one to consider established and dominant logics that come into conflict with 
alternative logics introduced through reform projects.  The book also contributed to 
development research by presenting a practical method for development in the South, 
which Andrews (2013) calls Problem Driven Iterative Adaption (PDIA).  In the PDIA 
approach, reforms should be driven by local actors who perceive problems they want 
to address, they muddle through and try to resolve those problems, and then they adapt 
their responses by learning from their mistakes and improving upon them in their next 
iteration.  Andrews demonstrated the application of the PDIA approach with empirical 
evidence within the second half of his book.    
 
Conclusion  
This study on public accountability organizations in Zambia contributes to the 
work of Andrews and others in development research by focusing on “the theorization 
of context”, to use Pollitt’s (2013, p. 585) words.  It develops and presents a typology 
of logics that can be used in research on public accountability organizations in Zambia 
and more generally on public organizations within Sub-Saharan Africa.  By applying 
the typology to the three empirical cases, it allows the study to examine more fine-
grained processes of change and ways in which organizations and organization 
members navigated and enacted the different institutional logics within their 
organizational contexts.  This advances the use of institutional logics as a theoretical 
perspective within development research as well as advancing this perspective more 
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broadly, as the institutional logics perspective has recently been criticized for being 
too narrow in its focus on organizations in the Global North and “organizations that in 
one way or another are associated with the market” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 
71).  Therefore, by applying this perspective on public accountability organizations in 
Zambia, it extends the theoretical perspective to new contexts and advances our 






Theoretical Approach  
This chapter provides a conceptual framework or a “clustering” of theoretical 
concepts (Layder, 1998, p. 159) for understanding the contexts of public 
accountability organizations in Zambia, how these contexts impact organizational 
action, and how they can change.  The theoretical concepts presented in this chapter 
have helped to orient the research process, to depict and explain the different 
organizational phenomena under question, and ultimately to develop and elaborate 
theory.  In the end, this contributes to a deeper theorization of the contexts of the 
public accountability organizations (Pollitt, 2013) and to a better understanding of the 
processes of reform and development in Zambia and throughout the region.  This 
chapter, broadly titled, Theoretical Approach, first reviews the literature that has been 
helpful in this regard and that was foundational in this study’s contributions.  Then, it 
presents the new typology of institutional logics that is used in the three case studies of 
Zambian public accountability organizations.  Finally, it presents a set of behavioral 
concepts (Layder, 1998) and mechanisms (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) that explain how 
actors within the organizations enact the different logics found in the typology and 
how they are involved in changing their organizational contexts.   
 
Institutional Logics: A Perspective within Institutional Theory 
The institutional logics perspective is a stream of research located within a 
broader theory addressing organizational behavior, institutional theory (Greenwood, 
Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008).  The central quest of institutional theory, according 
to Johansen and Waldorff (2017), “has always been to understand organizational 
action as a social construct, bound by more than economic reasoning and rational 
strategic goals” (p. 52).  According to this theory, organizations are also influenced by 
societal values and norms that may shift or be ambiguous, and organizations often act 
in non-rational ways (Ibid, p. 53).  The history of institutional theory began with 
studies of organizations by Philip Selznick (1949, 1957) that located organizations 
within their broader environment (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) and the different sets of 
societal values that influenced them.  These studies emphasized “the non-rational 
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dimensions of organizational behavior”, noting that organizations often have lives of 
their own apart from the intentions of the rational actors within them (Johansen & 
Waldorff, 2017, p. 53).   
In the late 1970s and 1980s, institutional theory continued with its emphasis on 
the non-rational choices of organizational actors.  However, it would then begin to 
focus on those choices and actions through a macro-level perspective, looking at how 
institutionalized myths and rules lead to isomorphism among the formal structures of 
organizations on a global scale (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012).  According to a seminal article by Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
organizations ceremonially adopt institutionalized rules and formal structures in order 
to attain legitimacy, but those organizations often decouple the formal structures and 
rules from their day-to-day operations.  This allowed the technical core of an 
organization to continue operating in informal ways while the visible elements of the 
organization, such as its structures and formal policies, would conform to the 
institutionalized myths of their environment.   
The notion of isomorphism would become a hallmark of institutional theory 
moving forward, as other researchers also used macro-level perspectives to explain 
how organizations were becoming more similar.  For example, Dimaggio and Powell 
(1983) argued that isomorphism occurs within organizational fields through coercive, 
normative, and mimetic mechanisms, leading, “in the aggregate, to homogeneity in 
structure, culture, and output” among organizations (p. 147).  This stream of 
institutional theory eventually became known as “the new institutionalism” after 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) coined the phrase to capture it as a “reaction to the 
behavioral revolution” (p. 2) and “a rejection of rationality as an explanation for 
organizational structure” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 100).  An overarching 
characteristic of the new institutionalism was its emphasis on societal structures and 
culture as sources of organizational similarity, and as such, it became increasingly 
criticized for being too abstract and ignorant about issues of change, dissimilarity 
among organizations, and the effects of human agency.   
It was in the midst of these criticisms that researchers began developing a new 
stream of institutional research that would later come to be called the institutional 
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logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012).  This was a response to the new 
institutionalism’s focus on the socializing effects of institutions at the expense of a 
focus on human agency.  In a 1991 essay, Friedland and Alford (1991) sought to bring 
the two foci together.  They introduced their work as a path toward “understand[ing] 
individual and organizational behavior” by “locating it in a societal context”, which 
could accommodate both the “utilitarian individual” and the “power-oriented 
organization” (Ibid, p. 232).  According to this perspective, each institution in society 
has a central logic: “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions – which 
constitutes its organizational principles and which is available to organizations and 
individuals to elaborate” (Ibid, p. 248).  This perspective shifted the focus of analysis 
away from isomorphism and towards the ways in which actors can draw on different 
institutional logics that provide meaning, motive, and identity and also how those 
actors can manipulate and elaborate on those different logics for their own advantage 
and to change social relations in society (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 101). 
Friedland and Alford (1991) listed several institutions and their corresponding 
logics.  The essay mentions, for example, the “central institutions of Western societies 
– capitalism, family, bureaucratic state, democracy, and Christianity” (Ibid, p. 249), 
and it also mentions other logics such as “the institutional logic of kinship” (p. 259) 
and of love (pp. 249-250).  Notably, the burgeoning community of institutional logics 
researchers, which have mostly come from business schools (Johansen & Waldorff, 
2017, p. 71), adopted and elaborated upon the five logics related to Western societies: 
capitalism, family, bureaucratic state, democracy, and Christianity (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012), and the variants of these five logics are often 
found in the literature today.  However, the institutional logics of love and of kinship 
that were discussed by Friedland and Alford (1991) have not been further explored or 
elaborated in detail with the exception of Friedland’s more recent works on the 
institutional logic of love (Friedland, 2013; Friedland, Mohr, Roose, & Gardinali, 
2014).  
Central to the institutional logics perspective is the notion of “embedded 
agency”, which assumes “that the interests, identities, values, and assumptions of 
individuals and organizations are embedded within prevailing institutional logics.  
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Decisions and outcomes are a result of the interplay between individual agency and 
institutional structure” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 103).  This notion of embedded 
agency distinguishes the institutional logics perspective from the two perspectives 
mentioned previously, and it attempts to find a middle ground between their two 
extremes: the rational choice extreme, in which actors are autonomous and make 
rational choices based primarily on their interests, and the macro structuralist extreme, 
in which “mindless” human action is guided by scripts and norms that are “taken for 
granted” (Hatch & Zilber, 2012, p. 95).  This middle ground provided by the 
institutional logics perspective leaves room for agentive action, as actors elaborate, 
combine, or manipulate the “potentially contradictory” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 
232) logics that exist in relationship to one another within “inter-institutional” contexts 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 104).   
 
Institutional Logics and Development Administration 
The recent book by Andrews (2013) was the first to use the institutional logics 
perspective to study development administration and reforms within the Global South, 
building on the notions of embedded agency and inter-institutional contexts discussed 
above.  Andrews (2013) argued that development and reform initiatives often fail to 
meet their objectives in the South because reform designers do not understand how the 
institutional contexts of those societies limit and undermine the contents of their 
reforms.  Andrews’s study uses the institutional logics perspective as a way of 
understanding the contexts of these public administrations and their stubbornness to 
change.  To do that, “[i]t introduces the idea of ‘inter-institutional’ contexts in which 
multiple institutional logics interact to shape the potential for change” (Ibid, p. 36).  
According to Andrews (2013), the administrative contexts into which reforms are 
introduced are comprised of multiple institutional logics that affect the outcomes of 
those programs.  Some logics can be more dominant than others, having long been 
embedded within society and making it more difficult for change to occur.  There may 
also be alternative logics that compete against those dominant logics.  A significant 
change would occur, according to Andrews (2013), if there was a “logic shift” through 
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which the previously dominant logic weakened and the competing alternative logic 
became stronger (p. 51).   
This view of institutional logics, as a way of understanding and explaining 
social context, places Andrews’s (2013) perspective squarely within the field of 
institutional logics research.  As Thornton and Ocasio (2008) argued, this is a core 
aspect of the theory: to understand individual and organizational behavior by locating 
it within its societal and institutional context, and to understand how the inter-
institutional system guides behavior and shapes action, while it also provides 
opportunities for change through individual and collective agency.  Thornton and 
Ocasio (2008) contend that institutional logics provide the social categorizations, 
classifications, and shared identities that shape organizational and individual action, 
yet organizations and individuals can also change institutional contexts occurs through 
entrepreneurial action as competing logics become more influential within an 
organizational context through various means (Ibid, pp. 115-117).   
As a way to illustrate the view of institutional contexts as interactions between 
multiple logics, Andrews (2013) presented a case of anti-corruption reforms in 
Malawi.  The context in Malawi was already dominated by the values and norms of 
“unchallenged patrimonialism” and “corruption… that deemed it appropriate and 
expected to provide for one’s kin – and extended kin – from the resources gained from 
office” (Ibid, p. 46).  Furthermore, the constitution of Malawi at that time gave 
unchecked power to the president, which “formalized the informal authority granted 
him” (Ibid, 46).  According to Andrews (2013), it was those values, norms, and laws 
that comprised an “anti-corruption logic”, which “shaped how agents understood their 
world, what they deemed appropriate, what they were willing to enforce, and how they 
planned to do so” (p. 47).  The logic of corruption was dominant within the Malawi 
context, but at the same time, there was also a competing logic of anti-corruption, 
which was based on the values of democracy, transparency, and strong control of 
corruption.  These values were reflected within Malawi society through various means, 
such as popular music, NGO activities, and formal regulations of the civil service 
against corrupt behavior.  However, according to Andrews (2013), their influence was 
limited, because the logic of corruption had become dominant in the society and 
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ingrained in the behavior of individuals and because the authoritarian rule of the 
president was unquestionable (p. 49).  
Even after a string of dramatic political events occurred and reforms were 
enacted in the 1990s, the logic of corruption continued to remain dominant in Malawi.  
A new president was elected through multi-party elections in 1994, a new anti-
corruption law was passed in 1995, and an Anti-Corruption Bureau was established to 
control corruption.  Yet, these did not lead to a shift in the dominant logic, and this 
became evident when a major scandal erupted in 2000 and the newly elected president 
was implicated among other officials in the theft of millions of US dollars.  As it 
turned out, the new Anti-Corruption Bureau that had been established was being 
perpetually underfunded and not given adequate power and autonomy.  Plus, the new 
anti-corruption laws were simply being ignored, and the president’s authoritarian 
power continued to go unchecked.  Therefore, the logic of corruption continued to 
remain dominant in Malawi society and prevented the alternative logic of anti-
corruption from becoming legitimate in the eyes of locals and government officials.   
 
Types and Institutional Logics: Extant Literature   
Research on institutional logics often use typologies of logics as a systematic 
way of viewing the inter-institutional system.  This helps order data collection and 
theorizing since the ideal types serve as stable points that “facilitate systematic 
comparison of empirical variation” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 378).  Typologies are 
classifications based on ideal types with exaggerated features that may be found in 
empirical reality.  Typologies of institutional logics are comprised of what could be 
considered the typical features that are internally consistent within those logics, which 
Johansen and Waldorff (2017) “call the ‘vertical relationships’ internal to the 
institutional logics and their more detailed compositions” (p. 60).  According to 
Layder (1998), developing and using typologies in social research “is a very useful 
means by which the theoretical imagination is fired” and “has the advantage of 
ordering one’s observations and analyses” by asking how phenomena are similar or 
different from others (p. 73).   
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Studies on institutional logics can derive their ideal types of logics in different 
ways depending on their area of focus, their research questions, and their 
methodological approach for answering them.  Reay and Jones (2016) elaborated on 
some of the different approaches that have been used in extant research.  They noted 
that some studies use inductive approaches to develop their ideal types, and that these 
studies are grounded in empirical data coming from interviews, texts, and 
observations.  The data are then categorized and developed into a set of different 
institutional logics that exist in relationship to one another in a particular social 
context.  In these studies, “researchers must immerse themselves in the data, 
examining and categorizing text segments to reveal the underlying meanings and thus 
identify patterns of behaviors and beliefs” (Ibid, p. 449).  Other studies, according to 
Reay and Jones (2016), begin with “the established literature” to develop a typology of 
logics (p. 447).  Thus, “they privilege theory and prior research” and they use a set of 
ideal types to avoid getting bogged down in the empirical data and to interpret 
meaning within the organizational or social contexts they are studying (Ibid, p. 447).  
Finally, Reay and Jones also noted that studies of institutional logics likely involve a 
combination of different techniques and “cycle between inductive and deductive 
approaches” (Ibid, p. 442).  Thus, it is important not to limit oneself strictly to 
inductive or deductive approaches when conducting institutional logics research, as 
this would limit theoretical development (Layder, 1998). 
The following subsections present typologies from extant research that are 
useful for understanding organizational and societal contexts.  They give an idea of 
how typologies are developed and used in research, and as will also be seen, they 
contribute toward the development of the typology created in this study on 
accountability organizations in Zambia.  The first subsection presents a study of 
different logics in Bolivian microfinance agencies, which, even though it is not 
focused on public organizations, it is still a useful example of types of institutional 
logics used in development research in the Global South.  The next subsection presents 
a typology that was used for research on public organizations in Austria, which in spite 
of its geographical location far from Zambia, still contributes to this study, especially 
as it relates to the vertical relationships internal to the logics one might expect to find 
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in public organizations.  The final subsection presents a typology of administrative 
models in Africa from Goran Hydén (2012).  Although Hyden’s types are not 
explicitly called institutional logics, they are comprised of similar categories and 
vertical relationships inherent in institutional logics, and, more significantly, they 
contribute insight into the conflicting values, norms, and practices likely to be found 
within public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  For that reason, they have 
contributed to the typology of institutional logics in this study of public accountability 
organizations in Zambia.   
    
Development and Banking Logics in Bolivian Micro-Finance   
Battilana and Dorado (2010) contributed one of the few works of research that 
uses an institutional logics perspective in the Global South.  Their study is focused on 
two microfinance organizations in Bolivia and the different strategies those 
organizations employed to manage the tensions between their fiduciary responsibilities 
as banks and their social responsibility to help the poor.  Their study contributes to the 
way we can understand hybrid organizations, particularly in the newly emerging field 
of microfinance.  It showed how different institutional logics offered competing goals, 
management principles, and ways of viewing loan recipients.  The authors identified 
two competing logics through an inductive approach, which were a development logic 
that focused the attention of organization members on helping the poor and vulnerable, 
and a banking logic that focused organization members on making enough profits to 
support the organization and meet obligations to investors and depositors.  Battilana 
and Dorado (2010) found that in order for these new types of organizations to work, 
they would need to develop a hybrid logic combining the development and banking 
logics in a sustainable way.   
The development logic (see typology in Appendix A) was focused on 
“Development and poverty alleviation”, while the banking logic was focused on 
“Deriving a rent and profit” (Ibid, 1423).  The logics also shaped the way organization 
members viewed the recipients of the microloans.  According to the development 
logic, they saw the “target population” as “Clients and beneficiaries… seen as more or 
less deserving of support”, while according to the banking logic, organization 
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members saw them as “customers… more or less risky sources of income” (Ibid, 
1423).  These logics were also seen in the management principles and practices within 
the organization.  According to the development logic, the management principles 
were “Maximizing the impact of donor funds on development and poverty 
alleviation”, while the principles of the banking logic were “Maximizing profit while 
fulfilling fiduciary obligations not only to investors but also depositories” (Ibid, 1423). 
The two microfinance organizations used different strategies to create the 
hybrid microfinance organizations and balance between the two competing logics.  
The first set of strategies was related to employment processes: hiring a mix of 
employees with different job experiences in banking and social work or hiring young 
employees with little or no work experience to be trained on the job.  The second set 
of strategies was related to the socialization of the employees, which took place 
through training programs, performance-based incentives, and evaluations for 
promotions within the organization.  The authors contend that these strategies helped 
foster a common organizational identity based on both logics, which was critical to 
sustaining the hybrid organizations.  The study contributes to the way we understand 
the creation of hybrid organizations and the organizational actors’ strategies in the 
midst of these new arrangements.  It also contributed one of the few studies in the 
Global South that used an institutional logics perspective.  It explained how these 
organizational contexts had innate tensions resulting from the different values and 
practices of a development logic that is based on empowering the disempowered and a 
banking logic based on market principles.   
 
Administrative Logics in the Austrian Civil Service   
One study from the Global North by Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 
2006b) focused on the Austrian civil service and used a typology of two competing 
logics – a legalistic-bureaucratic logic and a managerial logic (see typology in 
Appendix B), which they consider “globally available constructs” (Meyer & 
Hammerschmid, 2006a, p. 1002).  The legalistic-bureaucratic logic, is part of a 
tradition of European-style professional bureaucracy “characterized by a strong 
emphasis on processes, rules, and… impartiality toward sovereign and citizen… 
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drawing on distinctive bodies of knowledge… but especially tied to the legal 
profession itself” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, pp. 1002-1003).  The managerial 
logic is based on market principles, which are seen by some as a way to make 
government organizations more responsive and to serve their citizens more efficiently 
and effectively.  This form of managerialism has often been promoted under a 
program of New Public Management (NPM) and can even be seen as part of “a global 
wave of administrative reforms” within the public sector (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2011, p. 1).  
Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a) looked at “identity work” among civil 
servants and executives and contended that their identities “change with the logics that 
shape them” (p. 1001).  Under this view, identity is flexible and contingent, and as 
such it is socially constructed “from the productive power of discourse” (Maguire, 
Phillips, & Hardy, 2001, p. 304).  This construction of identity, according to Meyer 
and Hammerschmid (2006a) “is thus the micro-level enactment of social structure” or 
a translation of global categories on the local level (p. 1001).  In order to link civil 
servants with identities and logics, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b) studied 
the vocabularies used by civil service executives, which linked them with certain 
identities and the logics that sponsor those identities in a similar way to Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005) who contended that “institutional vocabularies… are the primary 
means by which institutional logics are articulated and manipulated” (p. 43) and “that 
the respective vocabularies would contain different role identities” (p. 44).  Meyer and 
Hammerschmid (2006b) argued that, “at the level of the discursive field… the 
vocabularies and accounts used give evidence of the prevalence of the different logics 
and manifest the specific local versions or translations of the global trends” (p. 100).   
Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a/b) contributed two significant findings from 
their studies.  First, they found that, within the civil service in Austria, there are local 
translations of global trends, as “actors pick elements of a logic, thus giving the global 
concept a local flavor” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b, p. 112).  Second, they found 
that there were only minor changes within the civil service related to these logics.  So, 
even though the authors found a blend of logics and identities that formed what they 
called a “hybrid”, they found that actors only identified with the managerial logic and 
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its values to a small extent and only “on an instrumental level, which does not 
necessarily entail a new governance mode” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, p. 
1013).  Thus, they found that the legalistic-bureaucratic logic continued to be the 
dominant institutional logic within the Austrian civil service and the main source of 
“belief systems… goals and values” that guided the civil servants’ actions and 
provided their frames of reference in spite of global trends toward managerialism and 
reform in human resource policies and civil service laws (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 
2006b, p. 99).  Finally, the typology from the Austrian study contributes to the current 
study on accountability organizations in Zambia by demonstrating categories that can 
be applied in public organizations.  For example, it demonstrated how employment 
status can be based on the different institutional logics, and it also presents categories 
for analyzing where organization members focus their attention, the values that guide 
their actions, and the systems of control and authority within the organization.   
 
Models of Administration in Africa  
A third typology that contributes to this study (Appendix C) comes from work 
by Goran Hydén (2012, 2013a, 2013b), who has spent much of his life’s work 
theorizing about and studying the contexts of government administrations in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Although Hyden’s studies do not approach these phenomena from an 
institutional logics perspective, they do look at the competing interests and competing 
“models of administration” within African contexts (Hydén, 2012).  Hydén (2013b) 
noted the importance of considering the historical development of administrative 
legacies and “the conflicts that exist between norms that are indigenous to African 
societies, those that were introduced by the colonial powers, and the contemporary 
reform agenda with its inspiration from New Public Management” (p. 922).  
Therefore, most states in Sub-Saharan Africa have relied on transplanted 
administrative systems, which have been shaped by colonial regimes and, more 
recently, by development programs of Northern donors.   
Hydén (2012) contends that the problems with reform and development 
programs in the Global South come from tensions between these three models, in 
which civil servants are pulled in three competing directions based on their 
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relationships with different actors.  The first model, patrimonialism, is based on a 
system of social interaction that flows from a personal form of rule or leadership, 
through which powerful leaders grant favors to people in exchange for their loyalty 
and fealty.  Although patrimonialism is commonly associated with African 
governments because of its barefaced prevalence there, it is also found in social 
relations all over the world wherever there are patron-client relationships (Jackall, 
2010).  The colonial model is based on the rule of law and a hierarchical division of 
labor, which was based roughly on administrative systems in Europe.  It arose in 
Europe as a response to, and a replacement of patrimonial rule with its fiefdoms, 
patronage, and fealty.  This model of administration was later transplanted to Africa in 
the 20th Century when most African administrations were directed by foreign powers 
in an effort to control and extract from their colonies (Hydén, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).   
The third model, New Public Management, can be considered a more recent 
phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa.  It too is a transplant, but instead of coming from 
colonial powers, it comes from donor organizations and initiatives and through 
consulting firms.  It is based on principles of the market and business trends, it tends to 
take flatter and more team-based approaches for organizing, and it has a flexible and 
open career system.  The New Public Management model emphasizes measurable 
results, which lend themselves to donor goals and objectives and the more short-term 
nature of donor-driven projects.  Therefore, donor organizations and consultancies 
often push African client governments to adopt elements of the New Public 
Management model through reform and development programs and with the 
enticements of donor funding (Ibid).   
Hydén (2013b) noted that these three models of administration are combined in 
public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and he used the term, “triangular hold” to 
describe the tensions and the effects that the three models have on African civil 
servants (Hydén, 2012, p. 606).  The tensions between the models produce “a hybrid 
administrative reality where norms shift and it is difficult to know which one is 
decisive where and when” (Hyden, 2013b, p. 930).  There are similarities between 
Hyden’s typology of three models and the Meyer and Hammerschmid’s typology 
based on the Austrian civil service.  Hyden’s typology and, in particular, the first type 
 
 23 
of patrimonialism, compliments the legalistic-bureaucratic logic and managerial logic 
from the Austrian study by providing additional concepts that account for local 
organizing principles, practices, and structures that have been institutionalized over 
time.   
Hydén (2013a) also discussed another concept that he called the economy of 
affection, which is based on communal relationships and revolves around three core 
principles: “whom you know is more important than what you know, sharing personal 
wealth is more rewarding than investing in economic ventures, and a helping hand 
today generates a return tomorrow” (p. 74).  Though it is called an “economy”, it is not 
based on capital, but rather an “informal political economy” (Ibid, p. 74) in which 
actors “share expectations about what is appropriate behavior: that is, reciprocity in all 
exchanges, even if this does not mean giving back exactly what one received, or 
responding within a specified time” (Ibid, p. 87).  While Lemarchand (1989) critiqued 
the economy of affection, arguing it was too broad and difficult to falsify theoretically, 
other researchers, such as Masunungure (2004) have used it to conceptualize 
tendencies within African civil service that run counter to professionalism and create 
tensions within organization.  Masununguru used the metaphor of “schizophrenia” to 
describe the African public official who must constantly balance the demands of the 
economy of affection and the formal public service.   
These concepts from Hydén (2012, 2013a, 2013b) offer a valuable perspective 
from development research to the typology of logics from Meyer and Hammerschmid 
(2006b) and other concepts from the Global North.  They offer elements of an 
institutional logic that can reflect the long-standing norms, values, and social 
structures of the local society in the Sub-Saharan region and within Zambia.  These 
informal norms and social structures may stand in conflict or be subversive of the 
more formalized norms and structures of a state bureaucracy (Friedland & Alford, 
1991, pp. 258-259).  The following section describes the development of a new 
typology for understanding the context of public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
It takes into account the contributions from Hyden and other studies on 
administrations in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as literature on institutional logics, 
public organizations, and the professions.   
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Developing a Typology of Logics for Studies in Zambia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
The typology used in this study and presented in this section was derived 
primarily from extant literature in conjunction with data collection in Zambia.  It is 
based on typologies that were presented in the previous sections as well as other 
concepts, models, and insights from other literature in the fields of development (e.g., 
Andrews, 2013; Cooke, 2001, 2004; Ekeh, 1975; Grindle, 1997; Gustavson, 2014; 
Hydén, 2012, 2013b; Masunungure, 2004; Thomas, 1996, 1999), institutional logics 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, 2006b; Reay & Hinings, 
2005; Thornton, 2004; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012; Waldorff et 
al., 2013), and organization theory (e.g., Freidson, 2001; Mintzberg, 1989).  The extant 
literature was selected to determine what ideal typical institutional logics may be at 
play when it comes to development work and administrative reform in Zambia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa.   
The development of the typology began with extant literature, but is has also 
been iterative, moving between the previous conceptualizations and observational and 
interview data that were collected from the field in the three public accountability 
organizations in Zambia.  This process of iteration comes from a view of theory as 
“adaptive”, following the adaptive theory approach by Derek Layder (1998).  Layder’s 
approach views theory metaphorically as a “scaffold” that pre-exists data collection 
and is a durable construction (Ibid, p. 150).  Yet, just as a construction scaffold can 
adapt and be reconfigured to fit different locations, so can theoretical constructs be 
reflexively adapted to understand new empirical data.  The “raw materials” (Ibid, pp. 
163-166) of adaptive theory come from four types of sources (see following table): 
general theory (e.g., institutional logics as societal level structures guiding action), 
substantive theory (e.g., more focused research on development, professions, public 
organizations, typologies of logics), extant data (previous findings from research on 
Zambian public organizations), and emergent research data (i.e., data collected in this 












Emergent Research Data 
(Layder, 1998, p. 163) 
 
To Layder, the dual approach of using theory and data in “dialectical interplay” 
is that “prior concepts and theory both shape and inform the analysis of data which 
emanates from the ongoing research at the same time that the emergent data itself 
shapes and moulds the existing theoretical materials” (Ibid, p. 166).  Through the use 
of theory and data in dialectal interplay, Layder attempts to find a middle ground 
between inductive studies that are grounded in empirical observations that lead to new 
theory and deductive studies that begin with theory, which is in turn tested through 
empirical observations.  To Layder, the adaptive approach can include elements of 
both deductive and inductive procedures, echoing the position by Reay and Jones 
(2016, p. 442) mentioned previously, about how researchers often cycle between 
inductive and deductive procedures, and that the resulting typology contributes new 
theory and insight into the empirical area of interest (Layder, 1998, p. 171).   
Therefore, when field work for this research project in Zambia began in 2014, 
there were already some preliminary concepts and types that could be used for 
organizing and understanding the data.  These were derived, generally, from the two 
types of civil service logics from Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) and the models 
of administration in Sub-Saharan Africa from Hydén (2012, 2013b) and his concept of 
the economy of affection (Hydén, 2013a).  This provided an initial scaffolding of 
theory, presenting three preliminary types of logics that might be found in the three 
organizations: a kinship or patrimonial logic, a bureaucratic logic, and a managerial 
logic.  This preliminary theoretical scaffold is presented in Appendix D as a rough 
working typology for early fieldwork, with footnotes corresponding texts from which 
the different concepts were derived.  This rough typology was developed prior to the 
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first trip to Zambia in 2014, with the intention of developing it further after conducting 
the first observations and interviews in Zambia at the Office of Auditor General.  It is 
included in Appendix D as a way of showing the iterative process, particularly early 
on in the process of developing theory adaptively (Layder, 1998). 
  While collecting data through interviews, observations, and extant 
documentary and academic literature sources, it was possible to re-evaluate the 
preliminary typology.  It became evident that some of the practices or values espoused 
within the public accountability organizations went beyond typical norms and 
practices of efficiency and public service found in the new public management or 
managerialism logic (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b).  For example, interview 
respondents discussed outreach and service to members of the public, particularly 
those who were poor and marginalized and who would normally have no access to 
systems of governance or democratic accountability, which went beyond the patterns 
of practices and principles of the managerialism logic and the other types from the 
preliminary typology.  A return to the literature then led to the theoretical concept of 
“development management”, which is a well-established discourse within international 
development and reform in the Global South (Cooke, 2001).  Within the development 
management discourse are normative notions about how public organizations in the 
South empower the poor and the disadvantaged and how modern managerial practices 
and techniques can help move developing societies towards modernization 
(Brinkerhoff & Coston, 1999; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2010).  These notions 
seemed to be a better representation of the typical features likely to be found within 
public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa and Zambia than managerialism alone.  
Therefore, instead of the more general types of managerialism or new public 
management, a more contextually relevant and specific type, the development 
management logic, was developed further and used in the three case studies.     
Another issue that became evident was that professionalism would need to 
somehow be addressed and analyzed.  Interview respondents spoke in terms of 
professionalization processes and practices and the organizational effects those 
processes were having in their organization.  Furthermore, extant data and literature on 
public organizations in Zambia also mentioned the effects of the “erosion of 
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professionalism” in the early days of the Zambian civil service (Mulikita, 2002, p. 2) 
and the compounding effects of that erosion of professional values and skills that are 
still being felt in the civil service today (Mpaisha, 2004).  In that way, professionalism 
can be seen as having been divorced from the bureaucracy in the Zambian context.  In 
addition, there was also a basis in the development literature on the analytical value of 
considering professionalism when studying development in the Global South 
(Hildebrand & Grindle, 1997) and public accountability organizations in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Gustavson, 2014).  Therefore, it seemed reasonable that a fourth logic should 
be developed based on “professionalism” as its core organizing principles.  This was a 
departure from the typology from Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b), which implied 
that professionalism is an innate characteristic of the bureaucracy.  That may have 
been the case in Austria, but in Zambia where bureaucracy had existed for many years 
devoid of professionalism, this did not seem to be the case.  Furthermore, literature on 
the professions (Freidson, 2001) and organizations (Mintzberg, 1979, 1989) have also 
made an analytical distinction between bureaucracy and professionalism as a way of 
understanding professional organizations and their members, texts which would come 
to inform the development of the fourth logic in this typology, the professionalism 
logic.   
The iterative processes between substantive and general theories as well as 
emergent and extant data resulted in a new typology of four institutional logics, which 
can be used for analyzing public organizations in Zambia and across the region.  In 
that way, this process follows Layder’s (1998) approach to developing a typology:  
The development of this typology subsequently becomes the centrepoint of the 
adaptive theory, which then feeds into the data collection… So that while the 
typology itself is shaped and modified by the extant theoretical materials and 
the incoming research data, the unfolding adaptive theory (the typology and 
related concepts) simultaneously shapes, modifies and orders the data and the 
extant materials…The typology that begins to shape up in this way becomes an 
addition and partly autonomous theoretical product (new theory) as well as 
providing new theoretical insights into the substantive area of [research] (Ibid, 
p. 171, parentheses in original).   
 
 28 
After the typology had been substantially revised and developed during early 
fieldwork at the Office of Auditor General, it was used to compare to the data being 
collected in all three cases, which was also a useful means of assessing its validity 
since the types needed to fit the incoming data and have a capacity to explain social 
reality (Layder, 1998, pp. 85-97, in particular pp. 85-86, 91-92).  The typology and the 
four ideal types are presented below, and descriptions of the specific dimensions and 
elements that make up the “‘vertical relationships’ internal to the institutional logics” 
(Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 60) are presented in detail in subsequent sections.    
 
Kinship Logic 
The first ideal type, kinship logic, is inspired by the original conception from 
Friedland and Alford (1991), in which an informal logic based on gift-giving and 
mutual obligations between individuals is used to “subvert the logic of other 
institutions” (p. 258).  The formulation of the kinship logic in this study also draws 
extensively from Goran Hyden’s work on the economy of affection, and as such, it is 
based on a communitarian and relational approach to life in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This 
way of life is “primordial”, according to Ekeh (1975), Hydén (2013a), and 
Masunungure (2004), in that it predates colonialism and is often divided along ancient 
kinship lines, and through which, actors “share expectations about what is appropriate 
behavior: that is, reciprocity in all exchanges” (Hydén, 2013a, p. 87).  Roberts’s 
(1976) history of Zambia discussed these types of reciprocal exchanges in ancient 
tribal relations in Zambia, that it “was one of the most important means of circulating 
scarce commodities such as salt, iron-work, or foreign cloth” at that time (p. 81).  
These types of informal exchanges also ensured the loyalty of tribe members to their 
chiefs by rewarding loyal tribe members with the material and cultural resources 
necessary for their existence.   
Masunungure (2004) contended that one of the central problems facing African 
public administration today is the tension that exists between this informal and 
primordial way of getting things done and the more abstract civic professionalism 
within government administrations.  This is because within the kinship logic there is 
no distinction between private and state resources.  Thus, state resources may be 
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distributed as favors in exchange for fealty, and patrimonialism is practiced and 
tolerated under a kinship logic.  Patrimonialism is a system of social interaction in 
which powerful leaders grant favors to people in exchange for their loyalty, and it 
flows from a personal form of rule or leadership.  Weber (1978, as cited in Hydén, 
2013a) noted, “the patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the 
‘private’ and the ‘official’ sphere” and is there to serve the ruler and the official – not 
civil society (p. 98).  Patrimonialism is commonly associated with African 
governments because of its barefaced prevalence there, but it is also found in social 
relations wherever there are patron-client relationships (Jackall, 2010).   
The kinship logic has its own basis of rationality in the sense that it 
“presupposes personal interdependence” between members across all levels of society 
(Hydén, 2013a, p. 86).  As Friedland and Alford (1991) described this 
interdependence, “Through gifts, the lower status persons take possession of powerful 
persons whose substance they have penetrated with their own… Individuals make use 
of the institutional logic of kinship to penetrate the state definitions of needs and social 
categories” (p. 259).  In this way it can subvert the professional and bureaucratic 
logics and their ways of determining what is appropriate and the ways in which they 
serve the public, and it can be used to get things done outside of those logics.  This can 
be commonly seen in practices such as payouts or bribes, the hiring or promoting of 
civil servants based on tribal affiliation, or the granting other types of benefits based 
on interpersonal relationships or exchanges of favors as opposed to being based on 
formal operating procedures.    
 
Bureaucratic Logic  
The second ideal type, bureaucratic logic, is based on the hierarchical division 
of labor in a standardized and stable work environment.  If a public organization is run 
according to a bureaucratic logic, the career system would be fixed and closed with 
promotions based on seniority, and public services would be delivered in a regulated 
fashion, without the requirements of bribes or payouts.  Bureaucratic organizing 
principles arose over time in Europe as a response to patrimonial rule with its 
fiefdoms, patronage, and fealty (Hydén, 2013a) and as a means of standardizing 
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industrial labor (Freidson, 2001).  An organization guided by a bureaucratic logic 
would be “characterized by a strong emphasis on processes, rules, and… impartiality” 
(Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, pp. 1002-1003).  This can be seen as “traditional 
bureaucracy” with “rigid rule orientation and a programming of all activities” rather 
than a more “modern” and professional bureaucracy (Askvik, 1993, p. 158) as was 
reflected in the typology for Austrian public organizations by Meyer and 
Hammerschmid (2006b).   
As Hydén (2012, 2013a, 2013b) noted in his typology of administrative models, 
bureaucracy is a product of transplantation from Europe in the 20th century, when 
much of Africa was colonized by European powers who set up administrative systems 
for collecting taxes, organizing industry, and controlling the native populations.  Many 
Africans have understandably looked upon this set of ideas with skepticism.  However, 
bureaucratic ideas, practices, and structures still can be seen on the continent, at least 
on the surface, in public organizations today (Ibid).     
 
Development Management Logic  
The third ideal type, development management logic, is based on private sector 
approaches to development processes.  It has much in common with the managerial 
trends in public organizations of the Global North, such as managerialism and the new 
public management, but it is centered around development and the empowerment of 
the poor and disempowered members of society in the Global South.  Development 
management is a value-laden term and is contested in research literature (Bawole, 
Hossain, Ghalib, Rees, & Mamman, 2016).  In its logically pure form, development 
management assumes the claim that governments in the Global South “have yet to 
achieve modernity, which is why they are deemed to need ‘development’” in the first 
place (Cooke, 2004, p. 604).  It also assumes the claim that management is a neutral 
technocratic instrument rather than an instrument of political power.  Much as Thomas 
(1996, 1999) argued in his pioneering work on development management, this study 
takes the concept of development management at “face value” (Cooke, 2001, p. 13) 
for the purpose of developing an ideal type that can be used for making comparisons 
with the empirical data.  As such, the statement by Thomas (1999) holds true: 
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“Development management will often remain the ideal rather than a description of 
what actually takes place” since what takes place in reality is “more ambiguous, with 
value-based conflicts, contestation over the definition of development itself, and 
power struggles” (p. 17).  
In a development management logic, the mission of the organization is centered 
around the empowerment of society and its marginalized groups.  According to 
Brinkerhoff and Coston (1999), “development management takes a normative stance 
on empowerment and supporting groups, particularly the poor and marginalized, to 
take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs” (p. 350).  This, again, 
makes the development management logic distinct from managerialism more generally 
because of its normative emphasis on promoting societal empowerment and good 
governance for the citizenry, particularly for the disempowered and vulnerable.  This 
normative distinction is kept intact for this typology even as recent research from a 
critical management perspective has debated whether or not development management 
is “simply another colonizing discourse… governed by an institutionalized managerial 
logic” and used as a form of oppression (Gulrajani, 2010, p. 140).    
The development management logic’s values and practices are centered on 
“results” – bringing measurable results for all members of society with efficiency and 
effectiveness, and in particular, those who are poor and disenfranchised.  It approaches 
organizing with flatter and more team-based approaches, and it has a flexible and open 
career system.  The principles and practices found in the development management are 
more recent arrivals to Africa, according to Hydén (2013b, p. 923).  These types of 
ideas lend themselves to donor goals and objectives and the more short-term nature of 
donor-driven projects.  Therefore, donor organizations and consultancies tend to 
promote elements of development management as part of reform and development 
initiatives in the Global South.   
 
Professionalism Logic 
Finally, it is useful to consider a fourth ideal type, the professionalism logic, in 
order to gain a better understanding of public organizations in Zambia and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Some development researchers (Grindle & Hilderbrand, 1995; 
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Gustavson, 2014) have been calling for greater attention to the role of professionals 
and professionalism in development processes.  They contend that professional 
identity, ethics, and skill sets can have a positive impact on reform and development 
efforts in the region.  Particularly in a country like Zambia, which saw a steep decline 
in professionalism during the early days of independence and Zambianization of the 
civil service (Mulikita, 2002) due to the severe lack of education among Zambian 
nationals.  This indicates a context in which the professionalism logic was either 
nonexistent or at least not very influential and a bureaucracy that was virtually bereft 
of professionalism.  
Within the professionalism logic, special emphasis is placed on education and 
training within an occupational specialty, and a professional ethic is assumed to 
eclipse other motivations when it comes to doing one’s specialized job or delivering a 
professional service.  For example, a professional accountant is assumed to not cheat 
when producing financial data, even when there is an opportunity for financial gain by 
doing so.  Thus, it is thought to add an additional layer of accountability to members 
of public organizations in the Global South, which would help ensure more effective 
delivery of public service.   
According to Freidson (2001), a professionalism logic would be characterized 
by control and coordination from within the profession by fellow professionals, as 
opposed to by organizational executives and management.  Within this logic, 
occupational roles are to be stable and fixed, offering freedom to professionals to 
assume those same roles across different organizations within the same professional 
field.  Formal and abstract knowledge are hallmarks of the professionalism logic, and 
this specialized knowledge is a key source for a sense of occupational identification 
and pride common among professionals (Freidson, 2001; Lamont & Molnár, 2002).  
The profession sets standards for labor market entry with particular training and 
credentials being required to enter the labor market.  A typical career line within a 
professionalism logic would be horizontal, with the ability to easily move across firms 
– thus a professional’s allegiance lies more with the profession than with the 




Dimensions of Institutional Logics  
When studying logics, it is useful to specify the sets of dimensions that 
comprise them, as it enables researchers to analyze how “actors handle different logics 
across identified characteristics” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 61).  According to 
Campbell (2004), there are three considerations for specifying these types of 
institutional dimensions: theoretical perspective, local salience, and the levels to be 
studied (pp. 37-38).  The first consideration is the analyst’s theoretical perspective, 
which broadly organizes a range of dimensions to be examined.  In this study, it is the 
combination of institutional and development theories that have informed the 
specification of dimensions to be studied.  In an institutional logics perspective, each 
institutional logic is a typification that can be broken down into multiple dimensions 
such as values, practices, and principles.  Development theories, among other 
contributions, explain how informal local administrative systems may deviate from or 
even undermine formalized administrative systems or perspectives of the Global 
North.   
The second consideration for specifying institutional dimensions is salience.  
Instead of researchers imposing their own categories on the phenomena they observe, 
they should allow room for input from relevant stakeholders about what is important 
within their own social worlds, which in this research project are the practitioners of 
development in Zambia and organization members in each of the cases.  Beyond 
ensuring that the research will be useful to practitioners, it also ensures the research 
can adequately reflect empirical reality.  “In other words, when selecting the 
dimensions of institutions that we think are important, we should try to ensure they are 
salient for the people who actually live in them” (Campbell, 2004, p. 38).  Through 
research trips to Lusaka and in the early interviews, part of the objective was to assess 
the salience of the dimensions described in the typology of logics.  For example, 
interview respondents were often eager to talk about how employment practices affect 
the ways they view and do their work, noting how it seems unfair if individuals are 
hired or promoted based on family connections or length of service instead of 
performance or academic qualifications.  They were less eager to talk about models of 
governance, sources of legitimacy, or economic systems as categorized within some 
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typologies of logics (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b; Thornton et al., 2012).  This 
process of refining the typology with data coming from interviews also helped 
increase its “ability to render accurately and adequately the lived experiences of those 
studied” and to ensure the theory can “‘fit’ the data and be relevant to the people 
involved” (Layder, 1998, pp. 85-86).   
The third consideration for specifying dimensions of a study relates to levels of 
analysis – be they global, societal, field, organizational, or individual levels 
(Campbell, 2004).  Different levels of analysis influence which dimensions are 
relevant and the types of theoretical insights that will be developed as a result of the 
research.  This study is focused on the organizational level, looking at the dynamics of 
institutional logics in three public accountability organizations in Zambia.  Therefore, 
the dimensions in the typology are more focused on practices, principles, and 
structures that would be experienced within organizations than within broader societal 
groups.  For example, employment practices are more relevant to a study on public 
organizations than to a study of rural villages or ethnic groups.   
 
Specifying the Dimensions in the Typology  
The typology used in this study is a reflection of these processes of narrowing 
the focus, as described above, according to the three considerations and by specifying 
the different dimensions of each ideal type.  It has been developed in an iterative way, 
going back and forth between extant theoretical concepts within the institutional logics 
and development literature and interviews with organization members.  This process 
narrowed down the dimensions from broad and expansive theoretical categories to the 
dimensions that are relevant to stakeholders of development and administration at the 
organizational level in the Sub-Saharan African context of Zambia.  For example, it 
specifies elements related to employment practices, evaluation criteria, and control 
systems, which were particularly relevant to interview respondents, and it also 
specifies elements related to organizational forms, values, and operational mode, 
which are relevant to theory on institutional logics at the organizational level.  Finally, 
it specifies elements related to education, accountability, and authority within the 
organizations, which are relevant to development in the Global South since they relate 
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to developing the capacity of the workforce, ensuring accountability, and the delivery 
of services to members of society.   The typology and its dimensions are illustrated in 
a table on the following page.  
 
Collective identity  
The first dimension in the typology is collective identity, which is central in the 
way organization members experience different institutional logics.  As organizational 
actors identify with different institutionalized groups, they experience a common 
shared status and connection with other group members and are thus “more likely to… 
abide by its norms and prescriptions” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 111, citing March 
and Olsen, 1989).  Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003) argued that the link between the 
institutional logic and the behavior of individuals is bound up in their social identity, 
“the self-image derived by actors when they categorize themselves as members of a 
collectivity or occupants of a role” (p. 797).   This is a phenomenon characterized by 
the oft-quoted questions about how humans take reasoned action (March & Olsen, 
1989, 2010): What kind of situation is this? What kind of person am I?  What does a 
person like me do in a situation like this?   In that way, decisions and behaviors of 
organizational actors link to the institutional logics and their respective categories and 
criteria of boundaries between who is in-group and who is out-group (Lamont & 
Molnár, 2002). 
Within the kinship logic, collective identity is rooted in primordial and informal 
affiliations, such as tribes or ethnic groups.  According to Ekeh (1975), tribalism, 
which only became prominent after colonialism, “arises where there is a conflict… 
regarding the proportionate share of [state] resources” (p. 109).  Within the 
bureaucratic logic, collective identity is rooted in affiliation with the centralized state 
bureaucracy, and organization members see themselves as servants of the state who 
carry out their relegated duties.  Within the development management logic, identity is 
rooted in the shared mission of the organization to serve society.  Within the 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Staff orientation  
Staff orientation relates to how and where the members of the Zambian public 
accountability organizations focus their efforts and their attention (Hydén, 2012, p. 
606) and defines the issues and realms that are important for organization members’ 
consideration (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006a, 2006b; Thornton et al., 2012).  
Within the kinship logic, organization members focus on members of their informal 
networks, which could be dominant patrimonial leaders, and members of their 
immediate and extended families or tribes (Hydén, 2013b).  Within the bureaucratic 
logic, the orientation turns inward to the bureaucratic organization itself in a form of 
“departmental patriotism” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b).  Within the 
development management logic, staff orientation is external toward the public, as it 
relates to the outputs and outcomes of public service delivery and good governance 
discourses (Brinkerhoff & Coston, 1999).  Within the professionalism logic, the 
orientation is toward the professional field itself.  The loyalty of professionals is not 
beholden in service to clients, customers, or managers.  Instead it is beholden to its 
own “professional priesthood” and “transcendent value”, and “it has the right to serve 
it independently when the practical demands of patrons and clients stifle it” (Freidson, 
2001, p. 123).   
 
Core values 
The third characteristic, core values, describes foundational principals for each 
of the four institutional logics.  Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) discussed these as 
“central values”, while Hydén (2012) discussed them as “service rationale” (p. 606).  
These core values, as they are considered in this study, describe the underlying 
motivations for action by the organization members.  In the kinship logic, the core 
values relate to relationships.  “Whom you know is more important than what you 
know”, and sharing one’s wealth with extended family and offering help are the best 
ways to prepare for an uncertain future (Hydén, 2013a, p. 74).  This assumes there is 
no distinction between public and private goods, and that “state resources thus become 
fair game for ethnic groups and extended family to build their own bases of support 
and legitimacy, through patronage, or sometimes, outright graft” (Dia, 1991, p. 11).  In 
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the bureaucratic logic, the core values are “based on a comprehensive and rigid rule-
orientation and a programing of all activities” (Askvik, 1993, p. 158).  Decision-
making is centralized and roles are rationalized in a “definite and stable” division of 
labor (Freidson, 2001, p. 50).  Organization members follow the rules and procedures 
that have been prescribed, and by following them, they ensure that policy is 
implemented in a stable and consistent manner.  In the development management 
logic, the core values relate to results.  Organization members should work efficiently 
and effectively in order to bring results to society with efficiency and effectiveness, 
especially to the vulnerable and disempowered.  In the professionalism logic, the core 
values relate to the reliability and repeatability of professional standards.  Organization 
members follow professional standards by using their abstract knowledge and methods 
and by working according to a professional ethic that remains consistent from one 
organization to the next.   
 
Preferred organizational structure 
Each of the four institutional logics presumes a different structure for 
organizing activity.  Hydén (2012) discussed this dimension as “organizational 
structure” while Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) discussed this as each logic’s 
“model of governance”.  For example, the kinship logic would guide the organization 
toward a patriarchal structure, operating at the discretion of the so-called “big man” of 
the organization (Hydén, 2013a, 2013b) – the leader whose whims, strategies, and 
goals are obsessed over by organization members (Jackall, 2010).  According to the 
bureaucratic logic, the preferred organizational structure is a centralized hierarchy, in 
which relative status and authority scales up through the organization, ending 
ultimately with its top leadership and the state. This includes a dominant 
technostructure, such as cadres of quality control analysts, schedulers, accountants, 
and researchers, whose role is to standardize the work processes of the organization 
(Mintzberg, 1989).  According to the development management logic, the preferred 
organizational structure is fragmented, where work is organized around projects, 
teams, and other ad-hoc bases.  Authority is thus more diffuse throughout the 
managerial echelons.  In the professionalism logic, the preferred organizational 
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structure is a decentralized hierarchy, in which the organization is led by a member of 
the profession (Freidson, 2001) and “hires duly trained specialists – for the operating 
core – then gives them considerable control over their own work” (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 
175).  In this case, standardization in the organization does not arise from cadres of 
technocrats, as with the bureaucratic logic, rather standardization of work arises from 
the common skills and training of the professionals within the organization. 
  
Operational mode  
Each of the four institutional logics would guide the Zambian public 
accountability organizations toward distinct modes of operation (Hydén, 2012, 2013b).  
According to the kinship logic, Zambian public accountability organizations would run 
as the personal fiefdom of the organizational official, as they “are engaged in a search 
for personal power and privilege and little else” (Montgomery, 1987, p. 913).  
According to this image of African civil service, bureaucrats would not be particularly 
interested in development, reforms, or other social programs.  Instead they would try 
to alleviate their own financial hardships and those of their relatives by engaging in 
graft or providing service to those who pay a little extra money, for example.  Within a 
bureaucratic logic, the organizational mode is mechanistic and “rationalized into 
simple tasks” that require minimal in-house training (Mintzberg, 1989).  Within a 
development management logic, the espoused operational mode is flexible, shifting 
modalities in order to meet changing demands from society.  This mode could be 
called “organic” (Hydén, 2013b, p. 930), because it does not rely on standardized 
activities but adapts to its environment (Mintzberg, 1989, pp. 103-104).  In the 
professionalism logic, the mode of operation is based on pigeonholing processes.  In 
pigeonholing, professionals encounter various contingencies, which call for a variety 
of standard programs to be executed.  The role of the professional is to “‘diagnose’ the 
client’s need in terms of one of the contingencies, which indicates which standard 






System of control  
Each of the four ideal types of institutional logics would entail a different 
system of controlling members of the Zambian organizations.  In the kinship logic, the 
system of control is informal and face-to-face, in which an exchange of favors happens 
directly between individuals, away from abstract civil institutions, written contracts, 
rules, or laws.  The norms of reciprocity as well as fear of informal punishment or 
ostracization ensure that favors would be returned in due time (Hydén, 2013a).  In the 
bureaucratic logic, accountability is based on strict rules and controls within the 
hierarchical system, with a chasm between employees and their superiors regarding 
work freedom and relative power (Meyer, Egger-Peitler, Höllerer, & Hammerschmid, 
2014).  Within the development management logic, the system of control lies in 
management’s use of tools such as performance appraisals, strategic planning, and 
employee reviews to motivate employees with rewards or sanctions.  In the 
professionalism logic, the system of control lies within the professional community 
itself – through relationships with fellow professionals, which according to Romzek, 
LeRoux, Johnston, Kempf, and Piatak (2014), “can supersede dynamics and incentives 
associated with bureaucratic, political, or legal accountability” (p. 5).  Additionally, 
professional associations may have the formal power to enforce rules or sanctions on 
their members.   
 
Source of authority  
The dimension, source of authority, relates to the right to exercise power over 
organization members.  Power is a topic of interest in development literature, as it 
relates to “big man rule” and patrimonialism, and it is of interest in organizational 
literature as it relates to organizational operation and change.  According to the kinship 
logic, the “formal authority of the office is emptied in favor of that of the informal, 
invisible one” (Masunungure, 2004, p. 81).  Therefore, workers do not always 
recognize the formal authority of their superiors, unless that authority is reinforced via 
informal relations such as tribe or quasi-political affiliation.  In the bureaucratic logic, 
authority is based on rationality and legitimacy.  According to Freidson (2001), “when 
rational-legal authority organizes work, formal written rules establish the duties of 
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each position, occupation, or job as well as their relationships… establishing clear 
lines of authority leading up to the ultimate executive officer” (p. 49).  In contrast to 
the kinship logic, within the bureaucratic logic, office holders empty themselves of 
their own interests in favor of the interests of the state and its bureaucracy.  In the 
development management logic, authority is vested in management to hold workers to 
account for their performance.  Managers exercise their authority through rewards and 
sanctions in accordance with the measurement of worker performance.  Within the 
professionalism logic, authority is vested in the professionals themselves, which is 
based on the transcendent value of the discipline (Freidson, 2001) and is exercised 
through rewards or sanctions by a professional association or network.   
 
Evaluation criteria 
The characteristic, evaluation criteria, describes how organization members 
measure success.  Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006b) discussed this as an element in 
their typology of logics, as it drew a dividing line between the legalistic-bureaucratic 
logic in which organization members are evaluated by rule following and the 
managerial logic in which they are evaluated by bringing results.  Rao et al. (2003) 
also considered evaluation criteria an important link to logics in organizational life and 
noted, “a system of incentives that rewards actors for conformity to a given logic and 
penalizes actors for violations of behavior” (p, 797).  Within the kinship logic, the 
measure of success is based on gaining status in the community (Dia, 1991; 
Masunungure, 2004).  In this way, African public servants can be expected to share the 
resources of the state with family and community, which in turn elevates their status 
and legitimacy within their community and builds support for whatever the future may 
hold.  Within the bureaucratic logic, organizational work is evaluated according to 
rule-following and the use of proper inputs: following the correct procedures that are 
clearly spelled out for all employees. Within the development management logic, 
organizational work is evaluated according to outputs: delivering results based on 
organizational and individual goals.  Within the professional logic, the criteria for 
evaluating organization members are based on delivering professionally sound work, 
which follows repeatable standards and methods.   
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Employment practices  
Employment practices are particularly salient in the literatures on development 
and on organizations as well as in the contexts of public organizations (Goodrick & 
Reay, 2011; Hydén, 2012, 2013b; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b).  Interview 
respondents were also particularly keen to discuss employment processes since they 
had a major impact on their lives and the lives of the other organization members.  
There were often comparisons of one’s own career path with those of others, and it 
seemed organizational members tried to make sense of the organization and 
management through their decisions related to employment practices, which included 
the hiring of new employees and especially the promotions of existing ones. 
Each of the four ideal logics contains different practices and processes for 
entering into the workforce of the organization and for being promoted within it.  
According to the kinship logic, employment is based on relationships.  For example, if 
someone is seeking employment in an organization, he or she may use community or 
familial connections to attain a position or may seek this position through an exchange 
of favors.  The organizational position would then make that person indebted to the 
individuals who secured that position as a favor.  According to the bureaucratic logic, 
entry to employment happens through a centralized and bureaucratic system such as 
civil service commission, which would apply rules and procedures to ensure that the 
hiring process is fair and equal, without respect to family or other informal 
connections.  Promotions would then be based on seniority, with the employee having 
the longest tenure being first up for open positions.  Within the development 
management logic, entry to employment and promotions are based on one’s ability to 
achieve the results required in a given position.  Within the professionalism logic, 
entry to employment and promotions are based on professional training and 
certifications, such as lawyers passing the bar or doctors being licensed through 
national medical associations.   
 
Relationships among Institutional Logics: Agency and Change  
The previous sections focused on how institutional logics are social structures 
that “shape individual preferences and organizational interests” (Friedland & Alford, 
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1991, p. 232) and how they are conceptualized as ideal types that have internally 
consistent vertical relationships between the different elements that comprise them 
(Johansen & Waldorff, 2017).  Those vertical relationships within the different logics 
are “modular” and “nearly decomposable”, according to Thornton et al. (2012, p. 60), 
which means an institutional context might be consistent with different elements from 
multiple logics at the same time.  This brings the discussion back to one of the central 
arguments of Friedland and Alford (1991), that society’s “institutions are potentially 
contradictory and hence make multiple logics available to individuals and 
organizations.  Individuals and organizations transform the institutional relations of 
society by exploiting these contradictions” (p. 232). 
To examine these processes, analyses then focus on the horizontal relationships 
between different logics in addition to the vertical relationships between the different 
elements within each logic.  It is by focusing on the horizontal relationships between 
multiple logics, according to Johansen and Waldorff (2017, p. 63), that the 
institutional logics perspective provides the capacity to explain processes of change 
and human agency.  Through this perspective, “the analyses of organizations become 
more nuanced, since they capture how actors drawing on different logics work 
together in the same organization” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 64) and how the 
elements from different logics are available to be combined, which Friedland and 
Alford (1991) have argued has the potential to transform social relations. 
 
Contexts as Competing Logics 
Most research on institutional logics, such as the studies by Meyer and 
Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b) and Battilana and Dorado (2010), have theorized 
institutional contexts as being conflictual and comprised of institutional logics that 
exist in competitive types of relationships with each other.  Analysis in these studies 
focuses on whether or not an alternative logic replaced a formerly dominant logic or 
formed some type of hybrid logic (see also Andrews, 2013, p. 51).  One of the main 
contributions of these studies, “has been to explicate how organizations find 
themselves in paradoxical situations where irreconcilable logics force them to choose 
and/or develop practices related to one logic or the other” (Johansen & Waldorff, 
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2017, p. 63).  This brings the issue of agency to the foreground, as these contexts are 
seen as changing as a result of social interactions over time.   
In one such study of competing logics, Reay and Hinings (2005) examined 
ways in which an alternative institutional logic was promulgated within the context of 
healthcare in Alberta, Canada.  The institutional context had previously been 
characterized by a logic of medical professionalism, in which the quality of service 
was controlled by the physicians and the doctor-patient relationship was central to care 
practices.  Then, through a series of reforms and new laws that were proposed by the 
government, a new competitive logic of business-like healthcare was promulgated into 
this context.  According to the new logic, the quality of service would be determined 
by market forces and the relationships between patients would then be seen as 
consumer transactions. 
A significant contribution from the study by Reay and Hinings (2005) was 
showing how an alternative logic was promulgated into an institutional context, which 
then, as a result of social negotiations, either culminated in a rejection of the 
alternative logic, the acceptance of it, or in an uneasy truce between the two competing 
logics.  The study examined these processes in a chronological narrative, which 
allowed analyses to follow the processes of promulgating alternative logics and the 
social negotiations occurring over time.  This began with a period of relative stability, 
in which the medical-professionalism logic was dominant and went largely 
unquestioned.  It followed with a period of promulgating the change, in which the 
business-like healthcare logic was introduced through a series of structural and policy 
changes.  The narrative continued with a period of resistance, acquiescence or 
acceptance of the change by the key actors, during which time the key actors were 
involved in social negotiations over whether or not to accept or reject the proposed 
changes.  The narrative ended with an uneasy truce, in which some actors accepted the 
changes and other actors rejected them but reluctantly acquiesced.   
The study by Reay and Hinings (2005) demonstrated how alternative logics 
were promulgated through “purposeful actions” and how actors within the context 
reacted for or against those promulgations (Ibid, p. 375).  The institutional context was 
described in the study “as a battlefield, where campaigns are waged using all available 
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sources of power.  Actors who resist imposed change respond based on their ability to 
do so, and may essentially give up the battle, but not the long-term fight” (Ibid, p. 
375).  In that way, the study by Reay and Hinings was clearly focused on competing 
relationships between logics, in which strengthening one logic implied the relative 
weakening of the other logic within the context of healthcare provision in Alberta.   
 
Constellations of Logics 
More recently, some studies of institutional logics have begun to move away 
from the battlefield metaphor and have started to focus on how relationships between 
logics can be complimentary as well as being competitive.  In this way, institutional 
contexts can be seen metaphorically as “constellations of logics” (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011; Waldorff et al., 2013).  Goodrick and Reay (2011) first used this astronomical 
metaphor to describe ways that different societal logics combine, since “constellation 
means a configuration or position of “stars” [or potentially other elements] in regard to 
one another (p. 399).  By seeing organizations as comprised of a constellations of 
logics or a “mix of multiple logics” (Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 448), this acknowledges 
that there are multiple logics at play within the organizational context, each with 
varying degrees of dominance or influence and with differing effects on how work is 
done.  This makes it possible to consider how some logics are more dominant than 
others, how some may compliment or compete with one another, and how these 
constellations can shift at times, leading to new constellations of logics.  This 
contributes to a more useful understanding of the contexts of the public organizations 
in Zambia and the Global South that are often comprised of multiple logics, and as 
will be shown, these relationships can be competitive and they can also be 
complimentary.     
Waldorff et al. (2013) took these notions of competing and complimentary 
logics and constellations of logics further with their study of healthcare policies and 
practices in Canada and Denmark.  They discussed how different types of relationships 
between logics can either constrain or enable action.  According to their analysis, 
action within organizations could be impacted in various ways depending on the 
constellation of logics guiding them, and in particular, through the ways that the 
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different logics relate to one another in the field.  The study categorized how the 
different types of arrangements of institutional logics in a constellation affected action, 
and it showed how the different constellations affected the design and implementation 
of healthcare policies and changed the way work was done and structured. 
For example, according to Waldorff et al. (2013), action can be constrained by 
the ongoing presence of a dominant influential logic within the constellation.  Similar 
to findings in other studies on institutional logics, they discussed how, when there is a 
large number of actors within a social context who hold the values and beliefs of a 
particular institutional logic, “change is constrained because only alternatives that 
respect the principles underlying the logic are possible” (Ibid, p. 121).  In those 
situations, alternative values and courses of action are not readily recognized by the 
actors, as they seem inappropriate, irrelevant, or even impossible.  Action can be 
enabled, however, through other types of relationships between logics.  For example, 
if there is a competitive logic that is viable and can be strengthened to become more 
influential within the constellation of logics, this can open up new alternatives for 
action according to the competitive logic.  Relationships between competitive logics 
can also be segmented when actors who are guided by different logics are separated 
from one another either geographically or by organizational division.  This allows 
them to act according to the values and principles of their competitive logics in their 
own space without a conflict occurring between their actions and the actions of others.  
Finally, action can also be enabled through facilitative logics, in which the actions 
based on one logic strengthens or reinforces another logic (Ibid, pp. 121-124).   
 
How Contexts Change 
In addition to explaining how individuals and organizations manage 
institutional contexts comprised of multiple logics, extant literature also provides 
concepts and mechanisms that can explain how change can occur within these 
contexts.  The constellations of institutional logics that guide organizational action are 
either reproduced or are changed by the individuals and organizations that are 
embedded within them (Thornton et al., 2012).  It is useful to look at these processes 
through a critical realist perspective (Archer, 1995, 2010; Porpora, 2013), which 
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indicates that at a given point of time, the constellations of institutional logics pre-exist 
the actions of agents, who in turn recreate or alter the constellations of logics through 
their actions.  Thus, human agency is central when it comes to these processes of 
change and reproduction.  According to Thornton and Ocasio (2008), these social 
contexts can be altered through “three mechanisms of change”: “institutional 
entrepreneurship”, “structural overlap”, and “rupture[s]” of unique and transformative 
events (pp. 115-117; see also Thornton et al., 2012).  These three concepts are 
described in more detail below as well as an additional concept of decoupling, and 
they are central in the analyses of the three cases in this study and provide a 
conceptual framework for explaining change processes.  
 
Institutional entrepreneurship 
A central concept for understanding change among institutional logics, 
according to Thornton and Ocasio (2008), is institutional entrepreneurship.  This is a 
process that revolves around resource-rich actors who “create new and modify old 
institutions” (Ibid, p. 115).  Institutional entrepreneurship has been defined as:  
[T]he ‘activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
transform existing ones’ (citing Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004, p. 657); 
while institutional entrepreneurs are those actors to whom the responsibility for 
new or changed institutions is attributed (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p. 198).  
Institutional entrepreneurship is often understood as a bricolage process in which 
institutional entrepreneurs import cultural symbols and practices from one institutional 
logic and combine them with another institutional logic, which leads to change in the 
constellation of logics (Højgaard Christiansen & Lounsbury, 2013; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008).  Institutional entrepreneurs bring about these changes through 
rhetorical strategies in which institutional vocabularies are used to affirm a new 
institutional logic, by positioning the institutionalization project in terms of existing 
categories and schema, and by drawing upon the discourses available in other logics 
(Hardy & Maguire, 2008).   
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Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum (2009) contend that institutional entrepreneurs 
are the central actors involved in driving divergent change, even if those changes fail 
to materialize.  Entrepreneurs drive divergent change as they engage in activities that 
dislodge principles of the formerly dominant institutional logics and enable the 
principles of alternative logics.  To do this, institutional entrepreneurs create and cast a 
compelling vision for change, they motivate organization members to follow that 
vision, and they mobilize resources and allies necessary for implementing the changes.  
Battilana et al. (2009) also noted the importance of social location in these processes.  
This is because institutional entrepreneurship is only theoretically possible if agents 
are capable of breaking from the norms, values, and rules of the institutional logics in 
which they are embedded while also having the resources and authority to make 
divergent change happen.    
It is on that point in which theory on institutional entrepreneurship is often 
criticized for “taking agency to far” (Cardinale, 2018, p. 132), and being a convenient 
deus ex machina explanation for change (Delmestri, 2006).  As Andrews (2013) 
argued, it is “questionable” that “a ‘supermuscular’ entrepreneur” can reflexively 
“break with dominant institutional logics and institutionalize alternative rules, 
practices, or logics” (p. 94) because of the paradox of embedded agency.  For that 
reason, Andrews argued that “multi-agent leadership fosters change, not solitary 
leaders” (p. 96).  This emphasizes the importance of considering the implications of 
structural effects on agency, that the institutional logics dominant within an 
organizational context will likely have a hand in shaping the motivations, values, and 
aspirations of the actors embedded within them.   
 
Structural overlap 
It is along those lines of structural effects on agency, that Thornton and Ocasio 
(2008) argue for another core mechanism of change among institutional logics.  They 
argue that change among logics can happen through “structural overlaps”, which occur 
when one organizational structure and the roles within it crosses boundaries with 
another organizational structure (p. 116).  This could happen through organizational 
partnerships, mergers, collaborations, or other means of interorganizational relations.  
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Through these means, structural overlaps can create “contradictions in organizations 
and organizational fields, creating entrepreneurial opportunities for institutional 
change”, which reduce the “constraints and embeddedness of actors and enables 
central actors to become institutional entrepreneurs” since they come into contact with 
new and conflicting logics and ideas (Ibid, p. 116).    
Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) concept of structural overlap returns the 
theoretical discussions to the conditioning effects of structure on organizational actors 
and how structure shapes organizational and individual behavior.  Within institutional 
theory, this has been seen as processes of “diffusion”, in which “organizational 
strategies and structures” are reproduced via isomorphic processes and pressures from 
organizational fields (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 157).  Alternatively, this has also 
been seen as more negotiated processes of “translation” of organizational ideas and of 
imitating the identities, values, and standards associated with particular 
institutionalized groups (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017).  In these 
ways, social structures are seen as enabling change by opening up a limited set of 
possible courses of action by orienting organizations and individuals toward certain 
possibilities and away from others (Cardinale, 2018). 
 
Decoupling 
In spite of these institutional pressures to adopt procedures and structures from 
the external environment, organizations often only implement them ceremonially and 
decouple them away from their core operations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Decoupling 
is a theoretical concept that has long been used in institutional theory to explain the 
“gap between policy and practice”, which “includes policies adopted purely as 
ceremonial window dressing or implemented, evaluated, and monitored so weakly that 
they do little to alter daily work routines” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 7).  Therefore, 
decoupling can explain why some change does not occur, and in particular, it can 
explain why change may occur on the surface, while in reality, the organizational 





Significant historical events  
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) argued for one final mechanism of change among 
institutional logics, that change can happen through dramatic historical events that 
bring “changes in cultural schemas, shifts of resources, and the emergence of new 
sources of power” (p. 116).  It is because these events are able to dislocate the way 
societies interpret the meanings of their cultural and social symbols and structures, 
which in turn can lead to new interpretations that transform societal relations.  Sewell 
(1996) has called these “historical events”, but he noted that they are more than mere 
occurrences in a particular point in time.  They begin with ruptures to the status quo 
that cascade to other ruptures that eventually transform social structures and practices.  
This happens in clusters of intense bursts – something Sewell (1996) described as the 
“lumpiness” of historical temporality (p. 843).  According to Thornton and Ocasio 
(2008), these types of dramatic events can “erode the dominance of the incumbent 
logic” (p. 116), which presents an opportunity for change to occur, or they can actually 
“reinforce” the dominant logic (Ibid, p. 116), which can then present a barrier to 




This chapter has outlined the theoretical approach and conceptual framework of 
this study, which uses the institutional logics perspective for understanding 
administrative contexts in the Global South.  It presented the institutional logics 
perspective as a unique approach to research and placed it within its own historical 
research context within broader institutional theory.  It demonstrated the ambition of 
the institutional logics perspective to find middle ground between approaches that 
emphasize the rational choices of actors and approaches that emphasize the structural 
primacy of institutions.  It presented a conceptual framework to show how institutional 
logics comprise organizational contexts that shape the behavior of individuals and 
organizations as well as how those individuals and organizations also have a hand in 
shaping their organizational contexts through human action.   
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The chapter also presented a review of relevant literature that applies the 
institutional logics perspective in a variety of cases as well as other research from the 
fields of development and organization theory, which together contribute to the 
development of this study’s typology.  The typology, which was constructed 
iteratively between extant literature and incoming research data, provides a way of 
categorizing organizational and individual behavior within the organizations in this 
study.  The following chapter will present the methodological approach used for 
analyzing organizational behavior and change within the three public accountability 







This chapter presents the strategies, methods, and sources of data used to 
answer the study’s three research questions and to contribute to our understanding of 
the relationships between multiple institutional logics, how they change, and how they 
impact action.  The study’s three research questions are:  
1. What types of institutional logics provide sets of organizing principles, 
practices, and social structures that constitute the contexts of public 
accountability organizations in Zambia? 
2. How do these institutional logics relate to one another within the three 
organizational contexts, and how does that affect organizational action? 
3. How does change within these contexts occur? 
  
Addressing these research questions implies dealing with socially complex 
phenomena since theory on institutional logics assumes there will be multiple logics at 
play within organizations, that the actions of organization members are shaped by 
more than one logic at a given time, and that these logics can come from a variety of 
sources.  Institutional logics research is also deeply contextual, as it focuses on how 
different logics are “translated by members for their time and place” as well as how 
“the patterns and interplay among symbols, beliefs, norms, and practices” construct a 
constellation of logics that can guide organizational and individual actions (Reay & 
Jones, 2016, p. 441).  This also assumes that individual and organizational actions are 
both constrained and enabled through embedded agency.  This notion of embedded 
agency is seen as a paradox within institutional theory (Lok & Willmott, in press), and 
it implies that human action is shaped and influenced through institutional logics 
within an organizational context, while at the same time, those logics are enacted and 
constituted through human action.  Therefore, the study’s research methods should 
adequately address the issues of social structure as well as human agency as they relate 
to institutional logics and change.   
This chapter describes how the study uses multiple cases and qualitative 
methods to answer the research questions.  It describes the case study approach, why 
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this approach is suitable for this study, and how the cases and the data address the 
research questions.  It goes on to describe the analytic strategies used to answer the 
questions and to further develop theories on institutional logics and development as 
well as describing the data sources and data collection in detail and why they were 
chosen to answer the research questions.  Finally, this chapter address the quality of 
this study on the basis four key areas: internal validity, external validity, construct 
validity, and reliability (Yin, 2014).   
 
Case Study Design 
This study uses three different cases to address the research questions and to 
develop theory on institutional logics within public organizations in Zambia and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  The three cases are three public accountability organizations in 
Zambia: the Office of Auditor General, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the 
ombudsman office.  Each of the three cases is comprised of dynamic institutional 
contexts with multiple institutional logics that exist in relationship to one another with 
varying effects.  These are complex settings in which “the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident”, which Yin (2014, p. 16) 
contends is a reason for conducting case studies, since they provide the ability to go in 
depth to examine phenomena while also considering contextual implications and 
processes over time.  This allows, for example, the research to focus on agentive 
action and change processes, while at the same time considering the structural and 
contextual implications that can enable or constrain those actions – i.e., the paradox of 
embedded agency.    
Case studies such as the three in this study are also suitable for answering 
“‘how’ and ‘why’ questions”, according to Yin (2014, p. 10), because of the space 
they allow to examine processes as they unfolded, “rather than mere frequencies or 
incidence” (Ibid, p. 10).  This is particularly useful as each of the three cases examine 
processes that unfolded over time and are presented in chronological order, following 
the approach from Reay and Hinings (2005) that was presented in Chapter Two.  This 
was useful for examining the processes through which alternative logics were 
promulgated within the contexts, how actors responded to those alternatives, and how 
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change may have occurred as a result, while at the same time considering that the 
agency of the actors was being shaped by the different institutional logics that were 
dominant within the context.     
Each of the three cases in this study are focused on public organizations 
involved in safeguarding public resources and the rights of Zambian citizens and 
residents.  Even though they have different mandates and institutional arrangements, 
they are all semi-autonomous, falling in-between centralized public organizations and 
autonomous entities.  As public accountability organizations, they have recently begun 
receiving increasing attention and funding from the international donor and 
development communities (Hydén, 2013b), which can have their own ideas and 
agendas about how these organizations should be run.  The political environment in 
which the three organizations operate can, at times, be hostile because of these 
organizations’ roles in holding government officials accountable for their actions.  
Therefore, there are often political power struggles taking place within and around  
these organizations (Kuris, 2015) that are related to which institutional logics will 
guide them.  Finally, each of the three accountability organizations has recently gone 
through, or is currently going through, processes of reform or development.  These 
processes can also introduce or strengthen alternative institutional logics, leading to 
greater complexity in institutional environments.   
Therefore, the three cases can be seen as “exemplary” cases, in the sense that 
they represent what could be considered typical or illustrative of public accountability 
organizations in Zambia and the region, in which multiple logics interact and guide 
social behavior (Ragin, 1992, p. 2).  The three cases provide rich empirical settings for 
analyses of the enactment of institutional logics within these types of organizations, 
the types of relationships that exist between the institutional logics and their impacts, 
and the way change can take place among them.  In that way, the three cases “come 
wrapped in theories”, as contended by Walton (1992), because they “embody causal 
processes operating in microcosm” that lead to generalizable findings based upon 
those theories (p. 122).  Thus, the multiple cases in this study are not used as statistical 
samples of a broader population of cases, but rather as a means of analytic 
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generalization and theoretical development at a higher conceptual level than the 
empirical cases themselves (Yin, 2014, pp. 21, 41, 68).   
The cases were used to develop theory through processes of explanation 
building, refining theoretical explanations about how the different logics relate to one 
another in an organizational context and about how those contexts can change.  In this 
way, the study contributes by refining and developing theory on institutional logics.  
According to Yin (2014), “explanation building occurs in a narrative form” to answer 
“‘how and ‘why’ something happened” (p. 147).  The case narratives in this study are 
“analytical” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998, p. 10), as they are 
based on the theoretical principles guiding the study, and in that way, they are “tightly 
constrained” and “disciplined” by the theory and do not get bogged down in empirical 
details not relevant to the theory (Ibid, p. 16).  They consider both structural and 
agentive explanations about change processes, which offer rival explanations about 
why change takes place (Bates et al., 1998; Yin, 2014).   
The three case narratives are each presented in chronological order, placing the 
organizations within their historical context and capturing the dynamic processes that 
surrounded the introduction of alternative logics within the context.  The cases begin 
with a brief history of the organization in Zambia and an overview of the general type 
of the organization on an international level, which provides the broader context of 
which the organization is a part.  It then follows with a description of a period of 
stability within the organization in which different logics had been enacted within the 
organization to varying degrees and with various effects.  Then, the cases go on to 
describe dramatic events or “ruptures” that happened within and around the 
organization that had the protentional to durably transform the organization’s previous 
structures and practices (Sewell, 1996, p. 843).  These were the moments in which 
alternative logics were introduced or strengthened within the organization, which 
could then lead to change.  These processes of strengthening or introducing alternative 
logics are referred to in the cases as “promulgating” the logics, following Reay and 
Hinings (2005).  Then, each case follows with discussions and analyses of the effects 
of those promulgations of alternative logics and the current relationships among the 
logics within the organizations. 
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Theory in this research project is seen as being adaptive, according to the 
adaptive research approach proposed by Layder (1998).  In that way, prior theoretical 
concepts impose order on the incoming empirical data being collected, while at the 
same time, the analyses of empirical data feeds back into the elaboration of a 
conceptual framework.  Extant theoretical materials or emerging theory from the data 
can then be added to the initial conceptual framework, providing it with more 
explanatory power in light of the incoming data.  For example, this can be seen in the 
initial typology in the study, as shown in Appendix D.  The initial typology imposed 
order on the data being collected in the earliest phase of the field research in 2014.  
However, after field research began, it became evident that a broader typology could 
hold more explanatory power, so the model was adjusted to accommodate the 
incoming empirical data.  Another example is found in the change mechanisms that 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) had elaborated, such as “institutional entrepreneurship” 
and “structural overlap”, which could explain some of the processes within the 
organizations.  However, with more incoming empirical data, it became clear that 
additional concepts, such as decoupling, might offer additional explanatory power.  
From Layder’s (1998) perspective then, “the interview data themselves fed back into 
the elaboration of the model and provided clues about the social processes that 
underpinned it, clues that could not be gleaned from, or suggested by, the initial model 
itself” (p. 153).   
As a result of these reflexive feedback loops within the research process, the 
additional concepts were added to explain these social processes.  For example, as 
described in Chapter Two, the professionalism and development management logics 
were added because they provided relevant categories and criteria for understanding 
the lived experiences of organization members and different types of organizational 
practices.  Also, adding behavioral concepts (Layder, 1998), such as “decoupling” 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and the “translation of 
organizational ideas” (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, Czarniawska & 
Joerges, 1996), were helpful for explaining the actions of organization members as 
they navigated their complex organizational contexts and enacted different 
institutional logics.  These reflexive adaptations of theoretical models and concepts 
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began to take shape and lead to what Layder (1998) calls “the newly emergent 
adaptive theory”, which can then “act as an ordering device, suggesting or imposing 
interpretive schemas and conceptual frames on incoming data in a manner similar to 
the extant theory” (p. 170).  In essence, the iteration between incoming data and 
theory, elaborated and developed the conceptual framework and typological model, 
which could then be used to explain the empirical phenomena of the three cases.   
 
Qualitative Methods, Data Sources, and Analytic Strategies  
In this study, the four ideal types of institutional logics, the kinship, 
bureaucratic, development-management, and professionalism logics, were used to 
make comparisons with the incoming empirical data from the three Zambian public 
accountability organizations.  Since these institutional logics are “contextual and 
translated by members for their time and place”, the methods used to study them had 
to be able to capture the cultural and symbolic meanings the actors draw on and the 
practices and social structures they embody (Reay and Jones, 2016, p. 441).  Reay and 
Jones (2016) argue that qualitative methods “hold great promise for studying 
institutional logics” (p. 441), an argument they expand upon further in the following 
statement:   
Logics, which are revealed through language, practices, and manifested in 
symbols and materials, are naturally suited to qualitative data and methods that 
demand immersion in the phenomenon. When studying logics, researchers must 
ground their insights and abstractions to the context through quotes, 
observations, and thick description (Ibid, p. 442).   
As a way of providing these quotes, observations, and descriptions, the three case 
studies captured data coming from interviews with organization members and other 
key stakeholders, from observations of work environments and practices, and from 
documentary sources.    
The main source of data came from semi-structured interviews, since they 
allowed actors within the three organizations to characterize their life experiences, 
their shared systems of meanings, their sense of identification, and their ways of 
viewing social reality.  As interview respondents described their organizations, the 
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work they do, how they relate to each other and their environments, and the unspoken 
rules of the organization, they provided rich descriptions of elements that were 
consistent with the different institutional logics.  Therefore, evidence of the different 
institutional logics comes from the narratives and vocabularies used by interview 
respondents, since “at the level of the discursive field… the vocabularies and accounts 
used give evidence of the prevalence of the different logics and manifest the specific 
local versions or translations of the global trends” (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006b, 
pp. 100; see also Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996).   
In addition to providing evidence for the existence of the different institutional 
logics, interview respondents also provided evidence for how the logics may have 
changed over time.  They did this, again, by providing descriptions of their 
organization, their work practices, and the unspoken rules of the organization from 
within different time periods.  For example, in the Office of Auditor General, 
interview respondents and extant literature pointed to significant changes that 
happened in 2003.  So, it was possible to ask the interview respondents who had 
worked in the organization during that time about those changes and about how their 
organization, their work practices, and the formal and informal rules of the 
organization were before that time period and how they were after it.  By describing 
ways that the organization previously operated and comparing them to the ways it 
operates now, it was possible to compare those empirical variations with the typology 
of logics and consider ways in which there had been changes within the constellations 
of logics guiding the organization.  This then made it possible to pose further questions 
about how and why those changes may have taken place.   
Interview data are particularly well suited to address issues of how social 
structures constrain and enable change and how human agency interacts with those 
structures.  As Rathbun (2008) argued, “interviewing… is often the best-suited method 
for gathering data on those characteristics of the social world that differentiate it from 
the natural world: human beings’ effort to intentionally transform their environment on 
the basis of cognition, reflection, and learning” (p. 8).  Interviews are also useful for 
capturing the motivations, preferences, desires, and beliefs among organization 
members and other key stakeholders and why they may act in certain ways, which are 
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aspects consistent with the different institutional logics.  Furthermore, interviews also 
provide useful insights about structural processes and causes as well.  According to 
Rathbun (2008), “Interviewing can help establish whether a political actor felt under 
pressure from forces beyond his or her control, and what those forces were, 
particularly when there are multiple independent variables in the theoretical mix” (p. 
8).  In that way, conducting interviews with key organization members was useful for 
explaining the structural forces important within these organizational contexts as well 
as the motivations and preferences of the individuals involved in change processes.   
Other sources of qualitative data were the observations of meetings, work 
environments, and work processes, which also helped illuminate the social reality in 
the three organizations as well as to corroborate the interview data (Yin, 2014).  In 
addition to these observations, photographs of the physical spaces within one the 
organizations were used as a way to record the physical instantiations of the 
institutional logics, the ways in which the unseen aspects of the institutional logics are 
“transmuted into the observable objects” (Friedland, 2013, p. 37).  Furthermore, 
documents such as internal organizational communications, employee guides, annual 
reports, newsletters, and strategic plans have also added to the picture of the espoused 
norms and values that have been circulating with the organizations.     
Using the different qualitative data sources listed above, the study has 
developed sets of analytic narratives that describe the different systems of meanings, 
practices and structures in use within the organizations that can then be compared to 
the four ideal types of logics.  Following Goodrick and Reay (2011), who examined 
the constellations of logics related to the practices of pharmacists, this study examines 
the constellations of logics related to practices in the three Zambian public 
accountability organizations as well as meaning systems and structural elements.  The 
similarity and consistency between the analytic narrative and the ideal type reflects the 
relative influence of the logic within the constellation.  Dissimilarity and inconsistency 
between the analytic narrative and the ideal type reflects the relative weakness of the 
logic within the constellation.  These similarities and dissimilarities are represented 
and explained in the empirical chapters through thick descriptions with quotes from 
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interview respondents and document sources as well as notations from observations 
and photographic evidence.   
 
Data Collection 
The interview data for this study were collected on three research trips to 
Lusaka, Zambia.  The first trip was for two weeks in November 2014, and the second 
was for ten days in September and October of 2015, in which members of the Office 
of Auditor General and other major stakeholders related to the Office of Auditor 
General were interviewed.  The third research trip was in April and May of 2016 and 
lasted three weeks, which also expanded the study to include the two additional cases: 
the Anti-Corruption Commission and the ombudsman office.  Interview respondents 
were selected from each of the three organizations based on their positions, expertise, 
and knowledge of the organization.  Interview respondents were added until a useful 
analytic narrative of the cases could be developed to address the theories on 
institutional logics, interrelationships between the logics, and change.   
All of the interview respondents were offered anonymity for their protection 
since some of the information they provided deals directly with acts of corruption by 
individuals who exercise political and organizational power.  Therefore, the interviews 
remain confidential, since revealing the identities of interview respondents could 
possibly lead to their harm or other forms of recrimination against them.  The few 
exceptions to this anonymity are some of the high-ranking officials who freely 
volunteered to speak on the record as indicated in the tables below.  For example, the 
Auditor General offered to speak without the protection of anonymity because the 
legal framework of the Zambian constitution protects her from recrimination.  
Furthermore, revealing the identity of these central actors who had given permission to 
do so strengthens the validity and reliability of the study, since the responses from 
these actors are particularly well-suited to address issues of change, the political 
contestations surrounding these changes, and the challenges or pressures they may 
have experienced along the way (Rathbun, 2008). 




Interview respondents: Office of Auditor General  
Auditor General Anna Chifungula  1 
Deputies Auditor General 2 
Department Directors 5 
Managers/principal auditors/auditors/other officers 10 
Former Vice President/Current Leader of Opposition Party, Nevers Mumba  1 
Members of Parliament, also sitting on the Public Accounts Committee  3 
Executive Director of Transparency International Zambia  1 
Local expert on programs at Auditor’s Office from Norwegian Embassy  1 
Norwegian Ambassador to Zambia 1 
Total respondents related to OAGZ 25 
 
Interview respondents: Anti-Corruption Commission   
Commissioner Steven Moyo (1 of the 5 commissioners in 2016) 1 
Department Directors  3 
Chief, Senior, and other Officers 22 
Executive Director Transparency International Zambia 1 
Total respondents related to Anti-Corruption Commission 27 
 
Interview respondents: The Zambian ombudsman organization  
The Zambian Ombudsman: Public Protector Caroline Sokoni 1 
Executive Administrator 1 
Investigators 2 
Administrative officers and other officers 3 
Executive Officer from Danish Ombudsman Office 1 
Total respondents related the Zambian ombudsman organization 8 
 
The interviews were transcribed and entered into a research database, and 
segments of the interviews were coded for later retrieval and analysis.  As interview 
respondents described their organization, the work they do, how they relate to each 
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other and to their environment, and the unspoken rules of the organization, they 
provided descriptions that were consistent with the different institutional logics.  As 
they described their experiences, their frustrations, and their hopes for the 
organization, it denoted the salient systems of meanings associated with the 
organization.  These systems of meanings comprise the intangible aspects of the 
institutional logics, such as values and sense of identity, as opposed to the more 
tangible aspects of the institutional logics, such as sources of control and authority or 
employment practices.  However, both aspects are important for understanding the 
institutional logics in the three organizations.  As Zilber (2008) noted, “meaning and 
the material are intertwined, constituting each other.  Meanings are encoded in 
structures and practices, while structures and practices express and affect those 
meanings” (p. 152).  In spite of their mutual constitution, is still useful to separate 
meaning and the material for analyses, particularly to see how one might affect the 
other.   
It was important that the interviews were not rigidly structured, but instead 
allowed respondents the conversational space to describe the meanings, practices, and 
rules that were salient to them – not attempting to force emerging data into preexisting 
ideas or types (Campbell, 2004).  This process guided the development of the typology 
toward a direction that makes the types more characteristic of what the social worlds 
of these organizations are like rather than forcing the concepts and types from 
literature focused on the Global North onto organizations within Zambia (Johansen & 
Waldorff, 2017).  These interviews, particularly those of well-informed or expert 
respondents also indicated the histories of the organizations and how the constellation 
of logics may have changed over time or how they were maintained.  Respondents 
who had been connected to the organization for a long period of time were asked to 
describe the organization now as compared to the way it was at an earlier time period.  
They gave an account of those changes and marked the major milestones along the 
way, which were useful in describing and discussing processes of change among the 
institutional logics guiding organizational and individual action.    
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, observations were also important 
sources of data.  Observations were made about how organization members interacted 
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with each other and the public, how they did their work, and even how their physical 
workspaces were designed and configured.  These observations were useful in 
corroborating and adding to interview respondents’ descriptions of the work practices 
of the organization – the ways that meaningful work and related tasks are done.  More 
significantly, they made it possible to examine the materiality of the institutional 
logics and how material structures constitute the logics and can enable change.  It was 
also possible to take photographs of the different work locations for the organizations.  
These images recorded physical aspects of institutional logics that are the 
transmutations of the ideational – their discursive renewals of commitment (Friedland, 
2013) and the expressions and affectations of their meanings.  In one case, these 
photographs were especially useful for later analysis and are included in Chapter 
Seven, which is based on the Zambian ombudsman office. 
The three trips to Lusaka between 2014 and 2016 also provided an opportunity 
to collect documentary evidence from the three organizations.  Documents such as 
strategic plans, restructuring plans, and other internal communications described 
espoused values and norms and help provide a fuller picture of the institutional logics 
in the organizations.  It was often a challenge to retrieve these documents since 
organization members did not usually have digital copies of them, and they did not 
know where to access printed versions.  Sometimes, it was not clear whether they 
wanted to give access to the files or not, which could have been because they were 
afraid of doing so without permission from their organizational superiors.    
In addition to forming an analytic narrative of the three organizations, the 
combination of these multiple sources of data provided a “convergence of evidence” 
that helped ensure that events, descriptions, and narratives were “rendered accurately” 
(Yin, 2014, pp. 121-122).  In this way, documentary evidence, as well as evidence 
from other interview respondents could confirm and clarify statements from other 
interview respondents.  When interview respondents had contradictory interpretations, 
the multiple interviews and sources could reflect “multiple realities”, which are 





Presenting Data and Analysis in the Three Organizations   
In November of 2017, a fourth and final research trip to Lusaka was made and 
lasted two weeks.  The purpose of this trip was not to collect data, but rather to present 
preliminary research findings to stakeholders from the three organizations for them to 
review and to give their feedback.  Those who attended the review meetings were 
among the study’s interview respondents, as well as additional members of the 
organizations who were in a position to respond to the research findings.  Participants 
were also given an opportunity to review preliminary case reports that were provided 
to the office and specific to their organization.  Each review meeting lasted 
approximately one hour, in which the first 20-30 minutes was a research presentation 
of the typology of logics, applying the typology within the organization, analyses of 
the how the logics were seen in the organization and their impacts on organizational 
action, and what change among those logics had taken place within the organization, if 
any.  The last 30-40 minutes of the meeting was an opportunity for feedback from 
those attending the presentation.   
The participants seemed eager to discuss the case reports and their own 
experiences within their organization.  They offered useful feedback in the form of 
corrections about dates, organizational processes, and historical events.  There was 
some confusion and discussion in one of the presentation meetings about what the 
word “institutional” means in “institutional logics”, thinking that an institutional logic 
actually meant the single governing logic for the entire organization.  This confusion is 
understandable because these three organizations are often called “institutions” in 
popular discourse (i.e., an “audit institution”, or an “ombudsman institution”).  
Overall, the feedback received in the review meetings validated research findings and 
the adequacy of the typology of logics to reflect their lived experiences, as respondents 
indicated that they could see them as a valid representation of the different practices 
and meanings systems they encountered within their organizations.  Furthermore, 
participants also noted that the narratives from the case reports gave an accurate 
historical representation of their organizations, and if any of the details diverged, they 
provided correct information.      
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After each review meeting, there was also ample time for informal 
conversations with individuals from the organization to get their feedback on the 
research presentation on-on-one or in smaller groups.  This was done on purpose, just 
in case some participants may have felt intimidated to speak up during the presentation 
meetings.  The informal feedback after the review meetings converged with the formal 
feedback in the meetings, thought it was more relaxed and expressive.  One exception 
was in the Anti-Corruption Commission in which the informal feedback after the 
meeting went deeper into issues of the agency’s lack of independence and how the 
political leaders were undermining its autonomy and independence on a regular basis, 
which participants did not discuss during the meeting.  This was understandable, in 
their politicized context, that organizational members would not want to speak freely 
about powerful political leaders in a negative way and that they would feel freer to do 
so informally after the presentation meeting was over.    
In addition to the final review trip to the three organizations in Zambia, a trip 
was also made to the headquarters of the Office of Auditor General Norway, in Oslo, 
to present the findings about the Office of Auditor General Zambia to a Norwegian 
advisor who has significant experience and knowledge about the Office of Auditor 
General Zambia.  This was because of the long-standing relationship between the two 
organizations, through which this advisor had served in a long-term secondment from 
the Norwegian audit office to the Zambian audit office.  He had lived in Zambia and 
worked at the Office of Auditor General Zambia as an advisor for more than five 
years, working alongside the Zambian auditors in a capacity-building role.  The 
Norwegian advisor was also able to provide useful feedback on the case study 
presentation as well as validate its findings from his unique perspective as someone 
from outside the Office of Auditor General Zambia and who also had extensive 
knowledge and experience from within the organization as a long-term advisor.     
The trips to Zambia and to Oslo to present preliminary findings were a means 
of validating the study and refining some historical details based on the feedback of 
actors who had first-hand experience working in the organizations or working closely 
with them.  Issues of research quality are explored further in the following section, 
using the four tests of research quality proposed by Yin (2014).   
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Assessing Research Quality  
 It is important to consider the quality of research to ensure that the case study 
findings are valid and reliable and are therefore able to contribute to the development 
of theory on institutional logics in development contexts.  The following sections 
discuss four measures for assessing research quality and how they relate to the three 
cases in this study (Yin, 2014).  As much as these four measures are “tests” to 
determine the quality of the study’s design, they were also ongoing guides for the 
research processes as they unfolded in the field, during analyses, and in writing the 
case study reports (Yin, 2014, pp. 45-46).   
 
Construct Validity  
Establishing construct validity is a foundational aspect of ensuring research 
quality in case studies, because the concepts being used in the study should accurately 
reflect social reality.  Layder (1998) has called this “the concept-indicator problem”, 
as a way to characterize the difficulty of social science research to have a “firm… 
grasp of the connections between theoretical ideas (concepts, frameworks, typologies) 
and the empirical materials (data, information) they represent” (p. 79, parentheses in 
original).  One way in which this study has attempted to make these connections was 
the presentations of research in the three organizations in Lusaka in 2017.  These 
review meetings allowed interview respondents and other organization members to 
read and to hear presentations of the preliminary case study reports on their 
organizations.  Through reading the reports and hearing the oral presentations, they 
had the opportunity to review the case and reflect on the concepts being used in the 
study, such as the typology of logics, and to give their feedback on them.  “Such 
review is more than a professional courtesy”, according to Yin (2014); it is “a way of 
corroborating the essential findings and evidence presented in a case report” (p. 199).   
The review meetings helped ensure the “subjective adequacy” of the different 
concepts used in the study, that they are relevant, understood, and that they 
“adequately reflect the lived experiences of those studied… Moreover, concepts must 
be recognizable, make sense and be understandable to those who are the subjects of 
the study” (Layder, 1998, p. 86).  The presentation participants had the opportunity to 
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reflect on the typology and the analyses of the cases, and they responded that it made 
sense to them and the work they do in their environment.  They also made corrections 
related to historical and biographical facts, and “the corrections made through this 
process… enhance[d] the accuracy of the case study” (Yin, 2014, p. 199).  Their 
feedback on the concepts used in the study, the overall narratives of the cases, and the 
correction of some factual errors, have helped produce stronger subjective adequacy 
and construct validity.    
The review meetings helped to mitigate some of the potential weakness in the 
case design related to the short length of stay in Zambia (4 trips that lasted between 10 
days and 3 weeks for each trip) and the cultural differences between the American 
researcher based in Norway and the research participants, who were Zambian for the 
most part.  However, as Layder warned, the concept-indicator problem is not fully 
addressed by ensuring subjective adequacy alone.  This is because “social reality is not 
simply composed of actors’ meanings and subjective understandings, but there exist 
systemic (or structural) factors which exert considerable influence on the nature of 
people’s lived experiences” (Ibid, pp. 86-87, parentheses in original).  This is 
particularly relevant on studies of institutional logics in which individual and 
organizational behavior is being shaped by institutional logics while at the same time 
those embedded actors are enacting or changing those institutional logics.   
To ensure the validity of structural aspects of the theoretical concepts requires 
that these concepts be “locked into a chain of reasoning related to a wider body of 
theory” (Ibid, p. 91).  This has “to do with the analyst’s (researcher’s) efforts to locate 
the empirical phenomenon in a wider, more generalized and abstract context of ideas” 
(Ibid, p. 91, parentheses in original).  In this study, this was accomplished by tying 
into institutional theory and the institutional logics perspective, which is abstract, 
generalized and able to provide the concepts that can adequately explain and analyze 
social reality.  This study uses constructs that had been previously developed in extant 
literature, and it builds upon those constructs.  These constructs were discussed when 
describing the theoretical approach in Chapter Two and are primarily the four types of 
logics, but also include theoretical mechanisms for change such as institutional 
entrepreneurship, structural overlap, and historical events.  Drawing on well-
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established literature helps ensure construct validity, while at the same time, it 
contributes empirical findings and theoretical elaboration back to those research fields.  
As these constructs were compared with incoming data from the field, they 
were able to provide a picture of how actors were enacting the logics within the 
organizations, the relationships between logics, and how they may have changed over 
time.  The sources of data involved in establishing these conclusions provided a 
triangulation of semi-structured interviews, observations, documents, and physical 
artifacts (e.g., the physical locations of the three organization’s headquarters).  While 
the interviews were the main source of data, observations, documentation, and artifacts 
were also useful for drawing conclusions and corroborating the interview data.  This 
triangulation of data also helped ensure construct validity through developing 
converging lines of inquiry, in which facts of the case were supported by multiple 
sources of evidence.   
 
Internal Validity  
Internal validity, which deals with causal arguments, mainly relates to the case 
of the Office of Auditor General Zambia, since it explains how change can take place 
among institutional logics.  One way that this case explains change is by looking at the 
agentive actions of an “institutional entrepreneur” in introducing alternative logics into 
the organization and driving divergent change, using explanation building to draw its 
conclusions based on prior theoretical propositions about how these agents can drive 
divergent institutional change.  However, Yin (2014) warned that this approach is 
“fraught with dangers” because it can be easy for the researchers to lose focus and drift 
towards other “topics of interest” and because “unwanted selective bias may creep into 
the process, leading to an explanation that glosses over some key data” (p. 150).  The 
solution from Yin is to continually be reminded of the purpose of the study, to 
consider alternative plausible explanations, and to use a case study protocol and 
database.   
The interview data from the study were entered into a digital research database 
and transcribed for later retrieval, and the purpose of the study was continuously 
revisited throughout the research process, which helped maintain focus.  In addition, 
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the theoretical concepts of change presented in the previous chapter provided a set of 
alternative explanations that are implicit within the paradox of embedded agency, 
namely that reflexive human agents drive change or that social structure constrains or 
enables change (Cardinale, 2018).  One of the “possible alternative explanation[s]” 
(Yin, 2014, p. 150) is that entrepreneurial agents drive divergent change within the 
organization leading to a new constellation of logics.  The rival explanation, based on 
institutional theories of diffusion or translation, is that embeddedness within an 
organizational field determines organizational arrangements.  Thus, change through 
“structural overlap” with other organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) is considered 
alongside “institutional entrepreneurship” (Hardy & Maguire, 2008) as rival 
explanations for change within the constellations of institutional logics.  The 
interesting result in the case of the Auditor General’s Office is that “structural overlap” 
and “institutional entrepreneurship” worked together to bring about changes in the 
constellation of logics guiding the organizations.  Therefore, the two explanations can 
be subsumed into a more general framework for understanding processes of change 
(Bates et al., 1998, pp. 17-18). 
 
External Validity  
To determine whether the findings of a case study are generalizable beyond the 
study itself requires a discussion of external validity.  According to Yin (2014), 
external validity in case study research is often fundamentally different from that of 
survey research.  In survey research, statistical generalizations are made based on a 
sampling unit that represents a larger population.  Statistical researchers follow 
methodological procedures to ensure their sample of respondents can adequately 
represent the larger population onto which they want to extrapolate their findings.  In 
case study research, on the other hand, analytical generalizations are made based on 
theory that exists “at a conceptual level higher than that of the specific case” (Ibid, p. 
41).  In that way, case study researchers “go beyond the setting for the specific case” 
(Ibid, p. 40) by generalizing from empirical findings to broader theory, rather than 
from sampling units to broader populations.  
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This case study generalizes its findings to broader theory on institutional logics.  
It builds a relevant typology for public organizations in the Global South, more 
specifically Sub-Saharan African and Zambia.  It also generalizes its findings about 
the relationships between logics and how different types of relationships impact action 
in different ways.  Finally, the case of Auditor General presents mechanisms of change 
within a constellation of logics.  The typology can be applied to cases in Zambia and 
the Sub-Saharan region, and the findings related to how logics interrelate and change 
could be used on cases using an institutional logics perspective regardless of whether it 
is focused on the Global North or South.   
One limitation to the generalizability of the study is its typology.  The typology 
is applicable to other public organizations within Zambia, as the four types are not 
dependent on the organization being a public accountability organization.  Arguably, 
the typology could also be used in public organizations throughout Sub-Saharan 
Africa, since the concepts and characteristics that comprise the kinship logics are 
drawn primarily from empirical research and theoretical literature on the Sub-Saharan 
context (Dia, 1991; Ekeh, 1975; Hydén, 2013a, 2013b; Masunungure, 2004; 
Montgomery, 1987; Posner, 2005).  However, the typology would likely prove less 
useful in other parts of the Global South, for example Latin America and South Asia 
which have different colonial and societal histories.   
 
Reliability  
Reliability is related to repeatability of the case study’s procedures.  As Yin 
(2014) argued, “The general way of approaching the reliability problem is to make as 
many steps as operational as possible and to conduct research as if someone were 
looking over your shoulder” (p. 49).  As noted earlier, this study relies on a research 
database that catalogued interview data, and even though the interview data is secure 
and anonymous, the database provides a way, at least hypothetically, that the case 
study could be repeated by another researcher.  Furthermore, a field research protocol 
is provided in Appendix E that documents data collection in Lusaka and contains brief 
summaries of the study’s purpose, theoretical concepts used, interview themes and 
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topics, as well as information for contact persons who facilitated the field interviews 
for the study, which is also a means of repeating the study.   
One significant limitation regarding the study’s repeatability is that the 
interviews are anonymous.  Therefore, it is not possible to reveal the identities of 
interview respondents, aside from the respondents who volunteered to reveal their 
identities, because doing so would put them in potentially dangerous situations.  
However, if another researcher was to go back to the three organizational settings and 
use the listed contact people to set up field interviews, then they could conduct new 
semi-structured interviews using the same theoretical conceptualizations, and they 
could reach similar conclusions.   
 
Conclusion 
The research design and methodology described in this chapter have provided a 
strategy for understanding the organizational contexts of the three cases and to answer 
the study’s research questions.  The qualitative data sources have made it possible to 
demonstrate how different institutional logics are consistent with the empirical cases, 
the types of relationships that exist between the different logics, and how those 
relationships can change.  These approaches have also allowed the study to examine 
the complex relationships between structure and agency within the cases and to 
describe how actors were shaped by the logics, while at the same time they were 
constituting them, and it allows the study to compare the analytic narratives derived 
from the cases with theoretical concepts such as institutional entrepreneurship, 
structural overlap, and decoupling.  The following section presents a brief history of 
the social and governance structures in modern-day Zambia, which provides a 
contextual background for the three empirical cases that follow, and it also provides 
discussions about how the four institutional logics were enacted during the different 




A Brief History of Zambia’s Social and Governance Structures  
In order to understand the state of affairs in Zambia today, it is important to 
consider its historical context.  This chapter will attempt, albeit briefly and modestly, 
to follow the history of the land and its people from its early inhabitants to today, 
giving special attention to its social structures and systems of governance.  Roberts 
(1976) noted the methodological difficulty of studying the prior history of a 
geographical area that would only come to be established millennia later, which is why 
he described it as “a study of history in Zambia, rather than a history of Zambia” (Ibid, 
p. xi, emphasis added).  Texts such as Roberts (1976) and Wills (1985) provide a 
background history of the land and its people before the arrival of Europeans, while 
other texts about the colonial period and modern-day Zambia also contribute to this 
chapter’s brief survey of Zambia’s history and its social structures (Bratton, Dulani, & 
Nkomo, 2017; Cheeseman, 2006, 2017; Posner, 2005; Tordoff & Molteno, 1974; 
Wills, 1985).   
The following sections will present a brief survey of the history in Zambia and 
relate it to the four institutional logics that were presented in Chapter Two.  For 
example, it will show how the social relations and societal structures in the early 
historical periods were the development and enactment of the kinship logic, and it will 
show how the British Colonial administration’s use of bureaucracies as a system of 
extraction was an enactment of the bureaucratic logic.  Indeed, these two logics, the 
bureaucratic and kinship logics have existed in relationship to one another in this 
region going back beyond 100 years.  By relating these historical periods to the four 
types of institutional logics, it then becomes possible to trace the development or the 
introduction of these logics within Zambian society and also provides a better 
understanding of the three accountability organizations in this study.   
 
From Nomadic Bushmen to a Tonga Diaspora: Prehistory-1600s   
The earliest human activity within the borders of modern-day Zambia can only 
be established in archeological evidence, mainly in the form of tools that were made of 
stone over 200,000 years ago (Roberts, 1976).  The early bushmen who used these 
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tools were nomadic scavengers and hunters who would later be misplaced by Bantu 
tribes that migrated from Western Africa in the 4th century AD, bringing iron tools and 
more modern agricultural practices with them (Wills, 1985, p. 14).  This time period 
came to be called “the bantu explosion” (Roberts, 1976, p. 27) and led to more stable 
settlements and the exchange of commodities between the groups of settlers.  In the 
12th century AD, the Tonga people arrived in the region, as part of what is called the 
Tonga diaspora (Roberts, 1976).  Based on evidence found in Tonga burial sites, the 
Tonga people introduced the idea of social stratification based on wealth and status, as 
some of the human remains found in the burial sites were much more richly adorned 
than other remains (Ibid, pp. 54-55).     
 
              
 
Maps of Modern-Day Zambia (www.cia.gov) 
 
By the 16th century AD, the region had become inhabited mostly by small-scale 
farmers, whom today’s Zambians could consider their hereditary ancestors (Roberts, 
1976).  To the Northeast and central parts of Zambia were the Bemba peoples of the 
“Luangwa tradition”, who occupied the woodlands.  To the South were the Tonga 
people who were herdsmen and cotton spinners.  To the west were the Lozi farmers 
who are thought to have inhabited that area for centuries.  In addition to these larger 
people groups were other smaller clans.  Everyone in Zambia at that time belonged to 
clans, which were named after natural phenomena such as animals.  These clans 
defined their own customs for marriage, family, and social relationships, and these 
customs helped provide social boundaries.  In the period leading up to the 1700s, 
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political relations and social organization were based primarily on familial relations, 
and power within the clans and people groups was diffuse among their members.   
 
The Rise of the Chieftains: 1700-1860 
The period from the 1700s marked the rise of the chieftains, and by the 1800s, 
nearly everyone in the area was governed by a chief.  The nature and extent of a 
chief’s authority varied across the region.  Some chiefs were the head men of the 
village, and others were paramount chiefs or “senior ruler” among all other chiefs in 
the tribe (Roberts, 1976, p. 80).  Chiefs were responsible for making sure people 
followed local customs and laws.  Most importantly, they made sure their people were 
kept safe from enemy tribes or other forms of calamity.  All of the chiefs required their 
subjects to pay tribute to them in some form or another, either in goods or services.  
While this made the chiefs wealthier than others in the tribe, much was required of 
them in return (Swidler, 2009).  They met the needs of visitors, maintained a supply of 
food in case of famine, and took care of people in the tribe who were unable to take 
care of themselves.  Indeed, upon payment of a tribute, “a chief commonly made some 
payment in return: such ‘reciprocal’ exchange was one of the most important means of 
circulating scarce commodities such as salt, iron-work, or foreign cloth” (Roberts, 
1976 p. 81).  These types of reciprocal exchanges are hallmarks of traditional systems 
that developed across Sub-Saharan Africa and in Zambia, and they were important for 
sharing scarce resources across the tribe, providing a common good, and taking care of 
those in need (Hydén, 2013a). 
The time periods from the early civilizations to the rise of the chieftains can be 
understood as being mainly consistent with the kinship logic, as social relations were 
informal and based on reciprocal exchanges to meet the needs of tribe members.  
Power relations can be seen as based on patriarchal structures and other informal ties 
such as religion and kinship.  Shared sense of identity at this time would have been 
based on clan or tribe membership, and it would have been reinforced through each 
clan’s unique customs, taboos, and family structures, which would have defined 




British Domination and African Resistance: 1860-1964  
The British first began arriving to the area as Christian missionaries during the 
19th Century.  David Livingstone was among the first and often wrote romantically 
about the region and his missional quest for “the heart of Africa”.  Later, other 
missionaries from Britain were inspired by his writings, and thereafter, “[a] welter of 
denominations, each bent upon capturing souls for a Christ of its particular 
persuasion” followed him there (Rotberg, 1965, p. 8).  At that time, the region was 
actually of little interest to the British Empire, who were “quite content to see northern 
‘Zambezia’ pass into the hands of Portugal” (Hughes, 1963, as cited by Cheeseman, 
2017, p. 100).  The British government only became involved after Cecil Rhodes, the 
mining magnate and colonial statesman, sought to attain a royal charter from the 
British after he had begun receiving mining concessions from among the local tribes.  
Territorialization of the region followed, sometimes by threat of force and by 1900, 
Rhodes and the British South African Company had established company rule in the 
land that would come to be called Northern Rhodesia.   
Northern Rhodesia would be a British territory under the administration of the 
British South Africa Company until 1924.  According to Cheeseman (2006), the 
British South Africa Company “was concerned with profits rather than effective 
government and so little was done to develop an effective structure of government” 
which “necessitated the construction of a system of indirect rule, in which the 
Company relied upon a ‘small body of white civil servants’ to preside over a tier of 
co-opted ‘native authorities’” (pp. 100-101).  This led Cheeseman to note that the 
“system of Administration developed in Zambia was… limited” (Ibid, p. 100), as the 
British South Africa Company only had “fewer than fifty administrators” in Northern 
Rhodesia at that time (Posner, 2005, p. 27).  Thus, local chiefs were co-opted as tax 
collectors and arbiters of conflicts among native populations.  
In 1924, the status of Northern Rhodesia moved from being a territory under 
the control of the British South Africa Company to becoming a protectorate under the 
British Empire, which brought the territory under the British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies.  The colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia followed the same pattern 
as the British South Africa Company, as it organized much of its administration via 
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tribes and chiefs (Posner, 2005; Roberts, 1976).  One difference however, is that the 
colonial administration vested more power in the chiefs through the Native Authorities 
programs that gave the chiefs more control over resources such as treasury funds, 
lands, agricultural resources, and judicial powers. This provided the chiefs with more 
means for compelling the allegiance and fealty of the members of their tribes and 
kingdoms.  Thus, as tribe members invested in their relationships with the chiefs, the 
chiefs would reciprocate with loans, land, and favorable court rulings.  In this way, 
colonial rule further strengthened the power and influence of chiefs by investing in 
them resources and power from the colonial state (Posner, 2005).   
These descriptions of the colonial administration from Cheeseman (2006), 
Posner (2005), and Roberts (1976) can be seen as the enactment of two institutional 
logics: the kinship logic and the bureaucratic logic.  The colonial office sought to 
achieve their purposes through the informal practices of the kinship logic, enabling 
them to control and extract from the native population via existing kinship and tribal 
relations.  As the chiefs already had informal authority within their tribes and were 
already practicing the methods through which they received tributes and reciprocated 
to circulate commodities and goods, the colonial authorities used those systems for 
their own benefit.  This strengthened the roles of the chiefs by layering the formal 
authority structures of the Native Authorities programs over the informal authority that 
the chiefs already exercised.  Thus, there was a facilitative relationship between the 
bureaucratic and kinship logics as the formal authority vested by the colonial 
administration strengthened and facilitated the informal authority and patriarchal 
position of the chiefs.  This precipitated Zambian independence with the development 
of an African elite who would later lead the nationalist struggle in what would 
eventually be called a “fairly peaceful and evolutionary, albeit hasty, transition to 
political independence in which Britain eventually co-operated with the nationalist 
movement” (Tordoff & Molteno, 1974, p. 11).   
 
The First Republic of Zambia: 1964-1972 
After years of struggle by the native populations, the former colony of Northern 
Rhodesia became independent from the United Kingdom on the 24th of October, 1964, 
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and it would be called the Republic of Zambia.  A new constitution was drafted, and 
Kenneth Kaunda, a former freedom fighter and national hero would become Zambia’s 
first president.  As with the populations of other former British colonies, Zambians 
then “found themselves straddled with a hybrid and disconnected system in which 
formal institutions transplanted from the outside had been superimposed upon 
indigenous informal institutions reflecting the cultures and traditions of these 
societies” (Hydén, 2013b, p. 925).  Zambia had inherited the Westminster model of 
government and its administrative systems, which had been composed primarily of 
British settlers and based on serving colonial interests.    
The systems of bureaucracy Zambia inherited were designed to maintain law 
and order and to extract resources from the colony to the colonial power at minimal 
cost (Mulikita, 2002).  The Zambian government then set out “to adapt the English 
model of local government to the post-independence situation” (Tordoff & Young, 
1994, p. 285).  The early days of “Zambianization” of the civil service faced 
significant challenges with a steady exodus of European bureaucrats and an influx of 
undereducated Zambians entering the civil service (Mpaisha, 2004).  To exacerbate 
these problems, Kaunda began using government jobs as way to reward those who had 
been faithful to his political party and the struggle for independence, placing party 
loyalty over administrative ability (Cheeseman, 2006).   
Levels of education during the First Republic of Zambia were extremely low.  
At the time of independence in 1964, there were “only 109 indigenous people with 
university degrees and 1,200 indigenous people with secondary school certificates out 
of a population of 2 million” (Mpaisha, 2004, p. 191).  Even after the Zambian 
government established the University of Zambia in 1965, enrolment of new students 
only stood at 312 students, and it would still take years for them to finish their studies 
and earn university degrees.  This meant that while the need to fill the Zambian civil 
service with qualified officers was overwhelming, the pool of available candidates was 
woefully inadequate.  Mpaisha noted, “The civil service was so desperate for staff, a 
basic secondary school qualification being all the was required for employment.  In 
some cases, students were withdrawn from schools to take up a career in the civil 
service” (Ibid, 193).  As a result of these problems with recruitment, “The image of the 
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whole civil service suffered” (Ibid, p. 193).  These situations led to what Mulikita 
(2002) described as an erosion of professionalism within the Zambian public 
administration.     
The Zambian government’s establishment of its new civil service in many ways 
was an enactment of the bureaucratic logic, as it adopted the bureaucratic systems it 
had inherited from the British.  It had many of the same characteristics, structures, and 
duties associated within the various bureaucratic roles, and many of the former 
European occupants of those roles remained for a time.  However, Kaunda and his 
party also used the civil service as a way of reciprocating benefits to faithful followers 
and freedom fighters, which was also the enactment of the kinship logic, with its 
emphasis on reciprocal exchanges, personalization of public resources, and 
employment based on personal favors.   
 
The Second Republic of Zambia: 1972-1991    
By the early 1970s, internal factions within Kaunda’s UNIP political party had 
developed around ethnic and tribal lines, and as a result, some UNIP members left the 
party and formed a new breakaway party, the United Progressive Party (UPP), which 
had widespread support from the dominant Bemba population.  This presented an 
existential threat to UNIP and to President Kaunda’s hold on power.  In February of 
1972, President Kaunda declared Zambia would become a one-party state.  He 
appointed a commission to determine how to move forward, which toured the country 
to hear from citizens and seemed more “an empty gesture to give the mere appearance 
of consultation” than a means of actually allowing “all who wished [to] have a voice in 
the eventual outcome” of Zambia’s democratic system (Pettman, 1974, pp. 239, 236).  
The commission culminated in a resolution that passed through Parliament on the 8th 
of December, 1972 and made UNIP the single party in Zambian politics and gave 
President Kaunda complete domination of the party and the government (Ibid, p. 240).   
The problem of unqualified civil servants within the Zambian administration 
became worse as Zambia expanded the civil service, as there was an “accelerated 
promotion of individuals already in the civil service”, and as a result, junior officers of 
“relatively poor quality were… shifted upwards in the bureaucracy” (Mpaisha, 2004, 
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p. 194).  This meant the new university graduates from the University of Zambia and 
the newly established Copperbelt University had to be placed in junior positions under 
senior-level bureaucrats with lower education and qualifications than their juniors 
(Ibid).   
New professional organizations were beginning to be established in Zambia at 
this time.  For example, the Zambian Parliament established the Law Association of 
Zambia (LAZ) in 1973 with its passage of the Law Association of Zambia Act (1973).  
Then, less than ten years later, in 1982, Parliament established another professional 
organization, the Zambian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) with the passage 
of the Accountants Act (1982).  The Accountants Act mandated that ZICA would be 
the professional organization in Zambia to “assist in the education and training of 
persons practising or intending to practise the profession of accountancy; (b) conduct 
professional examinations in accountancy; (c) maintain and improve the professional 
standards of accountants” (Accountants Act of Zambia, 1982, section 5).    
The development of new professional organizations and university systems 
were the enactment of the professionalism logic within Zambia, which is based on 
professional training and standards within the professional disciplines.  The 
bureaucratic and kinship logics continued to be influential within the Zambian 
administration at that time, as the spoils system and personal favors were still ways in 
which jobs were given, and benefits were extended to those who were in the 
government’s favor.  Cheeseman (2006) characterized the public administration in 
Zambia in the 2nd Republic as a “faltering bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (p. 42), arguing 
that the UNIP party and the bureaucracy were fused together as a means of providing 
political patronage.  Patronage from the Kaunda government flowed down to senior-
level bureaucrats, who enjoyed the benefits from the state-controlled economy and 
were able to enrich themselves and other members of the “aspirational ‘middle class’” 
(Ibid, p. 52).  However, these benefits were “not extended vertically into the locality in 
a way that connected the Zambian ‘public’ to the centre” (Ibid, p. 52), which resulted 
in a growing discontentment among many ordinary Zambians.  Their discontentment 
was intensified when the Zambian economy collapsed in the late 1970s and 1980s and 
structural adjustment programs led to crippling food shortages.  There was a popular 
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uprising among the public, the labor unions, and the church, which would eventually 
be followed by a reinstatement of multi-party elections and the dawning of the Third 
Republic of Zambia.    
 
The Third Republic of Zambia: 1991-Present    
The Third Republic of Zambia began in 1991 with the amendment of the 
Constitution allowing multi-party elections.  A new president would be elected for the 
first time in Zambia’s 30 years, Frederick Chiluba, and his new political party, the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), also won a majority of seats in 
Parliament.  They began liberalizing the economy and launched a series of major 
public service reforms beginning in 1993, with the Public Service Restructuring 
Program (PSRP) which was supposed to “make the Zambian Public Service leaner…, 
to improve Human Resource Management through Performance related incentives…, 
and to decentralize and devolve administrative power away from Central Ministries” 
(Mulikita, 2002, p. 4).   
The civil service reforms that began in 1993 were the enactment of the 
development management logic, with its emphasis on service delivery, performance 
evaluations, and decentralization.  In the midst of these reforms, however, corruption 
also increased at an alarming rate in Zambia.  Chiluba, along with other members of 
his administration, would be investigated and charged for crimes related to the theft of 
public resources and corruption.  It was in this point of Zambia’s history that 
corruption became institutionalized in society and in the government to a degree that 
the country had never experienced before (Momba, 2007; Rotberg, 2017). 
Chiluba tried to amend the constitution to allow him a third term, but that 
failed, and he had to step down in 2002.  Several presidents have succeeded Chiluba in 
the Third Republic of Zambia, beginning with Levy Mwanawasa, who died early in 
his second term in office, in 2008.  Mwanawasa’s Vice President, Rupiah Banda, then 
replaced him and won a by-election allowing him to serve the remainder of 
Mwanawasa’s term until 2011.  Michael Sata, won the 2011 elections along with his 
new populist party, the Patriotic Front.  Sata also died in office, in 2014, and his Vice 
President, Guy Scott served until by-elections were held.  Edgar Lungu won the by-
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elections and remains president today after winning the most recent elections in 2016.  
However, that election process was seen as “significantly flawed” by the Carter Center 
(2016, p. 1), due to incidents of violence, abuse of public office, and harassment of the 
media.  More recently, the Lungu government has incarcerated the main opposition 
leader, invoked a “state of threatened emergency” in the country (Cheeseman, 2017), 
and suspended opposition members of parliament for missing the President’s State of 
the Union address.  These heavy-handed tactics harken back to Kaunda’s time as 
authoritarian president when Zambia was governed under a state of emergency until he 
lost power in 1991 (Cotterill, 2017).   
 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the history in 
Zambia and to indicate the rise of the four different logics within its society.  It 
describes the development of the kinship logic within the contexts of the tribes and the 
relationships between tribe members.  It also describes how, with the arrival of the 
British, a more formal bureaucratic logic was introduced alongside the kinship logic, 
as the British created the colony of Northern Rhodesia.  Finally, the chapter described 
the introduction of the professionalism and development-management logics in more 
recent years, as professional organizations were established beginning in the 1970s 
and as the new government of Frederick Chiluba began launching administrative 
reforms in the 1990s.  Notably, the three organizations that are the focal points for this 
study began at different times in Zambia’s history, which is indicated in the timeline 
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Professionalizing the Office of Auditor General Zambia 
This chapter examines processes of change among institutional logics within 
the Office of Auditor General Zambia, using the concepts of institutional 
entrepreneurship and structural overlap to explain how these processes unfolded over 
time.  It presents a narrative showing how a new Auditor General promulgated the 
professionalism and development management logics within the organization at a 
critical juncture in Zambia’s history, the resistance she encountered, and how her 
unique social position informed and enabled the change processes to continue in spite 
of that resistance.  It also discusses how the audit office’s engagement with the 
international professional community lowered barriers to change and how these 
relationships provided ready-made standards, methods, and a shared sense of 
professional identity from which members of the Zambian audit office could draw, 
which also played a critical role in change processes.    
The chapter’s narrative is presented in chronological order, which allows it to 
present an impression of the context of the organization before the change processes 
began and after, showing how the relationships between logics also changed.  This 
demonstrates how changes among institutional logics can actually take place within 
public accountability organizations in the Global South, as processes of development 
and reform.  The case narrative places moments in which alternative logics were 
promulgated within the organization in their historical contexts, leading to the 
appointment of the new Auditor General in 2003, as well as the Office of Auditor 
General’s increasing engagement with the international professional community, and it 
shows how members of the organization enacted the promulgated institutional logics 
within their context as local translations and adaptations of logics from the societal 
level.  In describing these processes, the chapter draws from the concepts of embedded 
agency (Andrews, 2013; Battilana et al., 2009; Cardinale, 2018) and the imitation and 
translation of ideas (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Wedlin & 
Sahlin, 2017) to explain how organization leaders and members promulgated and 
enacted the institutional logics within the organization.   
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The remainder of the chapter begins with a section that describes the rise and 
the prominence of auditing and national audit offices around the world, particularly 
since the 1980s when auditing became a prominent tool of “public accountability and 
stakeholder dialogue” (Power, 2003, p. 200).  Indeed, some have even argued that this 
was the time when traditional society became an audit society, which changed the way 
work was done in order to make it measurable and auditable (Power, 1997).  The 
section also describes the rise of an international professional community of state 
auditors, which is responsible for developing and spreading professional audit 
standards around the world and promoting international cooperation between state 
audit offices.  These descriptions place the case of the Anti-Corruption Commission 
within its international context and provide a background for the change processes that 
are described later in the chapter.   
 
Supreme Audit Institutions and “The Audit Explosion” 
The Office of Auditor General Zambia is the public accountability organization 
responsible for auditing the government’s institutions.  This type of organization is 
known more generally as a Supreme Audit Institution (SAI).  The main function of a 
SAI is to make sure government accounts are correct and that the government is 
managing public funds appropriately.  SAIs perform this function primarily through 
auditing the government’s revenue and its spending (Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2001).  
However, “in recent years more and more SAIs have started to review the performance 
of public administration” in addition to reviewing budgets and spending (Noussi, 
2012, p. 32).  Because of SAIs’ core functions in overseeing government resources, 
these types of organizations are thought to play a role in curbing fraud and abuse and 
in increasing overall government accountability in their handling of public resources 
(Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2001).   
Nearly all states in the world have a SAI, which can be based on one of three 
models: the court model, the board-system model, and the Westminster model.  The 
court model is run by a collegial court of judges, who typically hold their positions 
until retirement.  These audit courts have judicial jurisdiction to impose penalties and 
are, therefore, not dependent on legislatures for following up their audits.  The board-
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system model is similar to the court model in that they have a “collegial approach to 
deciding important issues but have no judicial function” and must rely on legislatures 
or other bodies for following up their reports (Noussi, 2012, p. 35).   The Westminster 
model, also called the audit office model, typically has a single head called an Auditor 
General.  The authority that Auditors General have can vary widely from state to state, 
but they typically report to legislators who then follow-up on recommendations made 
within the audit reports.  Therefore, audit offices do not prosecute or take action 
against individuals or organizations, but they work closely with investigative bodies 
and the Parliamentary committees that do take these types of actions (Hoque & 
Thiagarajah, 2015).   
Globally, since the 1980s, there has been what is popularly called “the audit 
explosion”, characterized by “an increase in the quality and quantity of formal 
monitoring systems” of state resources and programs (Power, 2003, p. 185).  Auditing 
can be seen as a tool for both “blaming” and for “learning” since it is used to “identify 
and punish recalcitrant individual and organizational behavior” as well as to “support 
values of learning, development, and evolutionary improvement in organizational 
management systems” (Ibid, p. 196).  Since audits are used as a tool for identifying the 
misuse of resources as well as for improvement of organizational management 
systems, the international donor community has devoted increasing attention to 
programs that build institutional capacity in supreme audit institutions in the Global 
South (Hydén, 2013b, p. 928; Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2001).   
Alongside the “audit explosion” described by Power (2003, p. 185), the 
international arena has also seen the rise of an umbrella organization that supports the 
work of its member SAIs, the International Organization for Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI).  INTOSAI, which was first established in 1953, is now 
comprised of 194 member SAIs from around the world and considers itself to be “an 
autonomous, independent, and non-political organization” (INTOSAI, 2017, p. 2).  
The work of INTOSAI is centered around four strategic goals: providing and 
maintaining international audit standards; building audit capacity in SAIs; encouraging 
SAI cooperation, collaboration, and knowledge exchange; and being a “model 
international organization” that other organizations around the world would want to 
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emulate (INTOSAI, 2017, p. 11).  INTOSAI also works through smaller, regional 
branch organizations around the world.  For example, the African Organization for 
Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI) serves as the umbrella for SAIs in states 
across the continent, and the African Organizations for Supreme Audit Institutions in 
English Speaking Countries (AFROSAI-E) focuses on translating international 
standards and norms from INTOSAI for the African SAIs that work within their own 
unique governance contexts, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
One of the significant contributions of INTOSAI is the development and 
propagation of professional audit standards, which are called the International 
Standards for Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs).  According to INTOSAI, these 
ISSAIs are the foundational principles for the proper functioning of Supreme Audit 
Institutions, and they are the “authoritative international standards on public sector 
auditing” ("What are ISSAIs?," n.d.).  There are over 40 ISSAIs, each containing 
multiple guidelines related to SAIs.  Gustavson (2014), in her study of SAIs in Sub-
Saharan Africa, summarized the salient aspects of the ISSAIs into what she called the 
three pillars of a Supreme Audit Institution: the independence of the SAI, the 
standardized work procedures used by auditors, and competence in relation to 
appropriate levels of education and qualifications (p. 104). 
SAIs from around the world gather on a regular basis for INTOSAI 
congressional gatherings, workgroup meetings, and various symposia geared toward 
training and capacity building.  SAIs, such as Zambia’s, who are members of 
AFROSAI-E also meet on a regular basis as they hold training programs specifically 
related to capacity building within the Sub-Saharan African context.  These training 
programs focus on such topics as audits tools and methods, managing relationships 
between SAIs and Parliamentary committees, and the public relations functions of 
audit offices.  In addition to these regional gatherings, it is also a common practice for 
the different SAIs in the regions to cooperate with one another by auditing each 
other’s work practices and conducting joint audits to share knowledge and expertise 





The History of State Audit in Zambia  
The history of state auditing in Zambia goes back to the colonial period.  As 
with most other Sub-Saharan states, Zambia inherited its current audit model from the 
former colonial government (McKie & van de Walle, 2010), a model it has largely 
retained up to the present time.  When the British South Africa Company administered 
the territory between 1891 and 1924, audits were conducted by the British High 
Commission in Cape Town and were then submitted to the Secretary of State in 
London.  Later, between 1924 and 1963, when the territory officially became part of a 
self-governing British protectorate, the audits were carried out by the office of 
Colonial Audit Services and submitted to the local governor who responded to the 
reports and thereafter submitted them to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 
London (Simwanza, 2003).  It was not until 1954 that Northern Rhodesia created its 
own localized audit agency, the Audit Department of Northern Rhodesia, which had 
its own Auditor General.    
By the time of Zambian independence in 1964, a traditional and legal 
foundation of the Office of Auditor General had already been established.  It was a 
foundation based on the Westminster system of auditing, in which an auditor general 
and his (and later, her) accounting staff prepared written reports about the financial 
accounts of the government and treasuries that were then presented to select 
Parliamentary committees for review and follow-up, if necessary.  The newly drafted 
constitution of the fledgling state of Zambia would again call for an Auditor General, 
whom the President would appoint and whom should be ratified by parliament.  The 
constitution also called for the creation of an audit office with support staff to help 
fulfill the responsibilities of the appointed Auditor General, which is called the Office 
of Auditor General or, alternatively, the National Audit Office.  After independence, 
the former colonial staff remained in place within the National Audit Office, as well as 
the former British Auditor, John Bourne, who then became the first Auditor General of 
Zambia.  During this time, the Office of Auditor General operated as a part of the 
Ministry of Finance.  This arrangement, according to Mwambwa (1998), came as “a 




Early Growth, Stability, and Low Capacity in the Office of Auditor General  
In the midst of the uncertainties in the new state of Zambia, the Office of 
Auditor General slowly began hiring Zambian nationals to join its audit cadre.  This 
was part of the overall process of Zambianization, which saw the replacement of 
European officers with Zambian nationals.  As this process occurred at the Office of 
Auditor General Zambia, the challenges discussed in the previous chapter also apply, 
namely that the newly hired Zambian nationals had not received high levels of 
education due to the inequalities of the colonial system.  It would, therefore, require 
several years of educational development to have the capacity to recruit Zambian staff 
with higher education to work in the audit office.   
The British Auditor, John Bourne, continued to serve as the Auditor General of 
Zambia until 1972, when a Zambian national would replace him.  The first Zambian 
Auditor General was Stubbs Nundwe, who held the position from 1972 to 1992.  
During Nundwe’s tenure, the Audit Act of 1980 was passed into law, which further 
codified the security of tenure of the Auditor General and the powers of the office to 
have access to financial records for auditing purposes.  Then, in 1992, the third 
Auditor General was appointed, Frederick Siame, who served until 2003.  It was 
during these years, wrote Mwambwa (1998), that “the SAI ha[d] evolved from a small 
audit institution with a small work force of expatriates to a… work force of 150 audit 
staff, and… an autonomous office within the public service” (p. 18).  Frederick Siame 
served until 2003, when he was replaced by the fourth Auditor General of Zambia, 
Anna Chifungula, who would retire in 2015.  Currently, at the time of writing, there is 
still an “acting Auditor General”, Ronald Mwambwa, who is expected to hold the 
temporary position until the president appoints a formal replacement.   
Up until the early 2000s, there were significant challenges related to the 
capabilities of the audit staff, and the quality of the audit reports was considered low 
according to interview respondents and to outside observers (Norad, 2007).  By 2003, 
a four-year backlog of audit reports had been built up, and the quality of those reports 
was considered insufficient for holding government agencies accountable for the 
misuse or misappropriation of resources.  Therefore, the Office of Auditor General 
was not able to play its role in the punishment of “recalcitrant… behavior” or in the 
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“support… of learning, development, and evolutionary improvement” (Power, 2003, 
p. 196) within the government of Zambia.  This was illustrated by a case study report 
by Norad, which noted,  
Historically, the OAG faced several constraints in performing its duties: 
…independence compromised because supported by civil servants and public 
officers, inadequate financial resources; inadequate human resource capacity 
and skills; undeveloped internal systems…  These constraints resulted in some 
key failings including lack of professionalism and fiduciary duty; limited scope 
of audits; and inconclusive and untimely reporting” (Norad, 2007, p. 56).   
Commensurate with the Norad (2007) report, interview respondents also described an 
overall lack of professionalism in the office during this time period.  They noted that 
auditors lacked the skills and motivation to perform their duties and that most of them 
were underqualified to do the type of work they were assigned to do.  They lacked 
education and training in current accounting and auditing techniques, and the result 
was seen in the low quality and lack of timeliness in their work, for example the four-
year backlog of audit reports.    
In the ways interview respondents described this time period, the formal aspects 
of the organization were consistent with the bureaucratic logic.  The agency was part 
of the centralized state bureaucracy, and they were internally oriented, which served to 
isolate them from external pressures.  Some interview respondents noted that they 
were actually secretive in the ways they interacted with society, and they did not 
consider it important to communicate with the public about the contents of their audit 
reports at that time.  An advisor from the Norwegian foreign ministry described it this 
way: 
Previously you had an organizational culture where they considered everything 
[confidential, saying:] “No, no, this is confidential, this is secretive” - not 
knowing the constitution gives them the right to hold audit papers and 
preparations confidential until it is released. So, when it is released, they should 
give as much information as possible to the stakeholders, and now that has 
started happening.  So, part of the cultural shift has been shifting from the 
bureaucracy, which is inward, to outward looking. 
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During this time, the Office of Auditor General went about its business without a 
strategy to engage the public and without informing members of the public about the 
nature of the work of the office or the findings of their audit reports.  One officer 
described his own personal experience with the organization, that before working for 
the audit office, he had actually never even heard of it.  To him, this exemplified the 
insular approach the agency was taking at that time.  He said: 
I was quite active in my studies both within the university and outside, but I can 
confirm to you that I didn’t even know that there was such as an office - even at 
the time I graduated, I didn’t know about this office.  So, this is one litmus test I 
have used - if I didn’t know, myself a scholar, how many more people didn’t 
know about this - especially the taxpayers? 
The Office of Auditor General was operating in the shadows of the Zambian 
government and the public, with little regard for the external environment, and this 
arrangement seemed appropriate to organization members at that time.  This was 
characteristic of the bureaucratic logic, with its internal orientation of organization 
members toward the bureaucratic organization.   
The core values and organizational structure of the audit office were also 
consistent with the bureaucratic logic in the sense that it was a formal and centralized 
hierarchy with an emphasis on following established procedures.  It was based on 
following rules and directives, and those at the top of the hierarchy were treated with 
unquestioned respect.  One interview respondent described this way of operating in the 
following: 
It was a very small office.  It was highly formalized, and the relationships were 
the formal type - hierarchical… it was a very formal arrangement.  You’ve got 
the boss, junior, and what not.  Even in the relationships, it was just around 
those lines.  It was: “He’s your boss, and that’s it!”  
One of the Deputy Auditor Generals, who had worked for many years within the 
organization, described it as a “very, very closed office” and that it was difficult to 
work through the hierarchy at that time: 
Very few people knew what was going on in this place, and even working here 
when we joined, it was very difficult for you to go to your superior and say 
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anything.  The culture was totally different because you felt like, I don’t know 
how to describe it, but people just kept to themselves… That was the culture, 
but now it’s completely different because people are open with each other.  A 
lot of people come here [to my office], and we chat and things like that.  Yes, 
now it’s very, very different. 
These types of interactions and hierarchical structures were consistent with the 
bureaucratic logic, and some respondents also argued that this tended to slow down the 
auditing and reporting processes leading to the delays in their reports.   
The Auditor General described the situation when she first arrived to the office 
in 2003 and the work delays that were common during that time: 
They were so set in their ways of working, according to them.  The report had 
to go to the auditor general, and the auditor general could take up to 3 or 4 
months to look at it.  After that, then they would write to auditees.  They had 
strange time lags that were there.   
The time lags in the Office of Auditor General were, in some ways, reminiscent of the 
days during the colonial era, in which the reports had to move between the colonial 
territory, Cape Town, and the seat of the distant imperial power in London.  Because 
of the multiple levels in the hierarchy that needed to be worked through and the overall 
lack of capacity, those processes were slow, and the office was not able to submit the 
yearly audit report by December 31st each year, as they were mandated by law to do.  
Add that to the fact that they had fallen far behind in the production of their audit 
reports, and this made it difficult, if not impossible, to hold individuals and agencies 
within the government to account for the misuse or misappropriation of funds.  
Most of the auditors joining the organization were actually recruited into the 
audit office right after finishing secondary school without ever attending university.  
This was a centralized process in which new officers were inducted into the civil 
service in a cohort with others from across the entire civil service in Zambia.  In this 
way, the organization was enacting employment practices consistent with the 
bureaucratic logic.  One of the auditors who had been employed in the office for many 
years reflected on his own entry into employment with the following statement:  
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[W]hen we came, we went through what is called an induction course.  So, at 
the induction course, we were told what is expected of us, because the Office of 
the Auditor General falls under the public service… which means we have to 
adhere to the rules, terms, and conditions of service in the public service.  So, 
we underwent that training for a period of 6 days…  Then after training, we 
were posted in the field and we were called clerk officers.   
The newly appointed cohort of new clerk officers was then sent to study in a basic 
program that led to a diploma in state auditing.  After they completed the course 
successfully, they would then be called “assistant auditors” within the organization.  
To this limited extent, there was some form of professionalism in the office because 
officers did undergo specialized training in state auditing before they could officially 
be promoted from clerk officers to assistant auditors.  However, this was a 
rudimentary level of professional training compared to that which is required in the 
professional field of auditing, in which the content and complexity of audits 
continually evolves and advanced methods are required to conduct audits (Hoque & 
Thiagarajah, 2015, pp. 14-16).  
Promotions within the ranks of auditors at that time were based primarily on 
seniority, rather than on academic qualifications or work performance.  Another one of 
the officers who had been employed in the organization many years described his own 
experience with promotions in the following way:  
In the past, they looked at seniority very much.  But now I see that going.  You 
see, like me, I’ve been principal auditor for 10 years or so, but you find 
someone who just became principal auditor today, you would think we were on 
the same level.  But in the past, they used to take it [seniority] very seriously.  
You find that some people who are even junior to me, like my boss who came 
in after me as principal auditor, but he has a master’s degree so they promoted 
him above me.  He’s also doing his PhD, so they promoted him.  But in the 
past, I should have been the one to go first. 
This interview response shows the contrast between the old employment practices and 
the new employment practices, and it highlights the previous emphasis on seniority as 
the main criteria for promotions during that time.   
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The descriptions from the interview respondents above and from documents 
about the organization at this time are mainly consistent with the bureaucratic logic.  
There had been a formal structure with a steep vertical hierarchy within the 
organization.  Entry into the workforce was centralized through the Public Service 
Commission, as was the case with other public organizations in Zambia, and 
promotions were based on length of tenure rather than merit or professional 
qualifications.  There was rudimentary training leading to diplomas in state auditing, 
but this was not enough to keep up with changing trends in government finance as well 
as the global movement toward performance audits as a way of measuring the value 
for money of government programs (Hoque & Thiagarajah, 2015).   
While those descriptions described the formal ways in which the organization 
operated, interview respondents also described ways in which there was an informal 
mode of operation in the organization.  Workers often did not work full days – 
showing up late and leaving early.  One respondent described the way people viewed 
their work at that time as, “just waiting for your salary at the end of the month… I go 
to work, and at the end of the month, I get my salary.”  The notion that workers were 
responsible for producing tangible outputs and actually working the hours for which 
they were paid did not seem salient to many at that time.  This way of viewing work is 
consistent with a kinship logic, in which there is no separation between the private 
sphere and the public sphere (Hydén, 2013a; Masunungure, 2004).  So, according to 
the mode of operation of the kinship logic, the organization was there to meet the 
personal needs of its management and staff – serving as the “personal fiefdoms” of 
civil servants (Montgomery, 1987).  The consequences to this mode of operation were 
low levels of service to the public at the expense of state resources.     
Furthermore, there was also the impression that the Office of Auditor General 
had formerly been compromised by undue influence from political leaders at that time.  
The Auditor General herself said in an interview, that “the institution seemed to have 
been very politicized, because at that time, even the auditor general that was there, the 
poor man, was getting instructions sometimes from politicians.  That made his job 
very difficult”.  Hatchard (2014) likewise noted similar problems related to undue 
political influence of the Auditor General during the Chiluba administration:  
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[T]he Auditor General failed properly to exercise his duties or alternatively 
chose not to exercise the duties required of him probably because of the 
intimidatory nature of Chungu [who was the Director General of the Zambian 
Security Services at that time] and the unwillingness of the Auditor General to 
challenge him and thus the president (p. 72).   
These situations during the Chiluba administration, in which the former Auditor 
General was seen as acting at the behest of the President and the Director General of 
the Zambian Security Services, are consistent with the kinship logic, in which there 
was informal control through fear of reprisals or expectations of reciprocal exchanges.   
It was in the midst of these challenges, in 1996, that the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry began funding a development project at the Office of Auditor General 
Zambia, called the Restructuring and Institutional Development Project (RIDP).  The 
purpose of the project was to “to build the capacity of the Office of the Auditor 
General (OAG Zambia) to ‘conduct independent, timely and cost effective audits in 
order to ensure optimal utilisation of resources’” (Norad, 2008, p. 113, parentheses in 
original).  According to a representative from the Norwegian Embassy, the Norwegian 
government started the project at “the time when the thrust for proper management of 
corruption activities came into the fore” at an international level, and they saw the 
Office of Auditor General as “a very important institution, but [realized] it was playing 
‘second fiddle’ in the background, and it was not coming out as important as it should 
be”.  So, in light of international developments related to accountability and the 
control of corruption, the Norwegian government saw the Office of Auditor General as 
an increasingly important organization and a central part in an overall strategy for 
improving governance in Zambia.   
The interview respondent then went on to describe the Norwegian involvement 
at this time in the following:  
So, from 1996 till 2001, that was called RIDP-I.  Much of what happened there 
was trying to identify the proper building blocks to make a supreme audit 
institution, and realigning this in its proper sequence.  It was purely the basics 
of restructuring. 
At that time, the Norwegian development project at the Office of Auditor General was 
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focused on evaluating what needed to be done to modernize and build capacity within 
the organization, as well as offering technical training to members of the audit staff.  
These processes were consistent with the values of the professionalism logic, 
particularly as it related to training Zambian auditors in the skills and methods of the 
professional field of auditing.    
 
Instability, Transition, and the Promulgation of Alternative Logics 
Meanwhile, problems and scandals were beginning to surface within the 
government of Zambia and throughout the country.  The benefits from liberalization 
reforms that were promised by President Chiluba, who served from 1991-2001, were 
not being realized, and there was additional uncertainty after Chiluba had reached the 
limit of serving two terms as president (Ng'oma, 2008).  There were rumors of 
rampant corruption in the government, high levels of inflation, and rising 
unemployment as some of the nation’s copper mines began closing (Ibid).  At this time 
in Zambia’s history, there was a crucial role to be played by an Office of Auditor 
General that would be capable of holding the government to account for the way it was 
using public resources.  However, at this time, the agency was still not equipped to 
handle the scope of audits required for this responsibility, nor was it prepared to 
communicate the findings of their audits with the public.     
In the final years of the Chiluba presidency, the public and the media had begun 
calling for greater accountability of government officials who were suspected of 
committing fraud or the theft of public funds.  The independent Zambian newspaper, 
The Post, had begun running news stories alleging corruption at the highest offices of 
government.  The most notable news story was called Chiluba is a Thief, which sent 
shockwaves through Zambian society because it dared to speak negatively about a 
sitting president in such a frank manner, which up until then had been unheard of.  The 
newspaper editor and the reporter of the article were both charged with libel for calling 
President Chiluba a thief.  During their trial, however, they produced additional 
evidence of corruption as a part of their defense when they called government 
witnesses to testify and subpoenaed bank documents related to corruption.  The 
evidence pointed to Chiluba and to his inner circle of advisors, and the court case 
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“became popularly referred to as the ‘Chiluba is a Thief’ trial” (Ryder, 2011, p. 1) 
after the infamous title of the newspaper article.  During this time, the public and the 
donor community started to become interested in corruption and transparency, and 
they wanted the Zambian government to hold individuals accountable for acts of 
corruption and to recover public resources that had been stolen (Norad, 2011; Ryder, 
2011).   
In the wake of these events, Levy Mwanawasa was elected president in the 
2001 presidential elections.  He entered office in January 2002, replacing Chiluba, 
who was unable to have the constitution amended to allow for a third term as 
president.  After taking office, Mwanawasa began talking about the need to “root out 
corruption” in Zambia as pressure from the public continued to increase (Ryder, 2011; 
Taylor, 2006).  Mwanawasa called the Zambian Parliament into a special session later 
that year, where he “made a landmark speech” requesting parliament lift Chiluba’s 
immunity so that criminal investigations could begin (Ryder, 2011, p. 2).  Parliament 
voted unanimously to lift Chiluba’s immunity as a shock to many in the region and to 
Chiluba himself, since up until that time, there had been a longstanding policy of not 
investigating or prosecuting former rulers in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ng'oma, 2008).  The 
investigations against Chiluba and other government officials were carried by the Task 
Force on Corruption, which was established by Mwanawasa that same year.  Chiluba 
would eventually be charged with 168 counts of theft of government resources and 
later found guilty of stealing $46,000,000 (Ryder, 2011, p. 6).  In the midst of these 
events, The Mwanawasa administration also began strengthening accountability 
organizations such as the Office of Auditor General. 
The events surrounding the National Assembly’s stripping of Chiluba’s 
immunity and the Task Force’s investigations into his alleged corruption were a 
dramatic break with the status quo, and they sent shock waves throughout Zambia and 
the region.  This was an unfolding of historical events that had the potential to 
“dislocate, rearticulate, and transform the interpretation and meaning of cultural 
symbols and social and economic structures” and an ability to “reinforce or erode the 
dominance of the incumbent logic[s]” in Zambia (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 116).  
This was a critical moment in which changes to social structures in Zambia seemed 
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possible and when principles and practices from alternative institutional logics, such as 
the development management logic and professionalism logic, could be promulgated 
within the organizational context.  According to Sewell (1996), “historical events” 
such as these begin with ruptures to the status quo that cascade outward and lead to 
other ruptures, which can eventually lead to significant and sustainable change in 
institutional structures.     
The following sections present a narrative account of how alternative logics 
were promulgated in the Office of Auditor General Zambia, leading to change within 
the organizational context.  This account begins in 2003, which was a year in which 
major events began happening within the organization that strengthened the alternative 
institutional logics.  This was also the year that interview respondents and donors 
believe that the organization “made a leap forward” in its capacity-building process 
and its development as a public accountability organization (Norad, 2011, p. 37).  This 
section will consider two key processes through which the alternative logics were 
promulgated and how organization members responded.  The first process began in 
May 2003, with the appointment of a new Auditor General.  She would lead an 
organizational change process within the Office of Auditor General, promulgating 
principles and practices consistent with the professionalism and development 
management logics.  A second process is related to the first, when the Office of 
Auditor General Zambia became actively involved in international partnerships and 
networks with other Supreme Audit Institutions.  These engagements began with a 
partnership with the Office of Auditor General Norway in 2003, as part of the 
Norwegian development program already underway (Office of the Auditor General 
Zambia, 2010, p. 5).  Later, the office extended these relationships toward other 
Supreme Audit Institutions through its involvement with the International 
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and the African Organization 
for Supreme Audit Institutions in English-Speaking Countries (AFROSAI-E).    
These two processes are explained using theoretical concepts from the literature 
on institutional theory.  The first concept is “institutional entrepreneurship”, which is a 
process through which organizational actors drive divergent institutional change, 
breaking away from institutionalized norms and structures leading to new norms and 
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structures.  Here, the focus is placed on the newly appointed auditor general who acted 
as an institutional entrepreneur and led a professionalization process in the office.  The 
second process is the Office of Auditor General’s engagement with the international 
professional community as seen through the theoretical concept of “structural overlap” 
in which the boundaries of organizational structures overlap, providing opportunities 
for the exchange of new ideas and lowering the constraints and embeddedness of 
actors (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  Theoretical concepts about the “imitation and 
translation” of organizational ideas through the professional fields (Wedlin & Sahlin, 
2017) are also used to explain fine-grained processes through which the changes took 
place within the organization.     
 
Appointment of a New Auditor General, an Institutional Entrepreneur 
Just a few months after the investigation into Frederick Chiluba began and after 
President Mwanawasa’s call to “root out corruption” in Zambia, the president 
appointed a new Auditor General to lead the National Audit Office, Anna Chifungula.  
She began leading the office in May 2003 as Acting Auditor General before being 
formally confirmed as Auditor General three months later, in July.  As Auditor 
General, she came to play a central role in promulgating the professionalism and 
development management logics within the office.  Her role and her actions 
contributed to changes in the way the organization employs and promotes members of 
its audit staff as well as the values, norms, and practices that are central in the 
organization today.   
The analytic narrative in this section presents the Auditor General as an 
institutional entrepreneur for two reasons related to theoretical perspectives and 
salience to interview respondents (Campbell, 2004, p. 37).  First, the literature on 
institutions and institutional logics has laid a theoretical foundation for studies of 
institutional entrepreneurship, which describes the processes of actors who drive 
divergent structural change within an institutionalized environment.  Second, this 
reflects the experiences and descriptions of interview respondents, as they described 
her being the key actor in many of the changes in the organization.  In that way, 
presenting the narrative account as processes of institutional entrepreneurship is an 
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attempt to reflect the perspectives of the interview respondents as they experienced 
and understood these processes as well as being based in established theory.        
As discussed previously, institutional entrepreneurship is understood as the 
“activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and 
who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones” 
(Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p. 198).  This concept within institutional theory explains 
how change can take place within institutions and the role that central actors play in 
these processes.  According to Battilana et al. (2009), the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship “reintroduce[es] actors’ agency to institutional analysis”, a notion 
which had been overlooked in much of the new-institutional theory literature (p. 66).  
As the narrative is presented in this section, it will describe and analyze how the 
Auditor General acted as an institutional entrepreneur to bring change to the 
organization and promulgate alternative institutional logics.  It will provide an account 
of how she mobilized and leveraged resources from the state (Hardy & Maguire, 
2008), as well as from international donors, to promulgate elements of the 
professionalism and development management logics.  It will also provide an analysis 
of different factors and strategies that enabled the processes of institutional 
entrepreneurship within the audit office.   
 
 Enabling factors of institutional entrepreneurship 
Contextual and social factors are important aspects to consider, as they are 
thought to enable the process of institutional entrepreneurship.  According to Battilana 
et al. (2009), this because of the “paradox of embedded agency” (p. 72; see also 
Andrews, 2013, p. 94), which poses the “question of how organizations or individuals 
whose beliefs and actions are determined by existing institutions can break with these 
very same institutions and innovate” (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 72).  One contextual 
factor in the case of the Office of Auditor General is the organization’s previous 
engagement in a capacity building project with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.  This 
project had already begun to highlight structural weaknesses and a lack of 
professionalism in the office through its evaluations of audit methodologies, internal 
organizational systems, and human resource capacities (Norad, 2007, p. 57).  These 
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evaluations contributed to a state of “internal contradiction” and “unstable tension” 
(Battilana et al., 2009, p. 75) between the condition of the office at that time and that 
of a proper functioning professional audit office to conduct timely audits and hold the 
government accountable for its use of funds.  According to Battilana et al. (2009), 
these tensions would help lower the barriers to change, making it easier for 
organization members to question the status quo and diverge from the way things were 
being done in the organization up until that time. 
When the Auditor General was appointed to lead the organization in 2003, the 
audit office had previously concluded the first phase of the development project 
funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in 2001.  Upon her appointment, the 
Norwegians were again willing to sign on to another phase of the project, this time 
with expanded funding from the Dutch government and expanded technical support 
and training from the Office of Auditor General Norway.  According to Chifungula, 
signing the memorandum of understanding with the Norwegians was one of the first 
things she did as acting Auditor General, as she travelled to Norway before being 
formally confirmed in her position later that year.   
In addition to the ongoing development project with the Norwegians, another 
important factor was related to the social position of the new Auditor General.  
Institutional entrepreneurship is only theoretically possible if agents are capable of 
breaking from the norms, values, and rules of the dominant institutional logics guiding 
their organizational context while still having the resources to initiate change process.  
The Auditor General was in a unique position to drive divergent change and introduce 
alternative logics within the organization based on her social position.  She was 
coming from the Ministry of Finance where she had been the Acting Secretary of the 
Treasury and had also been the Controller of Internal Audits in the Ministry, where she 
played a role in uncovering corruption in the Chiluba administration and had also been 
involved in a professionalization process within the ministry.  Therefore, when she 
arrived in the Office of Auditor General, she was able to draw upon her cache of social 
capital and experiences from her previous roles.   
Chifungula had served in various positions within the Ministry of Finance.  She 
was Controller of Internal Audits from 1997-2002 and later appointed Acting 
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Secretary of the Treasury from 2002-2003.  While working in internal audits at the 
Ministry of Finance, she had played a pivotal role in uncovering evidence of 
corruption by Chiluba’s inner circle, evidence which would later be used by the 
special Task Force on Corruption set up to investigate and prosecute these cases 
(Chifungula, n.d.).  It was her work in uncovering and presenting this evidence about 
illicit financial transactions that first brought her to the attention of President 
Mwanawasa.  According to Nevers Mumba, who was Vice President during that time, 
it was Chifungula’s bold character that eventually led to her appointment as Auditor 
General.  He went on to say, 
I think, without any exaggeration, we set a tone in the fight against corruption 
that up until today is unmatched.  And so, it was arising from that vision of zero 
tolerance to corruption, which was our theme, zero tolerance to corruption, that 
we ended up with an auditor general that the President felt was strong enough 
to handle that office.  Obviously, the Auditor General has to be ratified by 
Parliament, but at that time we were very comfortable in the House because we 
had the majority in Parliament.  It made our job easier to have her ratified. 
Former Vice President Mumba continued by describing Chifungula as “a no-nonsense 
auditor general, because she doesn’t fear anyone”.  Which according to Mumba, was 
what the government needed to deal with corruption at that time.   
When Chifungula arrived at the Office of Auditor General, she was not already 
embedded within the institutional context of that office, and she could come in with a 
new perspective and envision and initiate change within the Office of Auditor General.  
She could also draw upon a cache of social capitol, as President Mwanawasa and his 
cabinet gave her considerable freedom to make changes within the Office of Auditor 
General.  She began the change process by working with the President’s Cabinet 
Office to restructure the office, drawing on significant support from the Norwegian 
and Dutch development partners (Norad, 2007, p. 46; 2011, p. 37).  As the Auditor 
General said during her interview for this case study, “When I came in, I just came in 
running!” because, according to her, there was much work that needed to be done in 
the organization to bring it up to professional standards.      
 
 102 
Furthermore, Chifungula’s experiences in her previous social position as 
Controller of Internal Audits, oriented her toward certain courses of action that were 
consistent with the professionalism logic (Cardinale, 2018).  She would use the same 
types of training and certification programs that had been used in the Ministry of 
Finance for the auditors to become certified chartered accountants.  It was also helpful 
that she had formal authority in her new social position as Auditor General to lead the 
organization and launch a “professionalization project” (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p. 
208), bringing it to an international professional level.  One way she did that was by 
changing the recruiting and promotion policy in the office as part of the organizational 
restructuring process.  Previously, auditors were recruited straight out of secondary 
school and apprenticed within the organization.  After 2003, auditors were to be 
recruited already holding university degrees or professional certifications such as from 
the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA) or the Zambian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (ZICA).  Existing auditors on staff, none of whom had these 
accounting certifications, were given seven years to upgrade their qualifications to 
those levels.  If they failed to upgrade their qualifications, they would have no chance 
of being promoted within the organization and could even face demotion.  In this way, 
the Auditor General implemented changes in employment and promotion practices 
that were the enactment of the professionalism logic and based on professional 
training and the achievement of certifications.   
As a result of these changes in employment practices, some officers who had 
been with the organization for decades were still working in junior-level positions 
while newer recruits have surpassed them.  These auditors, for various reasons, have 
either not upgraded their qualifications or are doing so at a slower pace than their 
colleagues.  One of the Auditors who was left behind by his colleagues was asked how 
he felt about the changes in promotion policies: 
 Interviewer: How do you feel about that? 
Auditor: Personally, I think it encourages people to read [i.e., to prepare for 
exams].  It’s OK. 
Interviewer: Even if you are missing out?   
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Auditor: Yes, because a lot of people used to be under me.  Some of them are 
high up there.  Some of them are in the same level.  Most of my colleagues are 
directors - those who went ahead and did what they were supposed to do.  But 
for me, I relaxed… That is the difference between the old way and now.  But in 
the old times we even had directors who didn’t have the papers [professional 
certifications].  That’s why she [the Auditor General] decided to push them 
aside. 
Some officers nearing the retirement age of 59 have decided it is not worth it to 
upgrade their certifications.  They have essentially made the decision that staying 
where they are and not being promoted is a better alternative than investing the time to 
upgrade their qualifications.  The following interview segment typifies this rationale:  
Auditor: Alright.  I’m not an accountant, and my highest qualification is an 
advanced diploma, and in terms of how it has affected me, I’m aware that I 
won’t be promoted beyond this point. Otherwise, how else is it affected me?  I 
don’t think it has.   
Interviewer: What if you want to be promoted? 
Auditor: I would have to move to another office [within the civil service] or 
upgrade myself… But for me that’s not really an option.  I’m only a few years 
to retirement. 
These interview responses note that not all organization members have been able, or 
have even had the desire, to upgrade their professional certifications.  Because of that, 
they have not been promoted within the organization because there has been a change 
from employment processes that were consistent with a bureaucratic logic to the new 
employment processes consistent with the professionalism logic.   
 
 Removing institutional defenders  
One of the critical decisions the new Auditor General made after she arrived 
was removing “institutional defenders”, those officers who were against changes in the 
employment practices and had “benefit[ed] from the status quo” (Battilana et al., 2009, 
p. 78).  As the Auditor General said in her interview, “We got rid of 30 of them.  We 
had to write them letters of retrenchment, because they were almost ‘dead wood’ 
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anyway.”  By terminating this “dead wood”, or the existing employees who were 
defending the bureaucratic logic’s employment practices based on seniority and 
resisting the move toward more professionalism, she eliminated much of the resistance 
within the office to change.  This made the process of professionalizing the office go 
smoother and move at a more rapid pace.   
However, according to some interview respondents, the removal of the 
institutional defenders was both “good and bad”.  They believe that the Auditor 
General “pushed out” too many people, and that “some people who could have helped 
and had knowledge of audits – they may have been pushed out because they didn’t 
follow what she [the Auditor General] wanted”.   Not everyone was happy with the 
way the Auditor General was changing the way the office operated, but according to 
Chifungula, “luckily, I had so much good will because it was a new government, and I 
had so much good will from the secretary of the cabinet”.  Therefore, she was able to 
drive through many of these changes, even being able to terminate public officers, 
with very little resistance at that time, because of her social position within the 
organization and within the government.    
 
Rhetorical strategies of an institutional entrepreneur 
The Auditor General created and communicated a new vision for divergent 
change within the organization, which is an important part of the process of 
institutional entrepreneurship, according to Battilana et al. (2009).  This is necessary 
for driving such divergent change processes, as it can “make explicit the failing of the 
existing organization” and “expose problems with current institutionalized practices” 
(Ibid, p. 79). As one of the Deputy Auditor General’s described it,   
The current auditor general came here in 2003.  Now when she came in 2003…, 
she had her own vision.  Her own vision was that she wanted a professional 
office, which was comprised of qualified people for what we were doing.  So, 
we started the restructuring program which was helped by RIDP [the 
Norwegian and Dutch development project]… The main issue was capacity 
building, and so a number of us, at least those who wanted to study, enrolled in 
ACCA [Association of Certified Chartered Accountants]… At the time when 
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the Auditor General arrived, there wasn’t a single chartered accountant in this 
office.  She was the only one when she came 1, but today I can tell you we are 
now over 100.  So, the transformation has been quite tremendous.  And we’ve 
continued with that process because almost every semester we are getting one 
or two or three who are qualified.  So, even in terms of recognition within the 
region, because of that, we are now being recognized as one of the audit 
institutions which is quite professionalized.   
The Auditor General’s vision entailed the need for new employment practices that 
were consistent with the professionalism logic, that employees should be trained and 
skilled in the standards and methods of the professional field and required to hold the 
appropriate professional certifications for the work that they were doing.   
While the Auditor General’s vision was consistent with the professionalism 
logic, in other ways it was also consistent with the development management logic, by 
its focus on the empowerment of society and its marginalized groups (Brinkerhoff & 
Coston, 1999, p. 350).  When she arrived, she cast a vision that diverged from the 
former way of working in the organization, being insular and merely just showing up 
for a paycheck.  The new vision was in line with the development management logic 
to watch over taxpayers’ money to ensure it was used for the development of the 
country.  She described the recurring pep talk she gave to the new auditors joining the 
office, in which she would try to inspire them, telling them:  
This is a calling.  You are here to make sure public resources are managed 
properly and they reach the intended purpose.  That is to follow every kwacha 
that is spent, wherever it is spent! 
The Auditor General used a religious term, “calling”, to describe the work they 
were doing in the audit office.  A development management logic is, at its core, an 
idealistic and moral concept based on taking “a normative stance on empowerment 
and supporting groups, particularly the poor and marginalized, to take an active role in 
determining and fulfilling their own needs” (Brinkerhoff & Coston, 1999, p. 350; 
Thomas, 1999).  Taking the development management logic and its normative 
                                               
1 Some documentation notes that there were actually 2 chartered accountants in the office at that time, 
including the Auditor General and one other organization member (OAGZ Project Document, 2010). 
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assertions to their ultimate end would call for an almost missionary zeal in fulfilling its 
mission of empowering the disempowered, giving voice to the voiceless, and 
protecting the poor from those who would abuse their authority and power against 
them.  Thus, it would not be much of an exaggeration to use the religious term, 
“calling”, to describe their work.   
This vision was repeated among organization members, and it can still be heard 
being repeated today.  It contributes to organization members’ shared sense of identity 
through their affiliation with the organization’s vision of serving the needs of society 
and its vulnerable members.  As one auditor put it, there is now more “emphasis on… 
the goals and mission of the organization… So, what are you going to do to make sure 
that mission is achieved? …The only way is for us to work together… trying to 
contribute to the achievement of the mission of the institution.” And, he went on to 
describe the heart of the mission in the following statement:  
That’s the mission of the institution.  It is society that is supposed to benefit – 
the community and the common person.  The moment the common person in 
society does not benefit, that means the mission of the institution is not 
achieved.  Hence, we have a motto which says, ‘We follow the kwacha 
wherever it goes.’ 
An important part of institutional entrepreneurship is “the use of discourse” to 
“convince different constituencies embedded in the existing institutions of the need for 
the change and mobilize them behind it” (Battilana et al., 2009, pp. 81-82).  Discursive 
statements, such as the motto to “follow every kwacha that is spent” and that the job is 
actually “a calling”, are more than simple sentences or phrases.  They form an 
“elementary unit of discourse” (Foucault, 2002, p. 90) or a “sign” that circulates 
within the organization to help the members make sense of their roles and the rules 
they follow and what acts they should carry out (Ibid, pp. 97-98).  They help create a 
“collective intentionality” among organizational members, in which “the crucial 
element… is a sense of doing (wanting, believing, etc.) something together, and the 
individual intentionality that each person has is derived from the collective 
intentionality they share” (Searle, 1995, p. 24, parentheses in original).  These 
statements that came from the Auditor General and were circulated through the 
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organization contributed toward a shared identity that is based on the mission of the 
organization to serve the public, and they are the enactment of the development 
management logic.   
The Auditor General also used storytelling as another rhetorical strategy and a 
way to mobilize people around her vision for the organization.  By doing so, she 
connected the organization to its missional goals and communicated a need for major 
change to be able to hold the government to account for its misuse of public resources.  
One of the stories she told in her interview is an example of this rhetorical strategy:     
I remember our auditors going to a very remote place, where there was a bridge 
that was supposed to be done there.  Four million US dollars had been paid, and 
an engineer had signed that the work had been done.  He certified the work.  So, 
when our officers went there with all these certificates of work, to go and see 
the place, they just found a wide river.  There was a heap of sand somewhere 
beside the river, but where was the bridge that you certified was done?  It 
wasn’t there, so we asked the Permanent Secretary, and he said, “No, no, the 
bridge was built.”  So, I took him along.  I said, “Look. Let us go there.”  And 
we went there together with the Public Accounts Committee, and he was so 
shocked [and said:] “But they said the bridge was here!”  [And I said:] “Well, 
as you can see we used the canoes to cross.”  But four million dollars was 
spent.  Because of the [four-year] time lag, when we were going there, they said 
the bridge had been constructed four years ago, but when we got there, there 
was nothing.  
The Auditor General’s story about the abandoned bridge and the canoes connects the 
former way the organization had operated and its failures to hold the government 
accountable with a need for change.  It expressed the need to change, to become more 
skilled and capable of “following every kwacha” and ensuring public funds are used 
for their intended purposes.   
The Auditor General also used rhetorical strategies to motivate employees, 
which was especially crucial in her first years within the organization.  She described 
the ways in which she motived them, that she would talk one-on-one with them, 
identifying with them and “providing compelling reasons to support the new vision” 
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(Battilana et al., 2009, p. 80) and rewarding those who supported it (Hardy & Maguire, 
2008, p. 207).  She described this process in the following statement:  
They were not difficult to motivate - just talking to them, you know, giving 
them a vision of the future, how I wanted this office to be in the next five years.  
I showed them, look, though you are like this now, but give me two or three 
years, and we should maybe be able to get our autonomy and remunerate you 
properly.  Also, there is the training, most of them were so interested in the 
training function, and of course auditing is moving around, so most of them 
would complain, “I have this problem or that problem”.  So, I would send them 
to some courses outside the country, just to make sure they interacted with 
other people and developed that interest in the office.   
Interview respondents described the marked change in how the new Auditor General 
talked with them on a personal level, remarking that it was a departure from the way 
previous Auditor Generals had interacted with them.  Communication with the 
organization had become more collegial and less rigid.   
At the same time, the hierarchal structure of the organization was also 
becoming less centralized and easier to work through.  This was a result of the 
restructuring process that began in the organization after the Auditor General was 
appointed.  These changes made the organization flatter, with fewer positions in the 
hierarchy and more departments focused on distinct tasks.  Organization members 
noted that the organization was still hierarchical, but that it had become less 
centralized and more collegial, and that they now had more autonomy to do their work 
than they previously had.  As one auditor said,  
The hierarchy is still there, but there is more horizontal interaction.  There is 
more interaction, like between myself and fellow principal auditors, and 
directorate to directorate.  There is more consultation.  You can call on various 
[areas of] expertise from various directorates.  So, if we are editing and are 
stuck on something, we can call on someone, if it is something to do with fraud, 
we can call on someone from specialized audits. 
The new organization structure also enables professionals to use their skills 
with relative autonomy in an organizational arrangement that is consistent with a 
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professionalism logic.  This structure places less emphasis on a technocracy that would 
set work standards and devise ways of ensuring workers adhere to them (Mintzberg, 
1989), as would be consistent with a bureaucratic logic.  In the case of a professional 
organization like the OAGZ, there is a standardization of work, but this 
standardization does not come from a technocratic structure or management.  Rather it 
comes from the professional training and education the auditors share (Freidson, 
2001).  This allows the organization to be more collegial and collaborative, with more 
autonomy and more interaction between the professionals, even from different 
divisions or departments. 
The auditors in the office spoke often about their professional training and how 
it was important to their work and their legitimacy as auditors.  Their training and 
certification comes from a variety of sources, with most being chartered accountants, 
either through the Zambian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) or the more 
internationally established Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA).  
Auditors also have bachelors or even master’s degrees in accounting, which solidifies 
their sense of shared identity.  Lamont and Molnár (2002) see this creation of shared 
identity as interactive work across social boundaries.  Through it, individuals 
“differentiate themselves from others by drawing on criteria of community and a sense 
of shared belonging within their subgroup” while at the same time, “this internal 
identification process must be recognized by outsiders for an objectified collective 
identity to emerge” (Ibid, p. 170).  This is especially true in the professions, which 
“originally emerged as a demarcation problem… between ‘special’ and ordinary 
occupations” (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 177, see also Freidson, 2001).   
From that perspective, one’s sense of identity is forged through a dialectic 
process of both internal and external definition.  It is in the interplay of seeing the 
meaning of “us” according to “them”, and vice versa, that individuals get a sense of 
whom they are.  Education is one way in which group demarcation happens, “by 
drawing a line between insiders and outsiders” (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 178).  
Education is an indispensable aspect of professionalism, because it is the “primary 
source of the status of its members and their personal, public, and official identities” 
(Freidson, 2001, p. 84).  It also leads professionals like the Zambian auditors to a 
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deeper “commitment to the occupation as a life career and to a shared identity, a 
feeling of community or solidarity among all those who have passed through it” (Ibid, 
p. 84).  Interview respondents often related their sense of shared identity with their 
professional education, and also in their participation within an international 
community of state audit professionals.  This engagement with the international 
community of professional state auditors had an impact on the way they saw 
themselves and the way they did their work, which is described in more detail in the 
following section.   
 
Engagement with an International Professional Community 
While the new Auditor General was acting as an institutional entrepreneur, the 
Office of Auditor General was also becoming increasingly engaged with the 
international community of state audit professionals.  These engagements were another 
means through which alternative logics were promulgated within the office.  This has 
happened primarily through two main avenues of international engagement with the 
professional community.  The first avenue has been through a twinning partnership 
between the Office of Auditor General Zambia and the Office of Auditor General 
Norway, which is a development partnership “meant to facilitate hands-on skills 
transfer for auditors” (OAGZ, 2016, p. 10).  The second avenue has been through the 
Zambian audit office’s involvement with regional and international professional 
organizations, the International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions 
(INTOSAI) and the African Organization for English-Speaking Supreme Audit 
Institutions (AFROSAI-E). 
The Norwegian and Zambian audit offices began having regular exchanges 
between them in 2003, after the second phase of the RIDP development project had 
begun (Office of the Auditor General Zambia, 2010, p. 5).  This type of “twinning” 
partnership between the Zambian and Norwegian SAIs is a capacity-building process 
through which “fellow professionals from similar organizations in the North” engage 
in a “variety of person-to-person relationships” with their counterparts from 
organizations in the South (Askvik, 1999, p. 403).  In a twinning partnership such as 
this, there is a focus on the face-to-face relationships between like-minded 
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professionals from both organizations in addition to the more traditional development 
methods of providing resources and technical assistance.  A recent report on the 
twinning partnership between the Zambian and Norwegian audit offices noted the 
types of exercises that were being carried out between the two organizations, such as 
“joint audits” in which Zambian and Norwegian auditors conducted audits together as 
a learning process and other activities through which they could have an “exchange of 
experiences” and ways to share knowledge between them (Riksrevisionen, 2013, p. 8).   
According to interview respondents, the partnership has been a benefit to the 
Zambian office, not least because of the material resources and training it has provided 
them.  They described ways in which it increased their confidence to conduct audits, 
especially the more modern types of audits such as performance audits or 
environmental audits, and that it helped them to “think outside the box” and imagine 
new ways of doing their work, as described by one of the interview respondents.  This 
happened as Zambian auditors began conducting performance audits alongside the 
more seasoned and experienced Norwegian auditors, and in doing so, they were able to 
build their professional skills and their confidence to eventually conduct these audits 
without help from their Norwegian counterparts.  This collaborative working 
relationship also modelled to the Zambian auditors the professional values and 
collective identity that are consistent with the professionalism logic.   
Interview respondents also noted the importance of working alongside other 
auditors from within the same region, through AFROSAI-E.  They mentioned how 
cultural similarities made it easier for them to work with their close regional neighbors 
than to work with those from other parts of the world.  As one of the informants said, 
“there is a shared sense of identity, especially with our close neighbors in Southern 
Africa.”  He went on to mention that, for example, “Nigeria is different and [their 
office is] structured differently, so there is not much common ground.  Also, culturally 
they are just different.”  So, even within the continent of Africa, cultural boundaries 
between Northern African and Southern Africa can have an effect on their professional 
engagement with one another, making the collaboration between close neighbors even 
more important.  Another interview respondent also described his relationships with 
auditors from the Sub-Saharan African region through AFROSAI-E, noting he felt 
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“more or less on the same level” with them and able to talk about similar problems 
they may encounter in their work.  Thus, in addition to the close cooperation with the 
Norwegian audit office, there was also an element of camaraderie and common 
exchange that they experienced with Southern African auditors through their 
collaboration with AFROSAI-E.   
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) discussed the importance of these types of 
interorganizational relationships, as they can lead to change among institutional logics.  
They called these types of relationships between organizations “structural overlaps” 
(Ibid, 116) since they are arrangements through which one organizational boundary 
overlaps another organizational boundary, which can provide access to alternative 
ideas and institutional logics.  This type of relationship exists between the Office of 
Auditor General Zambia and its regional and international counterparts, and it reduces 
the barriers to change as it “increases the awareness of and experiences with 
contradictions in logics, which lowers constraints and embeddedness of actors” (Ibid, 
p. 116).  The interactions that took place between the Office of Auditor General and its 
international and regional counterparts provided access to new ideas about how to 
perform audits and act as professional auditors.  In this way the Zambian auditors were 
“local interpreters and translators” of the institutional logics, which they “‘performed 
into being’ in [their] particular organizational context” through processes of imitation 
and translation (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, p. 121). 
 
The imitation and translation of professional ideas  
As auditors from the Office of Auditor General interacted with their 
professional peers, they engaged in a process of imitation, which is “a basic social 
mechanism tying people together” according to Wedlin and Sahlin (2017, p. 107).  
This process of imitation was based on their perceived shared identity as professional 
auditors.  In the process, they imitated the values, principles and practices of the 
professional community, translating them into their own organizational environment.  
This brings the imitation process back full circle, as the Zambian auditors started 
becoming more like the other members of the community in the process.  In that way, 
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the imitation process is dialectical: “perceived identity shapes imitation” while 
“imitation shapes identity” (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, p. 107).   
These processes of imitation and translation took place within the interstices of 
the overlapped social structures of the Zambian audit office and its counterparts from 
around the world.  As Zambian auditors met with auditors from other contexts, they 
were able to discuss similar stories about their work, discuss best practices, and 
exchange ideas; and through that process to develop their shared sense of identity as 
professional state auditors and translate the international audit standards within their 
own local context.  In this way, the ideas, standards, and values of the professionalism 
logic “became quasi-objects, transgressing the barriers of local time and entering 
translocal paths, becoming disembedded… becoming reembedded, materialized into 
actions, and – when judged successful – becoming institutions” (Czarniawska & 
Joerges, 1996, pp. 22-23).   
Auditors from the Office of Auditor General Zambia share a sense of 
professional identity with state auditors from around the world, and this is consistent 
with the professionalism logic.  This shared professional identity became evident in 
the course of conducting interviews in the office, as respondents discussed the ways in 
which they saw their roles within the office and their camaraderie with other auditors.  
One auditor described the sense of shared identity in the following statement: 
I can give an example of a recent [training session] from AFROSAI and IDI.  
They even invited people from the South African SAI, and you feel more or 
less on the same level.  And since you are learning together, you are asking 
questions, and together you see your friends where they are also lacking.  It 
makes you feel you are on the same level, and you feel a friendly feeling, even 
when you meet them in another meeting, you go back to that same person and 
say “Hey you remember we met in that place for this and that, and we were 
looking at this assignment.”  That’s my feeling.  
This interview response denotes the personal connection, even at an emotional level, 
that the Zambian auditors experienced with other members of the professional 
community.   
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Even in the midst of imitation and camaraderie, there is still a desire for 
members of the Office of Auditor General to distinguish themselves from other audit 
institutions through competition within the professional community.  This is done 
through a ranking system within AFROSAI-E in which the audit agencies are ranked 
according to how well they have implemented audit standards and practices.  There is 
a strong desire among many of the organization members to stand out from the rest of 
the field by being ranked higher than other audit offices.  Those processes of imitation 
and competition would not be possible without the structural overlap of AFROSAI-E 
and INTOSAI, which provides access to the auditors, organization leaders, and other 
prominent actors in the field with whom the circulation of ideas and identity 
construction depends.  One of the Deputy Auditor Generals described it in this way:  
The thing is, with our active involvement with AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI, this 
has helped us to try to be up there with the best.  Because with AFROSAI-E, 
we have these gradings, which we aim for, so that we improve, you know, to 
the next level.  We want to be at the highest level but there are certain criteria 
we need to meet to reach that level. 
The auditors talked about the pride they have as members of the professional 
community and particularly as members of their own office, which has made strong 
progress in moving from a poor performing SAI to leader in the region.  One of the 
partners from the Norwegian embassy remarked on this change in the auditors’ sense 
of pride.  He noted that it started from the top of the organization, with the Auditor 
General, and it worked its way down through the organization.  She is “competitive as 
a leader” and “wants to showcase the work [the office] is doing… and apart from that 
competitive leadership, there is a professional pride, where the staff want to stand out 
and prove their professionalism.  They are not shy to stand up and say, ‘We are able to 
do this!’”.  This was echoed in a later interview with a Zambian auditor who said, 
“you find that because of the sense of belonging to a professional body… it will make 
you want to prove yourself”.   The more the members of the Office of Auditor General 
strived to prove themselves, the more they came to identify with and imitate their 
counterparts from AFROSAI and INTOSAI, becoming more like them and reflecting 
their values and beliefs.     
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Training workshops are a key way in which the Zambian auditors engage with 
the international professional community, which can take place within AFROSAI-E 
and INTOSAI and through the twinning partnership with the Office of Auditor 
General Norway.  This is where the Zambian auditors meet other auditors from the 
region as well as auditors and trainers from partnering institutions from the Global 
North.  Freidson (2001) noted that training brings a shared “sense of community, or 
solidarity” to professionals, which “is strengthened by the common problems they 
confront in the course of their work, and both together encourage an inclination to 
form societies or associations in which they can come together” (Ibid, p. 101).  The 
training workshops give the auditors the opportunity to get together “to talk shop, 
trade war stories, and share new knowledge and techniques” (Ibid, p. 101).  This 
shoptalk was indicated in previous interview segments in which Zambia auditor 
described the “friendly feelings” he felt as he discussed common problems and audit 
approaches with auditors from other audit offices.   
The professional identity of the auditors is a central way they experience the 
professionalism logic (Rao et al., 2003).  As auditors in the office identify with the 
professional community through AFROSAI-E, INTOSAI, and their partnership with 
the Office of Auditor General Norway, this affects more than just the way they view 
themselves and their roles in the office.  Yet it is because of the way they see 
themselves as professional auditors that they choose to act in accordance with the 
professionalism logic (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017).  This affects the way they view 
education and training, modes of operation, systems of authority and power, and the 
employment and promotions processes.  These principles, which make up the 
professionalism logic, can be seen as flowing from their identity as professional 
auditors.  This harkens back to the three questions about human action that were 
mentioned previously.  When individuals want to take reasoned action, they can ask 
themselves questions about their role and identity (March & Olsen, 1989, 2010): What 
kind of a situation is this? What kind of a person am I?  What does a person like me do 
in a situation like this?  As auditors ask themselves the questions about who they are 
and what they should do, this focuses their attention to the professional field and the 
standards within it.     
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International standards for supreme audit institutions  
As the Office of Auditor General engaged with the professional community of 
state auditors, they translated the ideas, standards, and practices of that community.  
According to Wedlin and Sahlin (2017), this happens as “these institutional ideas 
travel”, and that “in the continued translation process, actors become carriers as they 
narrate and move institutional elements and ideas between contexts, but also link them 
to practice” (p 120).  The ideas then “become embedded in local practice”, which is 
“how logics get embedded in and enacted through local practices and day-to-day 
activities” (Ibid, p. 120).  In that way, the Zambian auditors are the local interpreters 
and enactors of the institutional logics.  Different aspects of those logics became local 
translations within their own organizational context, as they were adopted, adapted, 
and adjusted to fit local practices.    
For example, when one of the principal auditors responsible for the office’s 
standards and policies was interviewed and asked about how the office decides which 
auditing standards to implement, he replied,  
Basically, the number one consideration is just to say, ‘What is AFROSAI 
saying?’  And sometimes you can use that to supplement what you are already 
using…  You might find there is a new standard that’s come up which is very 
good and can assist you in what you are already using.   
The auditor’s statement demonstrates how it works when encountering the issue of 
which standards to implement in the office.  In these cases, the chief consideration and 
the focus of their attention is the professional community of AFROSAI-E and 
INTOSAI.   
Another auditor gave a more specific example of this process of translating 
international standards in the local Zambian context:  
I’ll give you an example of our audit manual that we are currently using.  We 
adopted that from AFROSAI-E, the regularity audit manual.  It was an 
AFROSAI-E idea, which we customized to meet our local arrangement.  What 
usually happens is when you go to those trainings, once the training is done, 
you write a report to the Auditor General, in this case, with recommendations, 
which she can either take it or drop it… Those recommendations are taken back 
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to the standards committee, of which the Auditor General, she’s chairperson…  
Once it’s approved, it’s adopted as the office policy. 
When it comes to the standards for auditing, the professional community is where 
members of the organization look for guidance, which is the enactment of the 
professionalism logic.  Then, as described in the interview segments above, those 
standards are deliberated upon and translated into the local context.  This is another 
situation in which structural overlap is important for promulgating alternative logics 
since it has lowered the barriers for organization members to adopt and adapt the 
elements of the professionalism logic within the Office of Auditor General Zambia.   
The implementation of these audit standards is regularly evaluated by teams of 
auditors coming from AFROSAI-E.  Every two years, the Office of Auditor General is 
visited by a team of auditors as part of what AFROSAI-E calls a “Quality Assurance 
Support Visit”.  The main objective of these support visits is to assess the way the 
Zambian audit office is implementing international standards and how they can 
improve the quality of their audit work.  The analyses within the Quality Assurance 
Support Visits are based on the principles from INTOSAI, which are used as 
benchmarks to evaluate the Office of Auditor General.  Based on these evaluations, the 
quality assurance report makes recommendations for the audit office to follow in order 
to improve their work.  A recent example of these evaluations comes from a quality 
assurance report prepared by an AFROSAI-E team composed of auditors from 
Uganda, South Africa, and Sweden.  According to their report, “The main objective of 
the support visit was to assist the SAI of Zambia to determine whether audits comply 
with international standards and to make recommendations on how the quality of 
audits could be improved” (Ogentho, Motala, Nordstrand, Öståker, & Gjerde, 2012, p. 
1).  
The AFROSAI-E quality assurance report used various international audit 
standards from INTOSAI to assess the performance of the Zambian office.  For 
example, they evaluated the way the Zambian office used their new manual based on 
ISSAI 40, which stipulates “the SAI should establish procedures and policies that give 
reasonable assurance that it will carry out audits where the SAI is competent and has 
the capabilities, including time and resources to do so” (Ibid, p. 29).  The evaluation 
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team found, “The SAI staff has not been adequately trained in the requirements of the 
ISSAIs and use of the AFROSAI-E manual” (Ibid, p. 30).  They further recommended 
the Office of Auditor General should engage more with the AFROSAI-E community 
for training and conduct knowledge-sharing exercises internally within the audit office 
in order to foster more learning across its different departments (Ibid, p. 30).   
 One of the Zambian auditors discussed this process of working with the 
AFROSAI-E support team in this way:  
In terms of the improvement that we have [made], like in our reports, through 
the AFROSAI-E, when they come to quality check our reports, there are certain 
recommendations that are made.  And through these recommendations, we see 
that this recommendation is worth taking forward.  They are helping us to 
improve our [audit reporting], I think. 
This response indicates how Zambian auditors accept and welcome the evaluation 
teams from AFROSAI-E, because they believe it improves the way they do their work 
and the quality of their audits.  These evaluations are the enactment of the system of 
control and criteria for evaluation from the professionalism logic, which come from 
the professional community and are based upon its norms and standards.      
The professional standards from INTOSAI and AFROSAI have impacted the 
way the auditors do their work.  One example comes from the way they select on 
which cases they are going to conduct the audit.  Previously, there was not a clearly 
distinguished set of programs and solutions in which the auditors could categorize the 
types of situations they encountered.  This led to confusion about how to go about the 
audit process and resulted in inefficient and ineffective work routines.  One auditor 
described the changes in the following:  
Initially, we didn’t have the documented manual guidelines… You would do 
the audit, and [the supervisor] approves it, and that’s it.  And then you go and 
get a lot of data there.  But now you follow the standardized way in which you 
collect data.  You have some working papers on the knowledge of the entity of 
the organization.  You have the working papers on the risk assessment of the 
organization.  And you have standardized working papers on some of the tests 
you will do.   
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These standards, which set the guidelines for how auditors select cases and perform 
audits, made their way into the organization through processes of structural overlap 
with AFROSAI-E, which has also provided legitimacy for these changes.  For 
example, as one auditor said, “There are certain ideas where if it is labeled an 
AFROSAI-E thing, people take it more seriously”.   
These professional standards have enabled the auditors to work through a 
process called pigeonholing.  Mintzberg (1989) contends that pigeonholing is “how 
the professional organization functions at the operating level” through standard 
programs that the professionals are ready to use and apply in a standardized set of 
contingent situations (p. 176).  The role of the professional, according to Mintzberg 
(1989), is to “‘diagnose’ the client’s need in terms of one of the contingencies, which 
indicates which standard program to apply, and to apply, or execute that program” (p. 
177).  Interview respondents described these pigeonholing processes, with their 
standardized programs and methods, as central and meaningful parts of their work 
roles.  One respondent described it as it relates to explaining to audited organizations 
the reasons why they were chosen for audit:  
So, there is a model, which we use on how to select clients to be audited.  So, 
we use the risk-based method.  That’s the one that is used by the office as of 
now.  So, it is no longer a matter of guessing, but we use certain permutations 
to ensure that, OK, even when one asked, “But why did you pick this institution 
as opposed to the other one?”  I would have the evidence actually, I would be 
very proud to tell them, “I picked this institution because of ‘ABCD’ using this 
risk-based method”   
These standardized models the auditors use indicate which organizations should be 
audited, based on the risk that the organization will misuse or mismanage public 
resources.  The model will then determine the type of audit to be conduct and the 
methods that should be used to conduct the audit.  Furthermore, by standardizing the 
audit process, this allows the reports of the Office of Auditor General Zambia to be 
evaluated by the other audit offices from AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI and for 
knowledge-sharing practices among the offices, since they are all using the same 
processes for their audit work (Gustavson, 2014).   
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 In another interview response, an organization member described how the 
organization uses the international standards now and compares this to the way the 
organization operated in the past. 
The issue of the standards is just to do one thing - improve the quality of our 
output, improve the quality of that process we are undertaking…  Now, [with] 
standards: we are coming from a background whereby you were recruited as an 
auditor, and we simply said, ‘We took you through the induction, go and audit 
and use your intuition because you have a fair understanding of what it is.’  But 
now we are coming from that background to a situation whereby we tell you, 
‘In auditing these are the principles that you follow, and this is how you audit 
this area.’  Why the use of standards?  If I go and audit Client A, and I came up 
with a result using the standards, even after I have left the institution, and you 
went and audited the same client on the same phenomena, using the same 
methodology, you should be able to come up with the same kind of results.  It is 
meant to increase the aspect of objectivity, the aspect of confidence, so that the 
work we finally churn out is of high standards.  So, basically, the issue of 
standards, especially as far as auditing standards are concerned, is to improve 
the quality of our work.   
While this response indicates how little the audit office once used the audit standards 
in the past, it also gives an indication of the centrality of audit standards today and 
how they are seen as important parts of the work they do.   
Several of the interview respondents discussed one professional standard in 
particular, which is ISSAI 12.  ISSAI 12 is considered one of the fundamental 
“prerequisites for the functioning of supreme audit institutions”, which is “constructed 
around the fundamental expectation of Supreme Audit Institutions making a difference 
to the lives of citizens” (INTOSAI, 2013).  ISSAI 12 entails many aspects of a 
supreme audit institution and how it should engage with the public, and it specifies 
that SAIs should be:  
Carrying out audits to ensure that government and public sector entities are held 
accountable for their stewardship over, and use of, public resources… Enabling 
those charged with public sector governance to discharge their responsibilities 
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in responding to audit findings and recommendations and taking appropriate 
corrective action… Reporting on audit results and thereby enabling the public 
to hold government and public sector entities accountable… Communicating 
effectively with stakeholders… to support beneficial change in the public 
sector… Striving for service excellence and quality… Capacity building 
through promoting learning and knowledge sharing (INTOSAI, 2013).  
The Office of Auditor General has translated ISSAI 12 and localized it into the 
organizational context in a number of ways.  One way has been by changing the 
format of their yearly Auditor General Report, making it more user friendly with 
executive summaries and a glossary.  These simple steps have made the reports more 
approachable for the public to read to instead of them being overly technical and only 
approachable to accountants.  This has enabled the audit office to communicate more 
“effectively with stakeholders” (INTOSAI, 2013).  They also work with a local NGO, 
the Policy Monitoring and Research Center (PMRC), who produce and publish 
simplified reports based on the report of the Auditor General for the general public to 
access.      
In addition to the simplified information about the reports that is printed and 
placed online, the audit office also discusses the reports on the radio, which provides a 
way for those who are not able to read to be able to listen to presentations about the 
audit findings.  Until recently, this had only been done in English and on the national 
radio station, ZNBC, which is only available around the capital city, Lusaka, and along 
the major rail lines in the rest of the country.  More recently, a new outreach initiative 
has begun in which groups of auditors take tours across the nether regions of Zambia 
to discuss audit findings on local radio stations using the local language, making the 
reports available to more members of the public.   
These simplified reports on the local radio programs around Zambia are 
particularly interesting to consider, because while the Office of Auditor General is 
following professional standards as specified in ISSAI 12, by “Reporting on audit 
results and thereby enabling the public to hold government and public sector entities 
accountable” and empowering even the poor members of public to hold their 
government accountable (INTOSAI, 2013), they are also enacting values and the 
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orientation of the development management logic.  They are putting their focus 
beyond the organization and on the disempowered members of society and enabling 
them to hold their government accountable in measurable ways.  It no longer keeps its 
data secret and looks out for itself with a departmental patriotism characteristic of the 
bureaucratic logic.  Now, it generates and delivers its reports with various stakeholders 
in mind.  It makes them simple enough for an average citizen to have an understanding 
of the way the government uses taxpayer money.  So, in addition to having an 
orientation toward the professional community, the audit office also has an external 
orientation toward society, especially the poor and vulnerable.  The public outreaches 
from the Office of Auditor General are an example of how two different logics, the 
professionalism logic and the development management logic, can co-exist in 
complementary ways in which “strengthening one logic serves to strengthen another 













Officers from Office of Auditor General Zambia at the local radio station, Oblate Liseli 
Radio, in the Western Province, preparing to talk about audit reports on live radio 
























Officers from Office of Auditor General Zambia talking about audit reports on a local radio 
program at Sun FM, in the Copperbelt Province (Photos courtesy of Ellen Chikale, Office of 
Auditor General Zambia) 
 
Change and Facilitative Relationships among Logics  
The sections above described ways in which the development management 
logic and the professionalism logic were promulgated within the Office of Auditor 
General Zambia, which led to changes within the organization.  Leading up to this 
period of transition, the bureaucratic logic was dominant, as evidenced through the 
interview and documentary data.  There had been a formal structure with a steep 
vertical hierarchy within the organization, which made it difficult for organization 
members to communicate with their superiors.  Entry into the workforce at that time 
was centralized through the Public Service Commission, and promotions were based 
on length of tenure rather than merit or professional qualifications.  There was a 
general lack of professionalism among the staff at that time with low educational 
qualifications and low motivation.  The training in state audit that did take place at that 
time was considered too basic and not at a high enough level to keep up with changing 
trends in government finance and the global move toward performance audits (Hoque 
& Thiagarajah, 2015).   
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Also, to a limited extent, the case evidence described ways in which the 
organization had operated in informal ways that were consistent with the kinship logic.  
The former Auditor General was seen to have been compromised by undue influence 
from the Chiluba administration and his security services (Hatchard, 2014, p. 72), and 
workers did not seem to take their jobs seriously, seeing them as personal fiefdoms to 
meet their own needs.  This contributed to the lack of professionalism in the office and 
the low level of output resulting in the backlog of audit reports and in the 
organization’s overall inability to hold the government accountable in its use of public 
resources.   
The organization’s move toward the professionalism and development 
management logics began to take place in 2003, the year it “made a leap forward” in 
capacity building processes (Norad, 2011, p. 37).  This happened after the new Auditor 
General was appointed and the Zambian audit office began regularly engaging with 
the international professional community.  This case views these change processes as 
occurring through the institutional entrepreneurship of the new Auditor General and 
through structural overlaps with an international professional community and as 
evidenced by the changes in employment practices, the adoption of professional 
standards, the way the auditors do their work, and the way the organization has shifted 
its focus to the public.    
Many of the changes within the organization are consistent with the 
professionalism logic.  This logic is evident in the audit office’s emphasis on training 
and certification in professional standards and methods for public auditing and 
delivering professionally sound work in an ethical manner.  Its system of control 
comes from the professional community, who regularly evaluate the organization in its 
compliance with standards.  Entry into employment at the Office of Auditor General 
and promotions are based primarily on academic and professional achievements, 
particularly within the field of accounting.  The evaluation criteria of the office is 
based on the professional standards coming from INTOSAI, and the evaluations of the 
audit office are carried out by other professional auditors from the Sub-Saharan region 
as well as from around the world.     
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The audit office’s move toward professionalism has affected the way the 
auditors conduct audits and do their work, which according to them, has improved the 
quality of their work.  Now, instead of conducting audits by using their “intuition”, 
which were the words one of the auditors used to describe the way audits used to be 
done, they now use audit manuals and guidelines that were adapted to their own 
context.  The training of auditors has given them more skills in their audit work and 
more confidence to conduct audits and report their findings to Parliament.  The 
Zambian officers now see themselves as professionals and emulate the standards and 
norms that come from the professional community.  This also enables their work to be 
evaluated by other audit offices in the region and subject to the “soft regulations” of 
the professional community (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, pp. 115-116).    
Some of the changes within the Office of Auditor General Zambia are also 
consistent with the development management logic.  This is seen most evidently in the 
office’s shift of focus toward the Zambian public, particularly those who are poor and 
vulnerable, and it is echoed in their stated goal “to enhance accountability in the 
collection and utilization of public resources in order to contribute to sustainable 
development” (OAGZ, 2015, p. 20).  The way the Office of Auditor General Zambia 
reports the audit findings and discusses those within the media have made the audit 
data more visible throughout Zambia and more useful for holding the government 
accountable.   
This leads to a discussion about facilitative relationships between logics.  When 
the relationship between institutional logics is facilitative, “strengthening one logic 
serves to strengthen another logic” (Waldorff et al., 2013, p. 123).  A facilitative 
relationship between the development management logic and the professionalism logic 
can be seen in the office’s implementation of the ISSAI 12 standard from INTOSAI.  
This principle is embedded within the professional audit community of INTOSAI as 
one of its fundamental “prerequisites for the functioning of supreme audit institutions” 
(INTOSAI, 2013) .  However, ISSAI 12 is also comprised of values inherent within 
the development management logic, such as serving society and empowering the 
disempowered.  According to ISSAI 12, it is based on INTOSAIs “fundamental 
expectation of Supreme Audit Institutions making a difference to the lives of citizens” 
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and of carrying out audits “to ensure that government and public sector entities are 
held accountable for their stewardship over, and use of, public resources” and also 
communicating the reports in ways that enable the public “to hold government and 
public sector entities accountable” (Ibid).  With professional guidelines such as those, 
the auditors at the Office of Auditor General were simultaneously pursuing the values 
and principles of a development management logic while also meeting the obligations 
of the professional community via soft regulations.  Thus, it can be seen as a 
facilitative relationship, since strengthening the professionalism logic also serves to 
strengthen the development management logic.   
In some ways, the bureaucratic logic is still evident within the Office of Auditor 
General.  One way this is seen is in how the organization is tied to the centralized 
hierarchical system within the overarching state bureaucracy.  This arrangement 
entails restrictions and obligations for the organization that a fully autonomous 
organization would not have.  One example is that some of the executive managers are 
unable to implement the managerial tools for measuring performance objectives that 
they want to use due to state employment regulations.  One of the Department heads 
described this dilemma in the following:  
 [T]he biggest challenge is that we have to work through overall government.  
We are still part of the government.  So, if there are changes we would want to 
propagate, we are basically told by the state, ‘Hey hold up, that’s not the policy 
of the government.’  We cannot fully implement the performance management 
system at the individual level because it’s not being done elsewhere.  And that’s 
the idea I’m trying to push now, that performance must be managed at the 
individual level.  So, we might not be able to succeed because now we are still 
part of the government. 
This response expresses the frustration that is sometimes experienced by 
organizational managers when they try to work within an environment characterized 
by the formal hierarchical structures and rule-oriented modes of operation consistent 
with the bureaucratic logic.   
Another example that has been discussed by development partners is the audit 
office’s lack of independence (Norad, 2007, p. 56).  This lack of independence from 
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the executive government and Public Service Commission makes it difficult to allow 
professional independence so auditors can do their work without the prospect of 
political interference.  One of the long-time auditors from the organization described 
this arrangement in the following:  
OK, legislatively, yes, you can say the auditor general’s office is independent 
and so on, but financially it is being controlled by the client [i.e., the 
Government].  And when you talk about the Auditor General herself, yes, she is 
independent and appointed by the president and ratified by parliament, but what 
about the staff?  We belong to the Public Service Commission.  So, the Auditor 
General is presiding over public servants.  And even the emoluments, they are 
determined by the public service management commission.  They are all civil 
servants, so in terms of motivation, they may try to do much, but looking at 
what they get and the work that they do, there is a mismatch. 
The lack of independence of the auditors was an issue that came up often in 
interviews, and this also a prominent point in the INTOSAI standards.  INTOSAI 
declarations dictate that the audit office should be autonomous from the executive 
government, which include control over the SAI budget.   
The kinship logic is not clearly evident in the Office of Auditor General 
Zambia.  Interview respondents did describe it in what they saw as some informal 
hiring practices that had happened and were based on personal connections rather than 
qualifications.  Admittedly, this was also something they said they “could not prove”, 
but something they just had a gut instinct about.  The lack of evidence indicating the 
kinship logic at the Office of Auditor General could also be because the very nature of 
the kinship logic is informal and less obvious than the other logics and therefore 
harder to detect.     
  
Conclusion 
This chapter examined how alternative logics were promulgated within the 
Office of Auditor General after a new Auditor General was appointed to lead the 
office and auditors from the Zambian audit office began to engage regularly with the 
international professional community.  This was explained through the theoretical 
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concepts of institutional entrepreneurship and structural overlap (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008).  This led to change within the organization as its practices and organizational 
principles became more consistent with the professionalism and development 
management logics.  The chapter also showed how dramatic historical events are 
important in the processes of change, as these events happened during a critical time in 
Zambia’s history.  The events surrounding the election of a new president, Levy 
Mwanawasa, who would become a champion for accountability reforms (Taylor, 
2006) and the stripping of Chiluba’s immunity opened a window of opportunity for the 
alternative logics to be promulgated and enacted within the Office of Auditor General.     
One of the critical processes through which alternative logics were introduced 
came through the appointment of a new Auditor General, who acted as an institutional 
entrepreneur within the organization.  The case presents a narrative of an institutional 
entrepreneur whose social position provided her with ideas about the 
professionalization process as well as giving her access to organizational resources and 
formal authority.  This helps explain why the paradox of embedded agency was not an 
obstacle to change among the institutional logics, since her previous social position 
within the ministry of finance guided her toward the courses of agentive action she 
took within the Office of Auditor General, which her new social position as Auditor 
General gave her the formal authority to execute.   
This case also demonstrated the importance of the professional community in 
promulgating alternative logics.  It showed the fine-grained processes of imitation and 
translation in the process of institutionalizing ideas, practices, and meanings systems 
from other organizations into the Office of Auditor General (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017).  
As auditors identified with the professional community, they began imitating other 
members of the community.  The standards and norms were translated into the 
Zambian context and gave a sense of legitimacy to what they were doing and the 
changes they were making.    
Although the Office of auditor General Zambia has made considerable progress 
in its outputs and has changed the way it operates, the future of the organization is not 
entirely clear.  The Auditor General who was a central figure in all the changes 
described in the previous sections, retired from her position in December, 2015, after 
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reaching the age of mandatory requirement in Zambia.  As of 2017, the Deputy 
Auditor General of Audits is still acting as Auditor General since the president has not 
formally appointed a new Auditor General, and it is not clear who that person will be.  
Only time will tell whether the changes in institutional logics described in the previous 
sections will continue to be developed and sustained.  There is a sense of concern in 
the office now as they await the formal appointment of the next Auditor General.  The 
external environment is now also less hospitable for the Office of Auditor General.  
The government has less political will to fight corruption and ensure financial 
transparency.  They are less supportive in the recruitment of auditors and less vocal in 
support of the work of the office.  Even public opinion has begun to change.  Many 
Zambians now see the former President Frederick Chiluba as a misunderstood figure, 
even the victim of “a British-led witch-hunt” (Ryder, 2011).  This is especially true 
since the death of Chiluba in 2011.  
Furthermore, there are still problems related to how the PAC and Parliament 
use the auditor general’s reports, since little corrective action is ever taken by 
Parliament against those who have abused, misused, or misappropriated public funds 
(Chikale, 2014).  Every year, the Auditor General’s report highlights many of the same 
issues, but “its recommendations are largely ignored” by Parliament (Chêne, 2014, p. 
8).  This is a result of the lack of political will of government since the Office of 
Auditor General continues to play its role in this process with Parliament, yet its 
committees are lagging behind.  Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006, as cited in Hoque and 
Thiagarajah, 2015) also noted this problem that exists in many countries in the South, 
and they argued, “Parliaments must have not only the tools but also the political will to 
oversee the government” (p. 6).  Without political will from Parliament to act on the 
Auditor General’s reports, the Office of Auditor General will not be as effective as it 
could be in its role of ensuring public accountability in Zambia, regardless of its 
professional expertise.   






Power Struggles at the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission 
This chapter examines the relationships among institutional logics within the 
Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), and it discusses ways in which 
alternative institutional logics were promulgated within organization and the effects 
this has had.  The passage of three new Anti-Corruption Acts promulgated the 
professional autonomy consistent with the system of control of the professionalism 
logic as well as the internationally accepted standards and norms for how anti-
corruption agencies should operate.  In addition, organizational restructuring processes 
promulgated a development management logic, which is seen in a new emphasis on 
engaging the public and the introduction of annual performance evaluations.  These 
promulgated logics contradict the incumbent bureaucratic and kinship logics that have 
long been influential in guiding the organization. 
In addition to discussing how the logics were promulgated, the chapter also 
discusses how elements of the different logics interrelate with one another in different 
ways.  In some ways, multiple competing logics can be seen as co-existing in the 
organization yet segmented away from one another in ways that enable organizational 
action.  In other ways, there have been competitive relationships between the logics 
with ongoing power struggles around them.  This chapter focuses specifically on a few 
elements of the institutional logics in the typology: staff orientation, system of control 
and system of authority, evaluation criteria, and employment processes.  It focuses on 
the dynamic relationships between the different logics, how some were able to co-exist 
through segmentation in different organizational departments, as well as how some 
logics have existed competitively with the incumbent logics that remain influential in 
the organization.   
Similar to the previous chapter on the Office of Auditor General Zambia, the 
remainder of this chapter begins with a section describing the rise of anti-corruption 
agencies in the international arena, which places the case of the Zambian Anti-
Corruption Commission within its international context.  It then continues with a brief 
history of the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission and some descriptions of the 
institutional logics that were influential in the early years of the organization.  Then, 
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the chapter will discuss how alternative logics have been promulgated at the Anti-
Corruption Commission with some explanations of how that may have affected the 
organization as well as some discussions reflecting on the different types of 
relationships that exist among the different logics and how they impact action.   
 
Anti-corruption Agencies Emerging on the World Scene 
Anti-corruption agencies are a relatively new type of public organization on the 
global scene that only “proliferated worldwide in the 1990s and early 2000s” (Kuris, 
2015, p. 126).  These specialized agencies are thought to play a role in ensuring 
accountability and curbing abuse of power through the investigation of corruption and 
by working with the public to increase collective action against it.  Singapore 
established the first anti-corruption agency in 1952, followed by Malaysia in 1967, and 
Hong Kong in 1974.  Following from Asia, anti-corruption agencies began to be 
established on the African continent in the 1970s, with Tanzania establishing the first 
anti-corruption agency in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1974 (Chêne, 2009, p. 6), followed by 
Zambia in 1980.  Anti-corruption agencies are now becoming increasingly common 
throughout Africa, Asia, Europe and beyond, with France establishing its anti-
corruption agency in 1993, Argentina in 1999, and Latvia in 2002 (de Sousa, 2010, p. 
6). 
Anti-corruption agencies around the world are organized and operate 
differently, depending on their national contexts and legal frameworks.  Therefore, 
they have “not converged in form and function”, according to Kuris (2015, p. 127).  
Anti-corruption agencies can be classified into three basic models, according to their 
mandates and functions.  The first is the law enforcement model, which investigates 
and prosecutes cases of corruption.  The second is the preventative model, which 
monitors ethics and promotes systemic reforms aimed at curbing corruption before it 
happens.  The third is the multi-purpose model, which combines these preventive and 
investigative functions (OECD, 2013, p. 26).  Hatchard (2014) has argued that the 
multi-purpose model has often been mimicked by states in Africa “without taking into 
account” which arrangement would actually fit best into their individual contexts (pp. 
178-180).   
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Kuris (2015) argues that anti-corruption agencies can be broken down further 
into two main categories.  They can either be guard dog agencies or watchdog 
agencies.  Guard dog agencies have strong legal mandates to prosecute cases of 
corruption in the court systems of their respective countries.  In other words, they have 
“strong teeth”, to follow along with Kuris’s metaphor (Ibid, p. 127).  Watchdog 
agencies, on the other hand, do not have strong prosecutorial power and are therefore 
considered “toothless” (Ibid, p. 127).  Kuris (2015) argued that the relative strength of 
legal mandates can actually lead to counterintuitive results, since guard dog anti-
corruption agencies with the “strong teeth” of prosecutorial power can actually be less 
effective, “especially in countries rife with entrenched corruption and impunity” (p. 
127).  Even though these guard dog agencies have more legal and prosecutorial power 
to go after those suspected of corrupt practices, they are also bound by more legal and 
regulatory restrictions, require more resources, face unrealistic expectations from the 
public and from donors, and encounter greater risks of political interference due to 
their legal power.  The weaker watchdog agencies, on the other hand, can operate 
more flexibly since they are not bound by the same legal constraints of “high 
evidentiary standards, due process requirements, and tight disclosure rules”, and their 
weaker legal provisions also make them less threatening to powerful officials who 
may be engaged in corruption (Ibid, p. 132).  Therefore, those officials are less likely 
to interfere with weaker anti-corruption agencies that do not pose a threat.   
In spite of the diverging forms and mandates of anti-corruption agencies, there 
have been some attempts from international and regional associations to coordinate 
these agencies and the work they do.  In Europe, the European Partners Against 
Corruption (EPAC) was established to facilitate knowledge exchange, cooperation on 
investigations, and to “develop common strategies and high professional standards” 
among European agencies (EPAC, 2017).  On the African continent, the African Anti-
Corruption Authorities Association was established to bring African anti-corruption 
agencies together across the continent (Association of Anti-Corrutption Authorities in 
Africa, 2014), while the Southern African Development Community Anti-Corruption 
Committee has a narrower focus on member states within the Southern African 
Development Community.  Internationally, the United Nations launched the 
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International Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies (IAACA) in 2006 to help the 
agencies adhere to principles from the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC), and in 2012, various stakeholders gathered for an international summit “to 
discuss a set of ‘Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies’ and to promote and 
strengthen the independence and effectiveness of ACAs” (Jakarta Statement on 
Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies, 2012).   
Chief among the principals for anti-corruption agencies is that they have 
sufficient “independence… to enable [them] to carry out… their functions effectively 
and free from any undue influence” (United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
2003, p. 10).  The principle of independence is generally agreed upon within the 
international community of donors, academics, and practitioners coalescing around 
anti-corruption work (Hatchard, 2014; Kuris, 2015; OECD, 2008, 2013; Quah, 2015), 
as the OECD (2013) has argued, “The independence of a specialised anti-corruption 
institution is considered to be a fundamental requirement for the proper and effective 
exercise of its functions”, and in addition, “[t]his consensus is reflected in all major 
international legal instruments” (p. 27).  In principle, independent anti-corruption 
agencies should be able to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption against even 
the most powerful officials in their countries, since they would be able to investigate 
and prosecute without any undue influence.  In reality, however, these agencies often 
find themselves in more complicated situations in which they must navigate hostile 
political environments and contend regularly with the influence of powerful actors (de 
Sousa, 2010; Kuris, 2015).  Therefore, it is not surprising that “there is widespread 
skepticism regarding the effectiveness of ACAs” (Schütte, 2015, p. 2). 
 
The History of Zambia’s Anti-Corruption Agency    
The Anti-Corruption Commission is the public agency “mandated to lead the 
fight against corruption in Zambia” (Chêne, 2014, p. 6).  It was established by the 
Corrupt Practices Act No. 14 of 1980, becoming an operational agency two years later, 
in 1982.  At that time, Zambia was a one-party state under the authoritarian control of 
its president, Kenneth Kaunda.  Chikulo (2000) noted that corruption in Zambia was 
actually not as prevalent at that time as it is today, and that it mostly “involved lower 
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level public servants, seeking to supplement their meagre salaries” (p. 163).  However, 
Chikulo also added that “it was not only restricted to this group.  Such cases were also 
reported among senior public servants and political officials” (Ibid. 163).   It was in 
the midst of these corruption cases that the Kaunda government and his United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) drafted and enacted the Corrupt Practices Act of 
1980, which established the Anti-Corruption Commission of Zambia in state law. 
President Kaunda’s personal motivation to create an anti-corruption agency can 
be interpreted in two different ways.  One way to interpret it is through a lens of 
“Kaundaist humanism”, which was rooted in Christianity and Zambian tradition and 
espoused “the high value of man” as a central tenet (Venter & Olivier, 1993, p. 26).  
According to that perspective, Kaunda led a fight against corruption because he was 
personally aggrieved by the sin of public theft and the harm it caused to the Zambian 
people (Chikulo, 2000, p. 175; see also Phiri, 2008).  Another way to interpret 
Kaunda’s move to establish the Anti-Corruption Commission is through a lens of 
political oppression, in that it was to create a tool to punish political enemies and 
potential political challengers (McLoughlin & Weerdesteijn, 2016).  Szeftel (1998) 
noted that during that time, the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission was seen to 
have “been used to harass political opponents”, which left a general sense of suspicion 
among opposition leaders (p. 228).  Even today, whispers of this legacy remain, as the 
Anti-Corruption Commission continues to be seen by some as a tool of the sitting 
government to harass and punish members of the opposition, which as Baniamin and 
Jamil (2017) noted, “sends a clear message about the dire consequences of opposing 
the government” (p. 396) and solidifies a sitting government’s control over politics.   
Regardless of Kaunda’s personal motivations, the Corrupt Practices Act 14 of 
1980 established the Anti-Corruption Commission with a strong and far-reaching legal 
mandate and prosecutorial power.  Therefore, it had “strong teeth” to continue with 
Kuris’s (2015) metaphor, and it was established as a multi-purpose anti-corruption 
agency, since it should simultaneously prevent and investigate corruption.  According 
to the Corrupt Practices Act of 1980, the Anti-Corruption Commission was to be the 
central agency in Zambia to “investigate and prosecute incidents of corruption…; 
prevent incidents of corruption… by examining the practices and procedures of both 
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private and public agencies and advising them on systematic reforms…; and carrying 
out public education campaigns on the evils of corruption” (Corrupt Practices Act no. 
14 of 1980, as cited by Mbao, 2011, p. 270).  This broad mandate was inspired by the 
so-called “three-pronged approach” used by Hong Kong’s anti-corruption agency 
(Rotberg, 2017), which is the approach used by most African anti-corruption agencies 
today (Hatchard, 2014). 
In spite of the Anti-Corruption Commission’s broad mandate, it initially only 
focused on the investigative and prosecutorial functions, opting not to focus on 
corruption prevention activities or on educating the public about corruption and how to 
prevent it.  This was ostensibly due to resource constraints and the small size of the 
organization in its early years.  At its inception, there were only 20 officers, recruited 
from the ranks of the Zambian police and military, which provided a quick way to get 
the agency up and running with a team of experienced investigators.   
 
Early Growth and Stability in the Anti-Corruption Commission 
During the early years of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the organization 
grew steadily as it began recruiting additional officers to expand its capacity for 
investigations and prosecutions.  At that time, the organization was developing a 
reputation within Zambia and throughout the region as being strong and effective in its 
work of controlling corruption (Rotberg, 2017).  Interview respondents who had 
served for decades within the organization also described it as working effectively at 
that time, and they noted that Kaunda spoke out publicly against corruption and often 
dealt swiftly with cases of corruption in the government.  One of the interview 
respondents described the organization during these years in the following statement:  
In the Second Republic [i.e., during the Kaunda presidency], it was very 
effective because it was lean.  It was extremely effective and lean.  We had a lot 
of political support.  And also, Kaunda was always talking against 
corruption.  He didn’t like corruption.  So, most of the speeches you can see he 
didn't like corruption.  Bear in mind also, it was not a liberalized economy, so 
most of the entities were either government or parastatal.  So, there was 
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corruption, of course, I’m not saying there was not corruption, but it was dealt 
with firmly.    
Rotberg (2017) echoed this sentiment describing ways Kaunda worked through the 
Anti-Corruption Commission to arrest several government representatives who were 
suspected of corruption, noting that even “several cabinet members were removed 
from their positions” (p. 170).  At the time, the Zambian public perceived the 
organization as hard-working and that it was an organization to be feared (Ibid).   
There was an attitude of following orders within the agency, which worked its 
way down through the hierarchy.  Steven Moyo, one of the current Anti-Corruption 
Commissioners, described the operational mode of the organization at the time as, 
“commandist”, meaning that it was formally organized in a steep vertical hierarchy, 
and in which junior officers followed their senior officers’ orders, often without 
question or critical reflection.  This type of blind rule following is consistent with a 
bureaucratic logic, with a centralized hierarchical system and rational-legal authority, 
scaling its way up to the top of the hierarchy.  Freidson (2001) described this rational-
legal authority of the bureaucratic logic, in the following:  
When rational-legal authority organizes work, formal, written rules establish 
the duties of each position, occupation, or job as well as their relationships.  
The organization of positions is pyramidal, establishing clear lines of authority 
leading up to the ultimate executive officer (p. 49).   
In the case of the Anti-Corruption Commission, those lines of authority traced their 
way up from officers, to the Director of Operations, the Commissioner, and ultimately 
to the President.  There were strict ways in which officers should address the 
leadership.  According to Moyo’s account, officers from the Anti-Corruption 
Commission did not challenge the opinions of their leader.  Instead, they simply 
followed the rules and directives that were given to them without question.  This 
allowed the organization to run smoothly, but it also left little room for internal debate 
and checks on authority.   
In its early years, the Anti-Corruption Commission’s “institutional position was 
within the Office of the President” (Szeftel, 1998, p. 228).  Its hiring and promotional 
processes were handled centrally through the Public Service Management Division, 
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promotions were based on seniority and loyalty, and authority and control were 
centralized at the executive.  In that way it was organized according to the bureaucratic 
logic, with its centralized hierarchical system and rigid structures of authority and 
control.  This organizational structure and the strict rule following by the officers in 
the Anti-Corruption Commission might have come naturally to them, since they had 
previously served in the military and the national police force.  As Moyo noted, 
“When the ACC was created, it was hived off of the police force and was still called a 
police force.  So, the first recruits were all seen as regimented officers to enforce the 
law, specific to corruption.”  Furthermore, the organization did not engage often with 
the public at that time.  Interview respondents described it as being internally focused 
and “rather secretive”, and that they did not talk to members of the public or even 
receive complaints from them at that time.  This internal orientation is also consistent 
with the bureaucratic logic since it is internally focused on the bureaucracy and not 
concerned with the external environment.    
Being an arm of Kenneth Kaunda’s executive government gave the Anti-
Corruption Commission political legitimacy, power, and legal authority to investigate 
and prosecute cases of corruption that included a genuine threat of force to back it up.  
Yet, since the authority and control of the Anti-Corruption Commission were squarely 
in the hands of the president and the ruling party, this also restricted the agency as 
well.  As Hatchard (1985) argued, it limited the Anti-Corruption Commission’s access 
to the political elites:   
[The Anti-Corruption Act of 1980] denies the Commission access to the 
defense forces, to the security services, and to the secret or confidential 
deliberations of the Central Committee of U.N.I.P. or the Cabinet, or any of 
their sub-committees. This restriction regarding top party and government 
officials means that critical areas of power are not within the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, and this may seriously weaken its attempt to eliminate corruption 
(493).   
With this arrangement, if the Anti-Corruption Commission wanted to pursue high-
level officials that were suspected of corruption, it would have to go through the 
President first.  This left the agency in a precarious situation if it ever wanted to 
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investigate individuals who were close to the President.  Therefore, the organization 
and its investigators lacked professional autonomy to pursue cases based on evidential 
criteria alone and remained under the control of the central bureaucracy.   
An additional element of control from the executive branch of the government 
was that the Anti-Corruption Commission had to receive clearance from Director of 
Public Prosecutions in order to prosecute a case in the courts.  This again curtailed the 
operational autonomy of the organization and provided an opportunity for the 
executive branch to interfere with investigations into corruption (Coldham, 1995; 
Rotberg, 2017).  These arrangements assured that, although the Anti-Corruption 
Commission operated with strong legal powers during its early days, it was not its own 
power.  Instead it was the power of the president who was standing behind it and 
directing it where he wanted it to go – for better or for worse.  It could be used to 
control corruption within the government, and it could also be used to control and 
harass political opponents of the president, undermining the very purpose of the 
organization and burdening it with undue influence from the President’s office.   
This historical account, drawn primarily from interview data and extant 
literature leads to an analysis that, during the early days of the Anti-Corruption 
Commission during Kaunda’s rule, the way the organization operated was mostly 
consistent with the bureaucratic logic.  This can be seen in the strict and centralized 
hierarchical structure and the following of orders, sometimes blindly, up the chain of 
command.  The agency was mechanistic in the sense that it was based on strictly 
following the rules and directives issued from the top of hierarchy, echoing the 
conceptualization of Mintzberg (1979): “the Machine Bureaucracy is a structure with 
an obsession, namely control” (p. 319).  It can also be argued that the Anti-Corruption 
Commission was used as a tool of repression or fear to control the opposition, which is 
consistent with a kinship logic.  There was little evidence of the professionalism logic 
since there was no autonomy or authority coming from the fledgling professional 
community during that time.  Likewise, there was little evidence of a development 
management logic and its public service orientation, fragmented structures, and 
performance measurements.  In many ways, the Anti-Corruption Commission at this 
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time could be seen as a blunt instrument of the government, and particularly of 
President Kaunda.   
 
Instability, Transition, and the Promulgation of Alternative Logics 
The political situation in Zambia changed dramatically in 1991, when it became 
“the first Anglophone African country to undergo a peaceful transition from one-party 
rule to a competitive multiparty system” (Bratton et al., 2017, p. 2).  After the 
landmark elections, a new president, Frederick Chiluba, was elected to defeat Kenneth 
Kaunda who had served as Zambia’s president for 27 years.  Chiluba was initially seen 
as a reformer and called “Mr. Clean” by members of the public (Chikulo, 2000, p. 
178).  He promised to bring in a new era of transparency to government in Zambia, as 
he pledged to “conduct our business openly… with accountability to the people, as 
embodied in our democratic ideals” (Taylor, 2006, pp. 285-286).  Chiluba also 
promised to liberalize the economy, privatize state-owned enterprises, and implement 
public sector reforms aimed at making government more efficient and effective.  
These promises was lauded by the donor community, who financially supported 
Zambia’s moves toward neo-liberal economic reforms and civil service reforms 
(Rotberg, 2017), as they hailed Zambia “a success story on the international scene” 
(Momba, 2007, p. 116). 
However, Chiluba’s electoral pledges to govern with transparency and 
accountability to the public soon “proved hollow, as Chiluba and his inner circle began 
engaging in rampant corruption….the unbridled use of state resources for his own 
private benefit” (Taylor, 2006, p. 286).  Many consider that it was during “Frederick 
Chiluba’s government when corruption became entrenched in the fabric of the 
country” (Momba, 2007, p. 115) and “flourished to a degree that Zambia had never 
before experienced” (Rotberg, 2017, p. 171).  During this time, the work of the Anti-
Corruption Commission was routinely frustrated by the government (Mwiinga, 1994).  
Rotberg (2017) noted, “Cases of the kind that formerly had moved smoothly from the 
ACC to the courts were blocked, usually on presidential orders.  With the withdrawal 
of executive and therefore political backing, the ACC became more and more 
powerless” (p. 171).  In the second year of Chiluba’s presidency, he began looking for 
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ways to minimize the Anti-Corruption Commission, either by merging it with the 
police force or dissolving it entirely (Szeftel, 1998, p. 228; see also Doig, Watt, & 
Williams, 2005).  These developments were leading to a critical juncture for the Anti-
Corruption Commission, as its future role or even its very existence as a public 
accountability organization in Zambia was uncertain.   
President Chiluba’s threats to dissolve the Anti-Corruption Commission came 
at a time in which the international community was becoming increasingly interested 
in the work of anti-corruption agencies (OECD, 2008).  In the early 1990s, 
international donors, governments, and civil society organizations had begun putting 
pressure on Chiluba and his government to control corruption and to strengthen the 
role and legal power of the Anti-Corruption Commission (Chikulo, 2000).  As Szeftel 
(1998) argued, the organization’s “survival owed much to strong support by Britain’s 
ODA [Office of Development Assistance] and political conditionality” (p. 228), as 
they began applying pressure for anti-corruption reforms.  It was in the process of 
adopting these reforms that alternative logics were promulgated at the Anti-Corruption 
Commission, which could potentially change the way the organization was operating, 
giving it more operational autonomy and more focus on serving the public.  The 
passage of new laws that provided the framework for the operation of the Anti-
Corruption Commission and two new organizational restructuring programs that 
altered the structures of the organization and introduced new management tools 
promulgated alternative logics in the Anti-Corruption Commission.   
The remainder of this chapter will discuss how these events promulgated 
alternative logics that led to some changes within the constellation of logics guiding 
the organization.  It will also discuss limitations to those changes using the theoretical 
concept of decoupling, which describes situations in which a state like Zambia may 
adopt anti-corruption policies or laws but fail to implement them fully (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012).  In these cases, the introduction of alternative logics through new laws 
or restructuring the organization can be seen as an example of what Andrews (2013) 
called “reforms as signals”, when he wrote:  
[M]any reforms are introduced as short-term signals that ensure developing 
countries attain and retain external support and legitimacy…  Such reforms are 
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prone to having limited success, however. They may produce new forms (like 
laws) in the short term, but these typically have poor functionality. 
Governments look better after reform but often are not better (p. 2-3 
parentheses in original). 
This also alludes to Campbell’s (2004) argument that “sometimes events, such as the 
passage of a new law, can end up having surprisingly little effect” (p. 47).  This is 
because they may be designed “more to legitimize or obscure organizational practices 
than to achieve real substantive change in how an organization operates” (Ibid, p. 43), 
and their implementation can also be watered down throughout the implementation 
process thereby further reducing their effectiveness.   
 
The Introduction of Three New Legal Frameworks 
In 1994, international donors and civil society organizations began pressuring 
the Chiluba government to curb corruption and implement new policies aimed at 
improving government accountability, which included changes to the legal framework 
of the Anti-Corruption Commission, making it more independent and “autonomous 
from the political executive” (Chikulo, 2000, p. 178).  The donor community then 
placed conditionality on their aid disbursements, which meant that, if the Chiluba 
government wanted to continue receiving monetary aid, it would have to comply with 
the demands to give the Anti-Corruption Commission more independence (Chikulo, 
2000; Szeftel, 1998).  As one of the Anti-Commission officers who worked for the 
organization during that time noted,  
So, there were a lot of calls for the institution to become independent… there 
was an outcry in the country, and the NGOs were a part of that outcry, 
including the donors - our external partners.  So, that’s how the law was 
changed.  
In the wake of the public outcry and increasing pressure from donors, the Chiluba 
government eventually relented and began drafting a new Anti-Corruption 
Commission bill that would later be enacted in 1996.  This was actually the first of 
three times that the anti-corruption laws would be changed in Zambia.  After the 
changes in 1996, they were later changed again in 2010 and in 2012, and as the 
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following sections will demonstrate, each time these laws were changed, they 
promulgated elements of alternative logics in the organization.   
 
Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 1996 
In 1996, the Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 1996 was passed in 
Parliament.  The new act granted the Anti-Corruption Commission more independence 
in its investigations of corruption, and it provided for the creation of a board of 
commissioners who would oversee the Anti-Corruption Commission instead of it 
being “under the control and supervision of the President” as it previously had been 
(Szeftel, 1998, p. 228, see also Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2005).  The new act also 
allowed the agency to handle its own employment processes, disengaging its officers 
from the executive branch (Chikulo, 2000; Musonda, 2011).  In this ironic turn of 
events, it seemed that even though Chiluba had wanted to marginalize or dissolve the 
Anti-Corruption Commission, he actually ended up signing into law a new act that 
called for more autonomy and strength for the Anti-Corruption Commission.   
The passage of the new Anti-Corruption Commission Act signaled to the 
international community that the organization would have more independence, in line 
with the international standards and principles for anti-corruption agencies, and that it 
would begin addressing the rampant corruption that was taking place within the 
country.  However, in reality, Chiluba still managed to weaken the commission, which 
he did by simply ignoring it (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2005, p. 80).  He did not 
appoint a new board of commissioners to lead the organization as the 1996 law had 
required, and he also held back the financial resources that it needed to operate (Ibid).  
In spite of the Anti-Corruption Commission’s new-found independence, its funding 
still had to flow through the Ministry of Finance, and this arrangement gave the 
executive a tool for controlling the agency’s capacity to conduct investigations, which 
required significant financial and human resources.  As Mwenda (2007) argued: 
[T]he Commission was under the Chiluba regime perpetually underfunded, as it 
was often denied operational funds… Although under the ACC act, the 
Commission is self-accounting, the Ministry of finance handles its financial 
affairs.  The executive always drastically reduces its proposed budget and even 
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the little money allocated in the budget is not released in full (Mwenda, 2007, p. 
75). 
Thus, while the new act had promulgated values of the professionalism logic, bringing 
it into line with the international norms and standards for anti-corruption agencies, 
decentralizing its hierarchical structure, and providing professional autonomy; and 
while it promulgated the bureaucratic logic by strengthening the legal authority of the 
agency, this was not experienced in reality.  It was decoupled from the way the 
organization actually operated and only seen visibly through the law that was on the 
books.   
 This decoupling was to the benefit of the president and those around him at that 
time.  The government would be able to attain external legitimacy from the 
international and donor communities by enacting the stronger law, but they would still 
be able to avoid the scrutiny and unwanted attention from a strengthened and 
independent anti-corruption agency by failing to implement the law fully.  This type of 
situation was discussed by Bromley and Powell (2012) who argued, “decoupling is 
more common when it serves the interests of powerful leaders…, in which networks of 
top managers and organizations become skilled at symbolic manipulation” (p. 11).  
Chiluba and his administration were able to manipulate the public and donor 
community by symbolically implementing the new law on paper, but in reality, they 
were able to continue abusing their offices for their own benefit.    
Organization members who were in the Anti-Corruption Commission during 
this time described it as a difficult working environment, in which President Chiluba 
“had a lot of negative influence on the organization… and officers were really not that 
motivated”.  One of the organization members reflected on this time in the 
organization’s history through the following comment:  
Under Chiluba, there was no political will to fight corruption.  Even the funding 
for the commission, it was literally zero.  So, in terms of operations, we were 
affected.  There were no high-profile cases.  So, even the pace at which we 
were disposing of cases was very slow - those which we could attend to 
because of limited funding.   
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Another organization member reflected on the organization under the Chiluba 
administration with the following comment:  
There was no money in the institution.  There was no money for anything.  
There was no money.  So, the morale wasn’t good.  To fight corruption, you 
need support.  Big corruption will involve big people, and you need that 
political support.   
According to interview respondents and extant literature, it appears that, even though 
the donor community had been successful in pressuring the Chiluba regime to 
strengthen the Anti-Corruption Commission through a stronger legal framework that 
had the appearance of independence and autonomy, the new law actually had very 
little effect.  The new legal framework formally provided more autonomy and 
independence for the organization, but the executive government and the President 
still found ways of controlling the agency and slowing down its investigations.  This 
led Chikulo (2000) to write about the organization of that time, “in spite of the 
amendments designed to strengthen the ACC… analysis of the relevant legislation 
reveals that the Commission, to all intents and purposes, still remains executive-based” 
(p. 179).  
 The situation for the Anti-Corruption Commission did begin improve under the 
next presidential administration that began in 2002, when Levy Mwanawasa was 
elected president.  Mwanawasa’s ant-corruption efforts are generally considered to 
have been robust and sincere.  As Rotberg (2017) argued, “Levy Mwanawasa… was 
genuinely determined to eliminate corrupt behavior” in Zambia (p. 172).  President 
Mwanawasa appointed a board of commissioners to oversee the anti-corruption 
commission, and he increased its funding.  He also called for Parliament to strip 
prosecutorial immunity from the former President, Frederick Chiluba, which they did, 
so that a criminal case could be brought against him.  Mwanawasa then established the 
Task Force on Corruption, of which the Anti-Corruption Commission was a part, to 
investigate and prosecute cases of corruption against Chiluba and other members of 
government.   
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Some interview respondents described the years during the Mwanawasa 
government as the best years for the Anti-Corruption Commission.  As one of the 
long-time organization members said,  
Mwanawasa, each time he had an opportunity, he spoke against corruption and 
he referred to the institution. Financially, the financial support to the institution 
increased. At that time the ACC appeared to be dead, but it came to be alive 
again, and it commanded respect. 
Interview respondents believed Mwanawasa demonstrated a strong political will to 
fight corruption, particularly since he even allowed the Task Force on Corruption to 
bring cases forward against members of his own government.  A 2011 Norad report, 
noted that, “[o]ver 30 government officials (including three ministers and seven 
permanent secretaries) were removed from their posts over 2005-08”, which was 
during Mwanawasa’s administration (Norad, 2011, p. 15, footnote 26, parentheses in 
original). 
 However, interview respondents also discussed negative aspects associated with 
the Mwanawasa years, particularly as they related to the Task Force on Corruption that 
he established.  To them, it made the Anti-Corruption Commission look bad, because 
it seemed that all of a sudden, there were cases of grand corruption going before the 
courts.  People began wondering why the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) had not 
been doing this previously.  As one of the respondents said,  
But the negative issues that came up was that these same officers from ACC are 
now in a public domain, they are in court, they are prosecuting a former 
president. What is lacking at the institution itself, and why weren’t they doing 
this before? …Why did it take [the Director of the Task Force] to become so 
proactive? But what about the ACC as an institution?  Are they able to do this 
on their own?  That opened up this institution to exposure, it opened up this 
institution to such thinking like that.   
There was a common perception at that time that the Anti-Corruption Commission 
was not up to the task of investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption against 
Chiluba and his alleged co-conspirators.  As Ryder (2011) noted, “the ACC’s low 
standing” and the perception that the “ACC did not have the internal capacity for such 
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an undertaking” led Mwanawasa to the conclusion that “the ACC simply did not seem 
up to the task” (p. 2).  “[H]e needed a crack team to hit the ground running and 
capitalize on the momentum he had created” (Ibid, p. 2).  However, that team would 
not be coming from the Anti-Corruption Commission.  It would instead come from 
Mwanawasa’s new Task Force on Corruption.   
The Mwanawasa administration did not last long, however.  Nor did the Task 
Force he had established.  Mwanawasa died while in office in 2008, and his Vice 
President, Rupiah Banda, served out the rest of his term.  Banda’s actions while in 
office are seen by many as undermining anticorruption work rather than supporting it 
(Hatchard, 2014; Mbao, 2011; Ndulo, 2014).  During Banda’s presidency, Frederick 
Chiluba was acquitted on all charges of public theft and corruption. The appeal by the 
Task Force on Corruption against the acquittal was withdrawn by the new Director of 
Public Prosecutions, and when the head of the Task Force publicly disagreed with the 
decision, he was removed from his position by President Banda.  The case against 
Chiluba that had been built over the years was eventually dropped in 2009.  Finally, in 
what can be considered a dramatic step backward, President Banda formally disbanded 
the Task Force on Corruption. 
 
 Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2010: a brief interlude 
The Anti-Corruption Commission law was changed a second time in 2010, 
when the Banda government introduced a new act, which was to ostensibly, “bring the 
law into conformity with the provisions of the regional and international conventions 
to which Zambia is a State party” (The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2010, the 
introduction section).  The new act brought the agency closer to international norms 
and standards in some ways since it toughened penalties for corruption.  However, it 
also curbed the powers and level of independence of the Anti-Corruption Commission 
in two key ways (Mbao, 2011).  First, it gave the President the authority to remove the 
Director General, removing the Parliamentary check that was put in place in the 1996 
Act.  Second, it removed the abuse of authority clause that criminalized abuse of office 
(Mbao, 2011, p. 270), which is seen as “an important tool for prosecuting high-level 
corruption in Zambia” (Lungu, 2017, p. 289).  This is because it criminalizes public 
 
 147 
officials’ abuse of their position for personal gain or even “maintains a standard of 
living above that which is commensurate with his present or past official emoluments” 
or “is in control or possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to 
his present or past official emoluments” (The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 1996, 
section 37).  The removal of this clause took away a key tool for investigating and 
prosecuting cases of corruption since it can be difficult to trace financial transactions 
to their original source.   
Again, the Zambian government was sending a signal to the international 
community that it was dealing with corruption and coming into line with the 
international standards for anti-corruption work.  Yet, as Ndulo (2014) argued, the 
2010 act moved the Anti-Corruption Commission backward in terms of its autonomy, 
as it “clearly ensures that the removal of the Director General is completely controlled 
by the executive” (Ndulo, 2014, p. 20).   With these legal changes, the Commission 
seemed to be back under the control of the executive again, in both formal and 
informal ways.  Not only could the president continue to work behind the scenes to 
apply pressure to the Director General of the Anti-Corruption Commission, he could 
even remove him or her by a presidential fiat.   
 
Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2012 
In March of 2012, shortly after the election of a new president, Michael Sata, 
his Minister of Justice presented a bill in Parliament that would change the anti-
corruption laws for the third time, just two years after Banda’s administration had 
changed them.  President Sata’s Minister of Justice noted that the changes to the laws 
would “domesticate the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the African 
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, the Southern African 
Development Community Protocol Against Corruption, and other regional and 
international instruments on corruption to which Zambia is a party” (Parliamentary 
Debates - Wednesday, 7th of March, 2012, 2012).  The new bill was enacted in 
Parliament on the 12th of April, 2012 to become the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 
of 2012, which is the current legal framework at the time of writing this case study.     
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The changes to the Anti-Corruption Commission Act would, once again, 
formally provide for broader legal powers and more independence for the agency.  The 
abuse of authority clause and the Parliamentary check on the president’s power to 
remove the Director General were now put back in the law.  This meant the agency 
would again have the legal provisions to investigate and prosecute public office 
holders who abused their positions to enrich themselves or their family members and 
that the President would no longer have the legal ability to fire the Director General on 
his own accord.  However, Hatchard (2014) contended the 2012 act still did not go far 
enough in several ways, and he described some of the law’s provisions as “alarmingly 
weak” (p. 194).  It still would essentially allow “the President to hand pick an 
appointee and have the (normally) cooperative legislature rubber-stamp the 
appointment, without the need for even an enhanced majority” (Ibid, p. 194, 
parentheses in original).  The new law simply said the Director General should be 
“appointed by the President, subject to the ratification by the National Assembly, on 
such terms and conditions as the President may determine” (Section 9, line 2 of the 
ACC Act, 2012).  Hatchard (2014) went on to argue, that with provisions like these, “it 
is the very people who the ZACC is likely to investigate who control the appointment 
of the Director General” (p. 194).  This opened the door, once again, for the informal 
control of the Director General and the organization, which is consistent with the 
kinship logic and based on expectations of reciprocity and fear of repercussions.   
The introduction of the new laws was conceivably meant to strengthen the 
independence of the Anti-Corruption commission, giving it more autonomy to be able 
to operate independently of the executive branch and giving it more power to 
investigate and prosecute cases of corruption.  While this was aimed at strengthening 
the rational-legal authority of the agency, which is the source of authority of the 
bureaucratic logic, it also introduced more autonomy for the organization, which is 
based on the international standards and norms of the professional field and consistent 
with the professionalism logic’s system of control.  It would provide autonomy and 
discretion to anti-corruption officers to work without undue influence from politicians.     
However, when interview respondents from the Anti-Corruption Commission 
discussed the independence and autonomy of the organization, they often expressed 
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their concerns about its lack of autonomy.  They consider this to be a major obstacle 
standing in the way of their work, and that this has become more of a problem in 
recent years.  Instead of the organization being run as an autonomous and independent 
commission, it is seen by many as receiving directives from the executive and “there 
to persecute the people that are on the opposing side”.  As one of the respondents said,  
You see when you talk about autonomy, I think this autonomy is just 
“autonomy” in inverted commas.  Of course, in the past, you would actually 
accept that ‘Oh, OK, 90% of the things we do here, we are really autonomous,’ 
but this time you see that the directives that happen there in the political 
environment are actually taken into this institution, and they are taken to be 
implemented.  This was not the case in the past. 
The interview respondents expressed their increasing concern about interference from 
powerful political actors, that it limits the cases they can investigate and prosecute, and 
this is primarily based on who is seated in government at the time.  Investigators are 
told which cases they should follow and which ones they should leave alone, and 
according to interview respondents, these directives ultimately come down “from the 
office of the president”.  This political interference from the president’s office affects 
their work since they do not have real autonomy to select the cases they will pursue, 
only the ones that will not negatively affect the government in power.   
 When interview respondents were asked to talk about political interference in 
the organization, they seemed uncomfortable discussing it since it was not something 
they usually spoke freely about.  As one of the officers said:   
Well, as much as we try to deny it, especially to the outside and sometimes 
even to ourselves within here, it’s something that we can’t run away from, 
something we are able to see happening.  Again, I will speak from my position.  
There were a number of times when you had to communicate something, but 
then before you get any kind of directions, you censor yourself and say, ‘No 
this will not sit well with those people’.  So, that gives you an indication.  And 
there are obviously even times when directions come down that say ‘Don’t go 
this way.  Go that way’.  I think that’s one we can’t run away from.  There’s a 
lot of cases that could have gone differently had the person involved been on 
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the other side of the fence, politically speaking.  So, usually, you can see that, 
as much as they try to not make it look so obvious, it’s something that we can’t 
run away from.  It’s there.  
According to these respondents, the Anti-Corruption Commission cannot run away 
from the fact that political interference is there, and that it limits the work they do and 
that it also diminishes the public’s faith in them to control corruption. 
The officers who were interviewed seemed understandably fearful when 
discussing political interference.  They were afraid of the personal repercussions they 
might receive for speaking out about it.  For example, during the interviews, some of 
the respondents spoke up and wanted to make sure the interview recording equipment 
would be kept secure so that it would not end up in the hands of the government.  They 
also wanted to make sure their identities would be kept anonymous and protected in 
case study reports.  One of the officers described the reasons for their fear, saying,  
[T]he environment we are operating in now is more political than independent.  
You risk being fired.  You risk being reprimanded.  You risk being demoted.  
You risk being all sorts of things. So, officers are operating in some kind of fear 
in this environment.   
Anti-Corruption Commission officers believe they have good reasons to be afraid, 
given the current political climate of the country.  There have even been a number of 
Directors General who have recently left the office under suspicious circumstances in 
recent years, which has also heightened the sense of anxiety among organization 
members.   
In essence, officers at the Anti-Corruption Commission are afraid of losing 
their jobs for doing their jobs properly – for investigating cases of corruption among 
public servants and politicians.  This subverts the rule of law in Zambia and is contrary 
to the rational-legal authority put in place within the organization.  The organization 
members’ fear is consistent with the system of control and authority of the kinship 
logic, which is informal and based on expectations of reciprocation and fear of 
reprisals.  This exists even though the Anti-Commission Act provides for the 
autonomy of the organization, for security of tenure for the Director General, and 
protections for officers.  As one of the interview respondents said, “the law is on our 
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side since the legal framework gives us autonomy and security of tenure for the DG.  
Maybe we are just scared of our own shadows.”    
When interview respondents were asked for more details about how political 
interference happens within the organization, they often pointed their finger at the 
Director General’s office (often times literally, they gestured toward the office of the 
Director General, which was located down the hall from the conference room where 
the interviews took place.)  They described different situations in which Director 
Generals did not support organizational officers who were investigating politically 
connected people.  If they went to search a politician’s office, for example, that 
politician could just place a phone call to the Director General, who would then tell the 
investigators that they needed to come back to headquarters to clear up some technical 
details before moving forward.  Those investigations would then get bogged down and 
end up not being finished.  This left the officers feeling embarrassed and demotivated.  
Respondents also discussed times in which a Director General had actually been seen 
removing critical files from the office “to ensure that no action was to be taken” 
against well-connected or powerful “politicians and ministers”.     
According to interview respondents, the autonomy of the Anti-Corruption 
Commission is just “on the books” or “in inverted commas”, and they believe the 
president still has the power to direct the organization through the Director General he 
had placed in that position.  Thus, the source of control still ultimately lies with the 
office of the President through fear of recrimination and through informal means of 
exerting influence and pressure.  In this way, the informal control and authority of the 
kinship logic undermines and subverts the rational-legal authority of the bureaucratic 
logic and the professional autonomy of the professionalism logic.  The independence 
and autonomy that are consistent with the professionalism logic and the strong 
rational-legal authority consistent with the bureaucratic logic, though promulgated 
through the passage of stronger laws in line with international standards, are decoupled 
from the way the organization is actually being controlled.  This form of control is 
particularly obvious and nefarious when it really counts, when the Anti-Corruption 
Commission is investigating powerful political operatives who are suspected of 
corruption.   
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Restructuring Processes  
Another way in which alternative logics were promulgated within the Anti-
Corruption Commission was through organizational restructuring processes.  The 
Anti-Corruption Commission went through two different restructuring processes in 
2005 and 2012, each of which promulgated elements of the development management 
logic.  Organizational restructuring is a process of “streamlining and rationalizing the 
structures and operations” of public organizations in Zambia (Mate, 2006, p. 30).  The 
restructuring process is done by determining the appropriate staff levels and 
organization structures to meet the organization’s mission and goals and adapting the 
structure of the organization to be able to meet those goals.  Since the launch of 
Zambia’s Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), all public organizations are 
supposed to be restructured after going through a managerial audit and strategic 
planning process to determine the organization’s mission and objectives and how the 
organization can achieve them.  The overall goal of PSRP is to “improve government 
capacity… for social and economic development… to enhance ministerial capacities 
to effectively manage public expenditure and meet fiscal stabilization objectives, and 
to make the public service efficient and responsive to the needs of the country’s 
population” (Government of the Republic of Zambia Public Service Reform 
Programme, 1993, as cited by Mate, 2006).   
 
Increase of outreach and corruption prevention activities  
One of the major emphases of the restructuring processes at the Anti-
Corruption Commission was related to public outreach and corruption prevention.  
This was a significant change since, for the first twenty years of the organization’s 
existence, it had mainly only been focused on investigating and prosecuting cases of 
corruption even though it had a broad legal mandate based on the Hong Kong model’s 
three-pronged approach.  To that end, the first restructuring plan in 2005 called for the 
creation of a new department called, Corruption Prevention and Community 
Education.  The creation of the new department signaled a renewed focus for the Anti-
Corruption Commission: “that the focus of the ACC was to move from investigation 
and prosecutions to corruption prevention” (Doig et al., 2005, p. 81), enabling it fulfill 
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its original mandate as a multi-purpose anti-corruption agency simultaneously 
investigating cases of corruption and working with the community to prevent it 
(OECD, 2008, 2013).    
The second restructuring process, which occurred in 2012, sought to sharpen 
the organization’s focus on the public even further.  It split the Corruption Prevention 
and Community Education Department into two separate departments.  The first 
department, Corruption Prevention, was set up “to create effective mechanisms for 
prevention of corruption in order to significantly reduce corrupt practices” (Anti-
Corruption Commission Zambia, 2012, p. 26).  It was to do this by developing and 
overseeing Integrity Committees in government organizations, through which those 
organizations are supposed to self-monitor and thereby “reduce corruption at service 
delivery level” (Norad, 2011, p. 32).  Corruption Prevention would also be the 
department to conduct monitoring evaluation exercises using survey data to diagnose 
which public organizations were at high risk for corruption and required intervention 
strategies (Ibid, p. 25).  The second department that was created in the restructuring 
process, Community Education, was set up to “create public awareness and obtain 
public support for preventing and combatting corruption” (Anti-Corruption Commission 
Zambia, 2012, p. 14).  Its sole focus was to communicate with the public in order to gain 
their trust and support in the fight against corruption.   
Since these new departments were developed, the Anti-Corruption Commission 
has increased its activities related to both community outreach and integrity 
committees.  It increased the number of Integrity Committees from 22 in 2011 (Anti-
Corruption Commission Zambia, 2011, p. 9) to 46 Integrity Committees in 2015 (Anti-
Corruption Commission Zambia, 2015, p. 9).  It also increased its number of 
community outreaches by giving more lectures and talks about corruption and other 
types of outreach activities within Zambian communities.  This increase is evidenced 
by organizational measures for public lectures and other presentations Community 
Education officers gave, which is tracked in the Anti-Corruption Commission’s annual 
reports.  For example, the annual report from 2006 showed that community education 
officers gave 33 lectures and talks to 2,750 participants (Anti-Corruption Commission 
Zambia, 2006, p. 46), while the annual report for 2015 showed that community 
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education officers gave 150 lectures and talks to 14,673 participants (Anti-Corruption 
Commission Zambia, 2015, pp. 40-41).  That is a significant increase in public 
outreaches over a nine-year period of time, and it also indicates changes that are 
consistent with the development management logic and its staff orientation that is 
externally focused on the public. 
The chart that follows below shows a steady yearly increase of reported public 
outreaches as measured by the Anti-Corruption Commission, which demonstrates an 
increase in the importance of public engagement with the organization.   
 
 Public Outreaches from the Anti-Corruption Commission by Year 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Number of public 
outreaches made 
across Zambia:  
33 91 110 58 128 78 126 161 151 150 
Number of people 
who were present 
during outreaches: 
2,750 5,765 5,700 5,433 7,229 4,828 15,354 16,889 14,473 14,673 
Chart based on available data from annual reports between 2006 and 2015.   
 
By creating a new department focused on community education, the 
restructuring processes promulgated a staff orientation consistent with the 
development management logic, one that is focused on empowering the public to 
become more aware and engaged in anti-corruption efforts in Zambia.  This also 
allowed the development management logic to increase its relative influence within 
the organizational context by segmenting it within the one department, Community 
Education.  One of the organization members described the department and the 
segmentation within the organization by saying:  
There’s a department called Community Education, and those are the ones I 
think who have the public at heart. Everything they do, they have to think of the 
public- “We have to get this to the public”.  They have a different perspective… 
The Investigations Department on the other hand, they don’t keep the public in 
mind.  I doubt it.  I think, for them, it’s just an issue of the organization.  ‘The 
organization wants this done.  We need to investigate this and give them 
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information on what transpired in this matter.’  And that’s it.  So, it depends on 
which department is involved.   
When it comes to the staff orientation of the Anti-Corruption Commission, it can be 
understood as mainly oriented in two directions, internally to the bureaucratic 
organization itself and externally toward the public.  The two logics can co-exist in 
this way because of segmenting between logics, which “allows competitive 
relationships to coexist by partitioning work consistent with different logics among 
actors or organizations” (Waldorff et al., 2013, p. 123).   
The new Community Education Department was set up to educate the public 
about corruption as well as to communicate with the public through its public relations 
division.  It is the very nature of the department to interface with the public and is not 
involved in investigating or prosecuting cases of corruption.  The Investigations 
Department, on the other hand, is focused on conducting investigations, which are by 
their nature, secretive and covert.  The two departments exist in separate parts of the 
headquarters building in Lusaka, and the officers within them can work on their 
projects without significant interaction with one another.  This spatial separation 
provides a way to keep the two logics segmented away from one another in day-to-day 
work.  The Community Education Department would be able to focus on the public 
while the Investigations Department could focus internally on the bureaucracy, abiding 
by the rules and routines and secrecy inherent in their work.   
 
Theatre troop performing during an Anti-Corruption Day event.  Photo and text found in  




Children listening to a presentation at an Anti-Corruption public rally at  
Chiyeke Market in Chavuma District. Photo and text found in the 2014  





A group of men listening to an anti-corruption talk at  
Chief Nkweto’s Palace in Chinsali District. Photo and text found in the 2012  





Group of women and children listening to an anti-corruption presentation at  
Chief Katyetye’s Palace in Isoka District. Photo and text found in the 2012  
Annual Report by the Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia (2012, p. 21). 
 
Introduction of performance appraisals 
Another change that came through the restructuring process was the 
introduction of annual performance appraisals.  According to Zambia’s Public Service 
Reform Programme (PSRP), after restructuring takes place within a government 
agency, the restructured organization is then conditionally required to conduct annual 
performance appraisals of its officers (Kanchebele, 2013; Manning & Agere, 2002).  
The Anti-Corruption Commission’s key donor, DFID, had also been pushing for 
performance appraisals and the importance of “holding staff to account for their 
performance against agreed standards of professionalism for the ACC work and 
leading by example” (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2005, p. 5).   
According to the Anti-Corruption Commission’s 2006 annual report, 
performance appraisals were first introduced within the organization in 2006, one year 
after the first restructuring process was completed (Anti-Corruption Commission 
Zambia, 2006, p. 12).  Annual performance appraisals are the yearly systematic 
evaluation processes, in which supervisors assess the performance of their direct 
reports based on previously agreed upon objectives as well as how those objectives 
contribute to overall organizational goals and objectives.  The central element of the 
performance appraisals is a yearly interview, in which a supervisor meets together 
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with his or her direct reports to discuss their performance.  One of the interview 
respondents described the interviews like this, “You sit with the supervisor.  Then you 
go through the form that you have filled in about why you were not able to fulfill 
certain targets and the reasons you have put there.”  The supervisor will then make 
recommendations based on the evaluation.  These might be to reward good 
performance with promotions and pay increases, for example, or to help improve an 
officer’s job performance with training programs, all based on the evaluation and 
interview processes.   
The introduction of annual performance appraisals promulgated elements of the 
development management logic at the Anti-Corruption Commission, particularly as it 
relates to evaluation and employment processes for organization members.  This 
appraisal process would presumably give more control and authority to management 
within the organization for evaluating organization members based on their job 
performance.  Members of management would then have the tools and authority to call 
for promotions, training programs, or corrective actions based on the evaluations of 
employees.  This also emphasized the strategic operational mode of the organization, 
which was focused on how it could effectively work toward its mission to prevent and 
combat corruption for good governance and sustainable development. 
However, officers within the Anti-Corruption Commission said that 
performance appraisals are not taken seriously within the organization or that they are 
not even being done at all in some cases.  When they are being done, they were 
described simply as “an academic exercise,” or something that just had to be done, 
even though respondents said there was no point in doing them within their 
organization.  To clarify this point, one of the respondents said,  
What I mean by ‘academic exercise’ is, figuratively speaking, there is nothing 
that comes out of them that the commission benefits from.  So, it’s just one of 
those things we just do for the sake of doing it.  So, people would just say [to 
their supervisor], “Write down whatever you want to put there because I’ve 
been doing this for the past few years, and nothing comes of it!” … it becomes 
something you do just for the sake of doing it.   
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These performance appraisals can be seen as a type organizational ceremony 
performed for the sake of making it look legitimate, yet doing very little to change the 
daily routines of the organization (Bromley & Powell, 2012).   
Some officers said that they had actually quit doing the appraisals years earlier 
after a government spending freeze prevented officers from receiving salary increases.  
One respondent noted that after that point, the “supervisor would not even ask about 
the appraisal for that coming year” because it was just understood that they would not 
do it.  He went on to say, “that’s why, me, I haven’t done those appraisals… nobody 
has done appraisals.  I think in the last three years no one has, because they have no 
motivation to do the appraisals.”  This situation has gotten worse over the years, as 
funding for the organization has decreased.  Therefore, without the incentives of pay 
increases, the policy of performance appraisals is seen as a meaningless act of 
ceremony, both by managers and their direct reports.       
A University of Zambia researcher, Njekwa Mate (2006), also found gaps 
between the Zambian performance appraisal policy and its implementation in public 
organizations.  His research showed that, across the civil service, performance 
appraisals are largely symbolic, rather than being used as tools to monitor and improve 
performance of public servants.  Mate (2006) noted that “the majority of civil servants 
interviewed (i.e., 58.5 percent) argued that the administration of the performance 
appraisal system in the civil service today was just a matter of routine and served very 
little purpose” (p. v, parentheses in original; see also pp. 48-60).  Mate’s research, 
along with the current case on the Anti-Corruption Commission, illustrates how 
processes of decoupling can affect the implementation of performance appraisals.  
They are decoupled from the core operations of the organization, which rewards 
officers for stable and consistent service in the organization rather than for 
performance.   
The issue of annual performance evaluations also relates to employment 
processes at the Anti-Corruption Commission, which continue to be consistent with 
the bureaucratic logic in spite of the development management logic being 
promulgated through the restructuring processes.  Promotions are based on seniority 
and do not take into account evaluations from the annual performance appraisals.  
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Interview respondents were eager to talk about the way promotions took place within 
the organization.  As one of the respondents described it,  
I would say unfortunately it only has to do with seniority, how long a person 
has been in this institution. So, whether you performed better than a certain 
person who has been here longer than you, you will still never get a position… 
rarely is performance or qualification looked at. 
Another organization member described it by saying, “In reality, promotions are based 
on how long you’ve stayed.  I know people who have been longer than me, and they 
have been promoted sometimes regardless of whether or not they have performed.”   
It troubles some of the officers that promotions are not being based on job 
performance.  One of the respondents described the situation in the following:  
What I have noticed is that promotions are based more on the years of service - 
long service is a very big advantage for a promotion – not really your output or 
performance.  It’s about who has worked with us longest: let’s reward him with 
this position.  So, people don’t really care how good you are at what you do.   
This seemed to affect the morale of the officers, and it has been exacerbated by a 
situation in the organization in which there are very few vacancies for promotions.  
The way respondents see it, the few promotions that are actually given, are given to 
those who have been at the organization longest, regardless of their performance.   
 
Decoupling, Segmentation, and Relationships among Logics 
The sections above described how the passage of news laws and organizational 
restructuring processes promulgated the development management and 
professionalism logics within the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission.  These 
promulgations in some ways led to changes in ways the organization operated and 
interacted with society.  These changes came as organization members enacted 
elements of the development management logic and its orientation toward the public, 
as evidenced by outreach activities throughout Zambia.  However, in other ways, 
particularly related to the autonomy and independence of the organization and the way 
that evaluations were carried out, they were only enacted on a surface level within the 
organization.    
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The passage of the new laws can be seen as signals sent to the international 
community that the Zambian government was taking action against corruption.  They 
codified the international standards for anti-corruption agencies into Zambian law with 
language that provided the agency more legal independence and autonomy to conduct 
anti-corruption work without undue influence from political actors.  The passage of the 
new laws promulgated the professionalism logic, since it espoused the standards and 
norms commonly accepted within that professional community, and because it 
formally provided more autonomy and independence for the organization to do its 
work without undue influence, which is consistent with the professionalism logic.  The 
new laws also promulgated the bureaucratic logic by formally strengthening the 
rational-legal authority of the organization, giving it more legal strength to prosecute 
cases of corruption.   
However, in spite of the promulgations of the professional and bureaucratic 
logics, the ultimate system of control and authority within the organization continues 
to remain consistent with the kinship logic.  The executive branch of government and 
those who are politically connected are able to use informal means of control.  For 
example, interview respondents stated that the President can expect the Director 
General, whom he appointed to that position, to reciprocate for this by steering 
investigations away from himself and those close to him.  In that way, the actual 
operation of the Anti-Corruption Commission is decoupled from the formal laws that 
provide independence for the organization and for its leader, the Director General.  
According to this perspective on decoupling, the laws were “adopted purely as 
ceremonial window dressing or implemented… so weakly that they do little to alter 
daily work routines” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 7).  As a result of these laws being 
implemented only ceremonially, officers within the Anti-Corruption Commission 
regularly operate in fear of losing their jobs or being punished in other ways if they 
expose corruption among powerful politicians and those closely connected to the 
President.   
In that way, there continues to be a facilitative relationship between the kinship 
and bureaucratic logics, since in some ways the laws and structures that are rational 
and legal can be subverted and used as weapons to instill fear and informal control of 
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the Anti-Corruption Commission and its members.  For example, the law requires the 
Director of Public Prosecution to approve cases before they can go to the courts.  This 
gives the President and the executive branch of government yet another lever to 
exercise control and undue influence in the organization, as was attested by interview 
respondents.  Likewise, even though the organization is now situated outside of the 
president’s office and is “self-accounting” with control of its own budget, it still comes 
under the ministry of finance, which is part of the executive (Mwenda, 2007, p. 75).   
The Ministry of Finance regularly cuts its budget and fails to release the total amount 
of its budgeted funds, which prevents the officers from doing their work (Ibid).  
Interview respondents believe these arrangements have allowed politicians to subvert 
the legal system and to control the organization through fear and intimidation, 
practices which are consistent with the kinship logic.   
The organizational restructuring processes promulgated the development 
management logic in two main ways.  The first was that it provided for more external 
focus on the public through education programs.  This was made possible through 
segmenting the development management logic and the bureaucratic logic in different 
departments.  Segmenting is seen as a way to enable action, according to Waldorff et 
al. (2013), since it allows competitive relationships to coexist by partitioning the types 
of work consistent with different logics in different departments.  The external 
orientation of the development management logic was segmented within the 
Community Education department, which has the staff resources and the responsibility 
for developing collective action against corruption in Zambia and communicating with 
the public about the cases the organization is investigating.  The Investigations 
Department, on the other hand, continues to have an internal orientation.  It is focused 
internally on the bureaucracy and operating under secrecy, which is arguably a 
necessary requirement for doing their work as investigators.  Even though there could 
be competition between the bureaucratic logic’s internal orientation, in which 
organization members would be focused on the needs of the bureaucracy and 
disregarding the needs of the public, and the external orientation of the development 
management logic, these can coexist by being separated within two distinct 
organizational departments.   
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Through that segmentation, the organization can satisfy demands of both logics.  
The constraints of the bureaucratic logic, with its internal orientation within the 
bureaucratic organization was able to continue unabated.  While, at the same time, the 
organization could also focus on the public through the Community Education 
department, both in its education programs such as lectures, talks, and workshops in 
the community.  Indeed, the number and types of programs have expanded with 
outreaches in the traditional communities, larger public rallies, and creative 
presentations through dramas and music (Anti-Corruption Commission Zambia, 2014, 
2015).  The staff members from the two departments are able to do their very different 
types of work without preventing each other from satisfying the demands of the 
different logics guiding their work.   
Restructuring also paved the way for performance evaluations, which are a 
requirement at all public organizations in Zambia that have been through the 
restructuring process.  The performance evaluations, at first glance, were implemented 
within the office in 2006.  However, interview respondents said that the performance 
evaluations were either not taking place at all or were merely done in a symbolic way.  
Therefore, performance evaluations in the Anti-Corruption Commission are another 
example of decoupling.  As a result of the decoupling and the symbolic 
implementation of the performance evaluations, the bureaucratic logic remained 
influential in the way employees were evaluated and how promotions took place 
within the organization.  Many organization members complained that promotions are 
not based on the evaluation or measurement of an employee’s performance on the job, 
rather they continue to be based on seniority instead.   
This can be seen as two different types of decoupling, according to Bromley 
and Powell (2012).  In the situations the interview respondents described, in which the 
performance appraisals were not being done at all, this can be seen as “policy-practice 
decoupling” in which policies are not fully implemented as an act of “symbolic 
adoption” (Ibid, p. 15).  In the cases the interview respondents described in which the 
performance appraisals were done, but only as an academic exercise that did not lead 
to any benefits to the organization or the officers, that can be seen as “means-ends 
decoupling”.  In means-ends decoupling, policies or practices are implemented “that 
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have an opaque relationship to outcomes”, or what can be called “symbolic 
implementation” (Ibid, p. 15).   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at how the introduction of new laws and restructuring 
processes promulgated alternative logics at the Anti-Corruption Commission.  These 
promulgations led to “limited change” within the organization, in which “visible 
elements of alternative logics are introduced ‘on top of’ less visible norms” (Andrews, 
2013, p. 51).  This is interpreted using theoretical ideas around the concept of 
“decoupling” in which “structural elements are only loosely linked to each other and to 
activities, rules are often violated…, and evaluation and inspection systems are 
subverted or rendered so vague as to provide little coordination” (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977, p. 343).  In some ways, the organization has changed to become more focused 
on the public, which is consistent with the development management logic.  This 
remains competitive with the bureaucratic logic and its internal orientation, but the two 
logics can co-exist as they are segmented between two organizational departments.  
The situation for the Anti-Corruption Commission is strained and conflicted in 
many ways.  There are influential and competing logics that prevent them from 
fulfilling their role in controlling corruption in Zambian society.  Consistent with the 
kinship logic, they do not have true autonomy and independence from the undue 
influence of powerful political actors.  This is in conflict with the autonomy of the 
professionalism logic that was promulgated through a number of laws passed in the 
Zambian Parliament.  The organization has, however, been able to engage the public 
through training programs and other outreach activities, which is consistent with the 
development management logic and its staff orientation focused on meeting the needs 
of the public.  This can be seen as a result of segmenting the logics based on 
organizational departments, which allows the Investigations Department to work in 
secrecy and away from the public eye, while the Community Education Department 
can work closely with members of the public. 
The political situation in Zambia seems to be becoming more opaque and 
oppressive in recent years (Bratton et al., 2017), which will likely make matters more 
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challenging for the Anti-Corruption Commission and its work of prosecuting and 
preventing corruption, especially as it relates to powerful political actors.  One of the 
officers in the organization had the following to say about this situation and the level 
of political will to fight corruption in the country:  
The political will?  Ah, it disappeared a long time ago.  It’s not there.  The 
support to the institution, financially, it’s not there.  We have vacancies we 
cannot recruit for, because there is no funding… Right now, like in my 
department, there is nothing!  It’s completely lacking in terms of finances.  
Officers just come to sit, play on the internet, knock off and go home.  So, there 
is a problem somewhere.   
The situation seems hopeless to many members of the Anti-Corruption Commission, 
as well as members of the public who are observing it.  The political power seems 
overwhelmingly strong in its ability to interfere with the operations of the agency, and 
the Anti-Corruption Commission’s legal autonomy seems largely symbolic and 
vaporous.  Perhaps as Kuris (2015) argued, an anti-corruption agency with broad legal 
powers like in Zambia faces greater risks of interference and politicization precisely 
because of its power and mandate.  This is especially the case where corruption runs 
rampant, as it does in Zambia.  Kuris contended that the government will likely 
“pressure them to act as attack dogs against opposition politicians” or that they “may 
respond by stripping its powers, removing its leadership, challenging it in court, 
reducing its funding, or curtailing its independence (Ibid, p. 130).  In light of all of 





Becoming an Ombudsman Office for the Zambian People? 
This chapter examines the relationships between institutional logics within the 
ombudsman office of Zambia, and it argues that the office is now entering a period of 
potential change as alternative logics are being promulgated in the organization.  The 
outcomes of these processes are still uncertain, however, as there are ongoing contests 
for power and negotiations over which logics will be influential in guiding the 
organization.  The ways the ombudsman office had been operating was in many ways 
consistent with the bureaucratic and kinship logics, and there is now a contestation 
between those established logics and two alternative logics – the development 
management logic and the professionalism logic.   
This chapter brings the focus of analyses “close to the action” on the 
organizational “battlefields”, where “political contestations” and “power struggles” 
over competing logics are currently taking place (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, pp. 117-
119).  These power struggles revolved around three key events in the recent history of 
the organization: a process of strategic planning and drafting a plan for restructuring 
the organization, a move into a new office building, and the drafting of new 
ombudsman legislation.  The three events promulgated the professionalism and 
development logics within the organization.  However, the case narrative in this 
chapter does not end in period of “relative stability” in which a new constellation of 
logics guides the organization (Reay & Hinings, 2005, p. 364).  There are still ongoing 
power struggles, and it is yet to be determined whether actors will accept or resist the 
proposed changes and how that will look (Ibid, p. 369).  Therefore, the present time 
period within the organization can be seen as a “transition period where multiple 
competing logics exist and a resolution is required” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 376).  
The narrative that unfolds below describes “power plays involving agents” (Andrews, 
2013, p. 50) who have different interests and are vying for different future outcomes 
for the organization.  There are the “institutional entrepreneurs” who are driving 
divergent change in the organization, and there are also “‘institutional defenders’ who 




The following sections begin with an overview of the work of ombudsman 
offices and the recent development and growth of these unique types of organizations 
on a global scale, which places the case within its international context.  It continues 
with an overview of the history of the ombudsman office in Zambia, the background 
of which is necessary for understanding the power struggles that exist in the 
organization today.  Then the chapter continues with a description of the institutional 
logics that were dominant in the office during the period of stability from 1974 – 2014, 
followed by a narrative account of how alternative logics were introduced by a team of 
institutional entrepreneurs and a discussion about how these logics currently co-exist 
in a tense and combative battlefield within the organization (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, 
p. 377).  Finally, the chapter presents some alternative arrangements that could come 
about in the ombudsman office over time, depending on how the actors involved will 
respond to proposed changes.   
 
Ombudsman Offices and “Ombudsmania”  
The organization that is the subject of this chapter is Zambia’s ombudsman 
office2.  As an ombudsman office, its core function is to investigate cases of 
maladministration and abuse of authority by the state bureaucracy.  Ombudsman 
offices do not typically have prosecutorial power or issue enforceable directives.  
Instead, they make recommendations to address cases of maladministration or unfair 
conduct and often use “‘soft powers’ of persuasion and cooperation” to bring about 
resolutions between accuser and accused (Reif, 2011, p. 270).  Therefore, an 
ombudsman can be seen as a “mediator” or “facilitator” who “brings indirect pressure 
to bear on the public agencies, so that they take appropriate corrective or remedial 
measures” (Abedin, 2011, p. 900).  Donald Rowat colorfully illustrated how an 
ombudsman can deal with the broad issue of maladministration case by case, when he 
wrote, “It may be true, as critics say, that the office is not very well equipped for 
hunting lions. But it can certainly swat a lot of flies” (Rowat, 1984, p. 211).  An 
                                               
2 Zambia’s national ombudsman office was originally called the Commission for Investigations from 1974 until 2016.  Then in 2016, it was 
reestablished in Zambian law as a new organizational entity with a new name, the Office of the Public Protector.  Throughout this paper, the 
organization will be referred to as “the Zambian ombudsman office” or simply “the ombudsman office” to avoid confusion, unless otherwise 
noted.   
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ombudsman office typically deals with many of the day-to-day issues that can arise in 
the process of public service delivery, in which the public is not served in the manner 
it should.  Taking corrective measures to address these types of cases, as well as 
addressing the systemic problems that may cause them, is thought to lead to better 
public administration and public service delivery. 
The history of ombudsman offices traces back to Scandinavia, as the first 
official ombudsman’s office was established in Sweden in 1809.  However, the 
concept goes further back to 1711, when a Chancellor Justice was appointed by the 
Swedish King to consider people’s complaints against royal officials.  Sweden was 
actually the only country with an ombudsman for over 100 years.  It was only in the 
first half of the 20th century that ombudsman offices began to spread throughout the 
rest of Scandinavia, then later making their way to British Commonwealth countries 
and beyond in the 1960s and 1970s (Reif, 2011).  Tanzania was the first state to 
establish an ombudsman’s office in Commonwealth Africa in 1966, followed by 
Mauritius in 1969.  Zambia established the third ombudsman’s office in 
Commonwealth Africa in 1974, called The Commission for Investigations, which was 
immediately followed by Nigeria in 1975.  This spread of ombudsman organizations 
from Scandinavia to the rest of the world has been “of such enormous magnitude on a 
global scale” that it has been labeled “ombudsmania… an ombudsman explosion… 
ombudsman tidal wave, or ombudsman tsunami” (Abedin, 2011, pp. 898-899).  The 
four early adopters in Commonwealth Africa initially chose organizational names 
other than ombudsman to communicate what the purpose of the organizations was to 
be.  “The principal reason for this”, according to Ayeni (1997), “was the need to give 
the institution an identity that people in the countries concerned could easily associate 
with” (p. 549).  However, beginning in the 1980s, these newly established ombudsman 
offices on the African continent did begin to refer to the word “ombudsman” in the 
names of their offices.  This only happened after the ombudsman concept began to 
become popularized in 1978, with the establishment of the International Ombudsman 
Institute (IOI), which serves as an umbrella organization for ombudsman offices 
around the world.  “With this, the title ‘Ombudsman’ became a basis for some 
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professional fraternity, and African offices did not want to be excluded” (Ayeni, 1997, 
p. 550).  
 As the adoption of ombudsman offices has proliferated around the world, so 
has the diversity of structures, approaches, and unique features found within these 
offices.  They take various forms and have a variety of legal mandates.  The structures 
and mandates of public ombudsman offices can be broadly classified according to two 
main types.  The first type is a classical ombudsman institution, in which the 
ombudsman is appointed by the legislature or parliament and reports directly to them.  
The second type is an executive ombudsman institution, in which the executive branch 
of government appoints the ombudsman, who then, in turn, reports directly to the 
executive.  Recently, many new and existing ombudsman offices have also begun 
placing an increased emphasis on the protection of human rights, moving beyond their 
narrow focus on maladministration.  These ombudsman offices are seeking to expand 
their legal mandates to become human rights organizations, or so-called human rights 
ombudsman institutions, as well as to have strengthened “powers like the right to 
inspect closed facilities, to bring abstract or concrete review actions before 
constitutional courts, to participate in administrative court proceedings, or to prosecute 
or recommend the prosecution of public officials” (Reif, 2011, p. 275).  
From its establishment in 1974 up until a newly amended constitution was 
passed in 2016, the ombudsman in Zambia was an executive ombudsman institution.  
It reported to the office of the President, and its investigative work was narrowly 
focused on administrative matters reported by complainants.  It has now begun a 
transition to become an entirely new organizational entity with a new name, the Office 
of Public Protector, and it will now be a legislative ombudsman and have an expanded 
mandate to protect human rights in Zambia.  The details of the history of the 
organization will follow below as well as descriptions of the patterns of institutional 
logics that were consistent with the operation of the organization at that time.       
 
The History of Zambia’s Ombudsman Office   
To trace the history of Zambia’s ombudsman institution, it is instructive to 
follow the course of Zambia’s constitution and its political system.  The first 
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constitution for the newly independent Republic of Zambia was adopted in 1964, 
based on the Westminster model inherited from the British during the colonial era.  
The 1964 constitution allowed for a multi-party democracy, which was initially 
dominated by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) with its leader, 
President Kenneth Kaunda.  This time period, known as the First Republic of Zambia, 
lasted from 1964 until 1972, two years before the establishment of the ombudsman 
institution.  During much of this time, the economic situation of indigenous Zambians 
began to improve dramatically.  Their “annual earnings… rose by 97 percent.  The 
manufacturing sector doubled its output, and the number of people employed rose by 
40 percent” (McLoughlin & Weerdesteijn, 2016, p. 128).  It seemed the future for 
Zambia and for Zambians was promising.   
UNIP and President Kaunda had initially enjoyed unchallenged hegemony 
within the electorate, because the only other opposition party, the African National 
Congress (ANC), had only been able to secure a small minority stake in the 
government.  It seemed that UNIP’s dominance would be able to last indefinitely, 
since Kaunda went to great lengths to appease the diverse ethno-linguistic factions by 
balancing their representation within the government.  However, a “general political 
malaise” began to develop in Zambia in the late 60s and early 70s (Chikulo, 1988, p. 
37).  Trouble had also begun to arise within the ranks of UNIP, as ethno-linguistic 
factions grew dissatisfied with the power balancing arrangements in government, and 
some factions began to break away to form splinter parties in opposition to UNIP.  In 
response to these challenges, Kaunda declared Zambia a one-party participatory 
democracy in 1972, and he assigned his vice president, Mainza Chona, to lead a 
commission to devise a strategy for moving the country toward becoming a one-party 
state.  Among the provisions that gave more power to UNIP and its president, the 
Chona Commission also called for the establishment of an ombudsman office in 
Zambia.    
The ombudsman office would be established two years later, in 1974, early in 
the Second Republic of Zambia, the period in Zambia’s history that lasted from 1972 
to 1991.  During that time, the only officially recognized political party in Zambia was 
UNIP, and its leader, President Kenneth Kaunda held the power of the government.  
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The new ombudsman office was established as an executive ombudsman institution, 
and as such, it was answerable directly to the President.  The ombudsman3, who led 
the organization, was “appointed by the President in consultation with the Judicial 
Service Commission” (Phiri, 1986, p. 235).  It can be argued that the establishment of 
the ombudsman office in Zambia actually served as a form of political control and a 
way to quiet potential opposition groups by providing legitimacy to the government 
and giving the appearance of transparency and accountability.  Alluding to this 
argument, Martin (1977) cited deliberations in the Zambian National Assembly about 
the establishment of the ombudsman office and how the government “felt that this 
would be viewed as an ‘independent and impartial’ institution… ‘of tremendous value 
to the administration’, since it would not only check excesses and provide an outlet for 
public resentment against them, but also protect the administration (p. 244).  The 
current ombudsman in Zambia also expressed a similar opinion of the establishment of 
the institution during her 2016 interview for this research project:  
Dr. Kaunda was right again.  I think he was a very clever man.  He was a clever 
strategist.  He didn’t have any opposition party.  It was a one-party state.  So, 
somebody sold him the idea of the ombudsman and said “Look you can have an 
ombudsman institution that can report on the public service delivery system, so 
that would be sort of like a pseudo opposition for you”. 
As with most of the policy instruments implemented by Kaunda and his 
political party, UNIP, the reasons behind their implementation are open to 
interpretation.   He may have been motived by his “humanist philosophy” and 
“inclusive ideas” or by a desire for “maintaining [his] position of power” (McLoughlin 
& Weerdesteijn, 2016, p. 128).  Regardless of the motivation, however, the 
ombudsman office was seen as a welcome addition to the administrative system in 
Zambia, especially in light of the precarious condition of the courts at that time.   
As Martin (1977) noted, Zambia had “a fairly standard Westminster export-
model constitution.  Typically the courts were envisaged as the major institution of 
                                               
3 To avoid confusion, this paper uses the generic term, “ombudsman” to signify an executive official who would 
hold the position “Investigator General” from 1974 – 2016 and “Public Protector” from 2016 onward.  These 
titles were given to the appointed official who leads the effort to redress maladministration in Zambia, which in 
general terms is the nation’s ombudsman.   
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control… [for] the enforcement of the provisions of the constitution concerning 
fundamental rights” (p. 241).  However, the courts in Zambia were actually not useful 
avenues for citizens as a means of redress in the face of maladministration or abuses of 
government.  The courts in Zambia, as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, lacked 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  There were also additional challenges because 
“cultural, geographical, procedural, and financial factors severely limit[ed] the access 
of the mass of the people to the superior courts where, generally speaking, rights 
against the state can be enforced” (Martin, 1977, p. 242).  The court system at that 
time lacked the capacity to handle cases of maladministration, and to compound these 
problems, “Kaunda gradually replaced all High Court judges who made decisions 
against the government, until the judiciary was stacked with judges known to favour 
the government”, which further eroded the judicial system’s ability to protect the 
rights of ordinary Zambians (McLoughlin & Weerdesteijn, 2016, p. 130).  For these 
reasons, Martin (1977) argued that the new ombudsman office had actually come at a 
fortuitous time in the nation’s history, since it would have had the potential to ensure 
better government services to the people.    
The economic situation of the country began to change in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and with those changes, the rising levels of prosperity in Zambia again receded, and 
Zambians began losing confidence in Kaunda.  The price of copper dropped, leading 
to the closure of copper mines and increasing rates of unemployment.  A public outcry 
for political change and a return to multi-party democracy began to rise.  To his credit, 
Kenneth Kaunda conceded and allowed multi-party elections to take place in 1991, 
and Frederick Chiluba was elected President.  To facilitate the move to multiparty 
democracy, the constitution was amended in 1991 and then again in 1996.  Likewise, 
the legal framework for the ombudsman office was also amended, with Parliament 
passing the Commission for Investigations Acts of 1991 and 1996.  However, as Ayeni 
(1997) argued, these changes were limited to “necessary amendments to reconcile the 
ombudsman to the new constitutional dispensation”, and there were still not “many 
substantive changes… made in the character and functioning of the institution”, as it 
remained an “essentially executive based institution, a situation all those concerned 
agree should not continue” (p. 554).   
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In spite of dramatic changes to Zambia’s political situation, the ombudsman 
office changed very little from the time of its initial establishment in 1974 up until 
2014, at which point significant changes and reforms would be introduced in the 
organization for the first time.  The section below describes the initial period of 
stability in the ombudsman office from 1974 to 2014 as well as discussing the 
institutional logics that were consistent with its practices and structures at that time.  
This will be followed by subsequent sections that describe the current period of 
transition within the organization in which alternative logics are currently being 
promulgated within the office.  Those sections also present details about the political 
contestations and power plays between actors that are likely to have an effect on the 
future constellation of logics within the ombudsman office, which can, in turn, shape 
the way the organization and its members do their work in the coming years.     
 
Stability and Low Capacity in the Ombudsman Office  
As noted previously, the Zambian ombudsman office operated in much the 
same way during its first 40 years of existence.  During this time, it faced limitations 
of various kinds that affected its ability to consistently address cases of 
maladministration in Zambia.  A recent report about the ombudsman office, which was 
funded by Danish and Swedish development agencies, noted that the ombudsman 
office had “persistently low case resolution” due to “a number of challenges, including 
financial constraints and inadequate human resource” (Chewe-Chanda, 2009, p. 19).  
Another problem, according to data from the report, was that there was a lack of 
professional autonomy because of the institution’s legal framework as an executive 
ombudsman, since it answered to the president and had its budget set by the Ministry 
of Finance.  The report also emphasized a number of what it called “claw-back 
provisions” in the law that allowed the executive government to interfere with the 
work of the ombudsman office (Chewe-Chanda, 2009, pp. 13, 29, 33).  One example 
of a claw-back provision was the fact that on one hand, the legal framework gave the 
ombudsman office “unrestricted powers to act, even where other bodies or institutions 
have been restricted from doing so”, while on the other hand, the commission would 
not be able to act in certain situations “unless it is specifically permitted by the 
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president to do so” (Ibid, p. 13).  Legal provisions like those stifled the autonomy of 
the organization by giving it “wide-ranging powers” with one part of the law, while 
taking them away with another part of the law (Ibid, p. 13).   
The legal framework also ensured the ombudsman office remained tied to the 
centralized hierarchical system of government.  This system is consistent with the 
bureaucratic logic, in which organizations are structured in centralized bureaucratic 
hierarchies with strict accountability up the chain of command.  This arrangement 
caused the ombudsman to rely on the executive branch for all of its resources, whether 
it was recruiting staff, paying their salaries, or budgeting for the investigative work 
related to cases of maladministration.  As Chewe-Chanda (2009) noted, “The 
commission is funded through the Ministry of Finance and National Planning which 
considers the budget prepared by the commission, determines, the allocation, with the 
approval of Parliament, and transfers funds monthly”, which leaves the ombudsman 
vulnerable to interference via its finances (p. 19).  One of the interview respondents 
from the ombudsman office described how this kind of political interference happened 
in the following statement:  
The commission reports to the President, and when he doesn’t want to pursue a 
case, they don’t.  Most of the investigations we do are expensive.  They [the 
executive branch of the Government] delay funding the monthly disbursements, 
which slows us down. 
It is ironic that while the office’s centralized hierarchical system was based on the law, 
it could still be used by the President to interfere with ongoing investigations 
whenever he wanted, which runs contrary to the general understanding of how an 
ombudsman office should operate.   
The ombudsman office was established as an executive ombudsman institution, 
linked to the President of Zambia and his government.  This linkage with the executive 
branch reduced the autonomy of the ombudsman office and made it essentially “an 
arm of the executive” according to Abedin (2011, p. 919).  The Zambian President 
retained power over the investigations and deliberations of the Commission, and he 
could intervene at any time.  He could even terminate an investigation if he did not 
want the office to continue looking into it (Chewe-Chanda, 2009, p. 27; The 
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Commission for Investigations Act, 1996, section 21).  This, in particular, was a 
challenge for the ombudsman office because it meant that it lacked independence from 
the very offices it was also responsible for investigating.  This led to a tenuous 
situation in which organization members were not sure how to proceed with cases that 
were related to the executive.  An example of this is when the ombudsman’s 
investigators, who are civil servants, had to investigate the ministry directly in charge 
of their resources, the Ministry of Finance.  As one of the officers said, “With 
complaints against the Government or the Ministry of Finance, if we start pushing 
them, we will be scared and think, ‘How will this affect our funding?’”  
As illustrated above, the centralized hierarchical system, which is consistent 
with the bureaucratic logic, at times actually hindered the operations of the office.  
Yet, during the time in which Zambia was a one-party state, perhaps the best and only 
reasonable type of arrangement was for the ombudsman to be located under the 
president.  In that way, the office would have been able to benefit from the strength of 
the presidency.  Furthermore, if the ombudsman office did not operate as an arm of the 
executive, it would not have had the legitimacy to act as a mediator or facilitator.  This 
type of legitimacy would have been meaningful and also practically useful if the 
ombudsman also enjoyed “the confidence of the political leadership” to back up his or 
her recommendations (Martin, 1977, p. 245).  This also would have allowed the 
ombudsman to turn to the office of the President as the final arbiter in unresolved 
cases with the belief that the President would listen favorably.  This may have been the 
case in the early days of the office during the First Republic, but the ombudsman 
office began to grow increasingly marginalized after the democratic system in Zambia 
changed in 1991 at the start of the Third Republic.   
The organizational system of the ombudsman office was formally established in 
the laws of Zambia, but it did not allow the investigators to work independently, and it 
precluded any real autonomy for their investigative work related to maladministration 
by the government.  This lack of autonomy in the organization is consistent with the 
bureaucratic logic’s system of control and source of authority.  The ombudsman office 
was controlled by the centralized power structure of the state bureaucracy.  The source 
of authority was also bureaucratic in the sense that it was rational and legal, as it was 
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based on a legal framework established in Zambian law and its constitution.  
Furthermore, the officers in the organization also saw themselves as civil servants 
affiliated with the centralized state bureaucracy, which is also consistent with the staff 
orientation of the bureaucratic logic.  This was evidenced in field interviews, when 
respondents often discussed their status as civil servants, particularly how being under 
the authority and control of the executive branch of government was a threat to their 
ability to conduct investigations without undue influence.     
However, the bureaucratic system of control and source of authority in the 
organization were also subverted by a kinship logic, in which informal control 
occurred through intimidation and fear of recrimination.  When discussing political 
interference with the work of the ombudsman office, respondents from the 
organization said they had reason to be afraid.  As one of the officers said, “We are 
scared because we are just civil servants.  So, we are afraid of losing our jobs”.  This 
meant that the investigators could actually be punished for doing their jobs properly 
and not acting to please the desires of government officials and protecting their 
privileged positions.  In this way, the systems of authority and control of the kinship 
logic, which are based on informal authority structures and expectations of reciprocity 
or fear, were being facilitated by the authority and control of the bureaucratic logic, 
which is based on a rational-legal authority with strict control by a centralized 
structure.  This enabled powerful government officials to abuse their formal power 
within the state bureaucracy to intimidate members of the ombudsman office and to 
keep them from investigating cases of maladministration that would have negatively 
affected them in some way.   
In development literature these types of arrangements are sometimes referred to 
as “neo-patrimonial” (Hydén, 2013a; Therkildsen, 2010), in which the ancient and 
informal patrimonial power structures of African society continue to guide behavior in 
spite of, as well as through, modern forms of government.  According to Hydén 
(2013a), this is actually just a new form of patrimonialism: “Patrimonialism in Africa 
after independence is new in that it is backed by the resources of the modern state” (p. 
99).  Thus, political leaders could exert informal control based on fear or intimidation 
using the formal and legal bureaucratic structures and power arrangements that were at 
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their disposal.  This layering of patrimonial control over bureaucratic structures 
happens all over the world, but it seems especially prevalent in Africa according to 
Hyden (Ibid).  An aptly descriptive reference to this form of subverted bureaucracy 
comes from Jackall (2010) in his work on American corporations:  
The kind of bureaucracy that developed… was a hybrid; it incorporated many 
structural features of the pure form of bureaucracy but it also resembled 
patrimonial bureaucracy… There, personal loyalty was the norm… one 
survives and flourishes by currying favor with powerful officials up the line 
who stand close to the ruler. It is a system marked by patronage and by 
intrigues and conspiracies among various factions to gain the favor of the ruler 
and the perquisites that accompany his good grace (p. 11)… the subordinate 
must symbolically reinforce at every turn his own subordination and his willing 
acceptance of the obligations of fealty. In return, he can hope for those 
perquisites that are in his boss’s gift (p. 20)… and acceptance of the gift 
implicitly involves a reaffirmation and strengthening of fealty (p. 23).   
The systems of authority and control of the ombudsman office were overlapping and 
dual in nature.  Its formal source of authority and system of control were based on the 
constitution of Zambia and the Commission for Investigations Act, which are 
consistent with the bureaucratic logic. Yet, at the same time, those legal provisions 
provided the opportunity for the President, members of his government, and the 
political and bureaucratic elites to abuse the ombudsman office in ways that are 
consistent with the kinship logic.  In that way, this was an example of facilitative 
relationships between logics, as the enactment of the systems of control and authority 
consistent with the bureaucratic logic based on laws and regulations, also facilitated 
forms of informal control that are consistent with the kinship logic and based on fear 
of reprisals and expectations of reciprocity.       
Interview respondents described ways in which they dealt with the fear of 
reprisals from powerful or politically connected officials.  They talked about the 
possibility of losing their jobs as well as losing the sparse funding for the organization 
if they investigated those individuals.  As one of the respondents said, “Sometimes it is 
quite scary.  We take those cases to the Investigator General [the ombudsman], but 
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she’s not a person who is easily scared.  We are lucky that way.”  In that way, officers 
were sometimes able to manage their fears by delivering a case up to the ombudsman, 
who would then handle it.  However, not all officers were convinced that the 
ombudsman was able to stand up against the patriarchal power structures.  As another 
officer said, “The Investigator General [the ombudsman] was appointed by the 
President, and she doesn’t want to bite the hand that feeds her.  So, if the President 
doesn’t want a case pursued, they will find a way of slowing it down.”   
The potential for collusion between the executive and the ombudsman was 
exacerbated by the fact that all investigations and proceedings had to be done in 
camera, or in private quarters, according to the law (The Commission for 
Investigations Act, 1996, section 16).  Therefore, it was only the President who was 
privy to the details of some investigations and reports from the ombudsman office, and 
cases of maladministration could even be closed without any reasons given to 
complainants (Ibid, sections 20 and 10.3).  With the proceedings done in camera, there 
was virtually no public accountability for the work of the ombudsman, which made it 
easy to abuse the formal authority the President had over the organization.    
As organization members have navigated their way through this complex 
environment, they have had to continually focus their attention on both formal and 
informal power structures, the state bureaucracy and the patriarchy, in order to protect 
their jobs and their livelihoods.  This is consistent with the staff orientation of both the 
kinship and bureaucratic logics.  However, the place where members of the 
ombudsman office have not been focusing much of their attention is on members of 
the Zambian public.  Most of the cases the office has been handling have come from 
complaints by civil servants, and only a limited number of cases have actually come 
from the general public (Commission for Investigations, 2006, p. 9; Martin, 1977).  It 
was for this reason that, after a fact-finding trip to Zambia by the Danish Ombudsman 
Office in 2009 (Commission for Investigations, 2009, p. 14), the Danish office decided 
not to pursue development cooperation with the Zambian ombudsman office.  A lead 
officer from the International Section of the Danish ombudsman office discussed their 
reason for not cooperating in the following:  
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As a result of the fact-finding trip [to Zambia], the Danish ombudsman 
institution came to realize that the Zambian ombudsman office was not a de-
facto ombudsman.  That’s because the Zambian ombudsman was mostly just 
dealing with complaints from members of the civil service, related to their pay 
and benefits.  It wasn’t dealing with complaints from the public.  This was an 
entirely different focus than the Danish Ombudsman… the delegation didn’t 
feel that the cooperation would be effective. 
Instead of the Zambian ombudsman office being focused on members of the public, as 
a “de-facto ombudsman” would, it was mostly just dealing with cases brought forward 
from other civil servants.  This is also consistent with the staff orientation of the 
bureaucratic logic, as it is characterized by an internal orientation and focus on the 
bureaucracy.     
There were several potential factors contributing to Zambian ombudsman 
office’s bureaucratic orientation and lack of public orientation.  One factor was that 
the ombudsman office did not have regular public awareness campaigns, which would 
have let members of the public know about the office and the work it did.  Another 
factor was related to the building in which the ombudsman office had been located.  
As Chewe-Chanda (2009) noted, 
“The commission is not accessible to the general public because it has only one 
office in Lusaka, hidden in the former Bank of Zambia building, which is 
difficult to locate, even for Lusaka residents. This contributes to the fact that 
there is little appreciation among the general public of the commission’s role 
and mandate” (p. 26).  
Staying in the building that interview respondents affectionately called “the Old Bank 
of Zambia Building” had been a factor in keeping the ombudsman office internally 
focused on the bureaucracy rather than on the general public.  Most members of the 
public did not even know the organization existed, much less where it was located.   
Being housed in the Old Bank of Zambia Building also enabled the 
organization to operate in a mode consistent with the kinship logic.  Its physical 
location and space allowed some organization members to use their positions as 
personal fiefdoms, not separating private and public resources (Hydén, 2013a; 
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Therkildsen, 2010).  One way in which organization members could use the office for 
their own personal benefit was that it enabled them to shirk their responsibilities and 
engage in their own personal affairs during office time.  One interview respondent 
described it in the following:    
I could just walk out of my office and there were a lot of shops!  I could buy my 
groceries and clothes… I think sometimes it was to the detriment to the 
institution because I’m supposed to be there, but then I would go across and just 
buy a shirt for my son.  So instead of me working, I’m stealing office time.   
This was, in part, possible because there were so many hidden exits from the office.  
As the ombudsman said, “In the old building, we had three outlets.  There were even 
the fire escape stairs, which people could regularly use…  When you went into your 
office, that’s it.  You didn’t know what was actually happening [in the building].” 
Another way the kinship logic’s mode of operation was seen was through 
members of the ombudsman office collecting cash “tips” from members of the public 
to help them get faster access to the passport services in an adjacent office within the 
building.  As a respondent described it,   
Some people… were actually getting money from members of the public for 
speeding up the passport application process… Members of the public would 
come and give “tips” to the workers [from the ombudsman institution], who 
would then go and find the passport office workers and split the tip money with 
them, and then the passport application process would move faster.  
These activities demonstrated how some organization members were guided by the 
core values of a kinship logic – reciprocal informal exchanges to get things done and 
meet needs, which came at the expense of following proper procedures in the office, 
delivering unbiased service to the public, or of following professional methods and 
standards in ombudsman work.  This was a tragic irony in the ombudsman institution, 
as members of the very organization tasked with redressing cases of maladministration 
had actually been perpetrating cases of maladministration themselves.   
In that way, being housed in the Old Bank of Zambia building was a “material 
expression” of the kinship logic (Jones et al., 2013).  The values and principles of the 
kinship logic were “transmuted into observable objects – nested and interlocked – 
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which are the means by which practices are anchored, affected, and oriented” 
(Friedland, 2013, p. 37).  The ombudsman’s own words encapsulate best what the 
building was like and the transmutation of the kinship logic.  She called the building 
itself a case of “maladministration” and described it in the following statements:   
So that building, it was dark, sort of like a prison atmosphere.  The stairs were 
very narrow and dark.  And the outside of the building, it just looks sort of like 
a prison building, the way you would imagine a prison.  And then, secondly, 
there were a lot of other departments, about three or four other departments in 
that building… There would be a lot of queues and a lot of people.  The room 
as you enter the building, that’s where all these people would be.  There’s no 
ventilation, apart from the door.  So, it’s just, the air is just dense. I don’t know 
what I can say.  So, at the end, the people would have no access to toilet 
facilities.  They would have to go look for a public toilet somewhere.  You 
would have people begging you to use the toilets.  The departments would lock 
their toilets, because they would think their toilets are not going to be properly 
used.  Now can you imagine putting an ombudsman in such a building?  I’m 
saying: Can you imagine putting an ombudsman in such a building?  Because 
what is the work of an ombudsman?  It’s to resolve maladministration!  And we 
were sitting with this maladministration.  I think it killed me just to be in that 
building. 
The Old Bank of Zambia building expressed maladministration, as it was a barrier to 
the delivery of public services in a humane way.  It was also the transmutation, and a 
condition for, the enactment of the kinship and bureaucratic logics.  It was the physical 
place employees in the ombudsman office could be paid cash “tips” by people who did 
not want to wait for service in the passport office and who were willing and able to 
pay a little extra for it.  It was also the physical place from which they could slip away 
to take care of their personal business.  Finally, the building also expressed a disregard 
for serving members of the public, since it was hidden away with other public 
organizations and was not designed, built, or maintained in a way that made it easy 
and secure for members of the public to access it and to lodge complaints of 



































Above: The building’s broken elevator, still 
unrepaired after more than a decade, making it 
impossible for wheelchair bound citizens to 
access the office of the ombudsman. 
 
Left: One of the fire escapes that employees 
used to walk out of the office to go shopping or 
conduct personal business.   
Above: The crowds outside of the Old Bank of 
Zambia Building, making it difficult for people 
to access the office and complain in 
anonymity.   
 
Left: A waiting room at the passport office, 
where some members of the public paid so-
called “tips” to employees of the ombudsman 
office to help speed up the process of applying 
for a passport.  The “tip” money would be split 
between the employee from the ombudsman 
office and the employee from the passport 



















(Photos taken by the author in May 2016.)  
In addition, the ways that employment processes were handled in the office also 
had an impact on the way that work was done.  Employment was handled entirely 
through the centralized Public Services Commission.  Most of the officers working in 
the organization were transferred from other government ministries or agencies, and 
promotions were based on time spent within the public service and were also handled 
through the Public Service Commission.  One of the officers noted that, technically, 
promotions “can happen based on academic upgrades, but there have not been so 
many promotions”.  The Zambian ombudsman office actually had only two 
investigators in the office for the entire country with a population of over 16 million 
people.  Because of this shortage of investigators, they had developed a system of co-
opting officers from the administration division to help with investigations.  This was 
problematic, according to respondents, but it was the only way the ombudsman office 
could manage to move forward through the numerous complaints that came through 
their office each year.   
Above: The stores and shopping center right 
across from the Old Bank of Zambia Building 
at which the employees from ombudsman 
office would shop during office hours. 
 
Left: The entryway into the ombudsman office 
in the old building.  The ombudsman described 
it as dark and narrow, and that it was 
uninviting to visitors.   
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These administrative officers were neither college-educated nor trained in 
investigation techniques.  They were given instructions about how to carry the cases 
forward, and they reported regularly to the two official investigators and the 
ombudsman.  One investigator described the ways in which they would simplify the 
entire investigations process into simple steps for the co-opted investigators to follow:  
You analyze everything, when the complaint comes, it gets screened, and you 
formulate an investigations strategy and then put it on paper, and then you pass 
these files to the co-opted staff.  They will just transplant what is written, they 
will pursue it because everything will be done for them.  It was a matter of 
simplifying the work for them to make it easier for them.  On their own, they 
could not understand the nature of the complaint or the mandate of the 
institution and its jurisdiction.  We also tried to formulate an investigation 
strategy for them, because strategies differ from one complaint to another.  So, 
it was prudent to do that for them, because when you gave it to them it was 
easier for them to follow.  
Due to shortages of staff and operational resources, co-opting non-skilled workers to 
do investigation work may have been the best way to handle the hundreds of 
complaints coming into the office each year, but still the results were not adequate.  
The backlogs of investigations were long and the quality of the work was low since 
those doing it were not equipped or capable of using professional methods and 
standards or using professional judgment and discretion.  The investigators who 
oversee the work of the co-opted investigators described working with some of them 
as “hav[ing] to teach somebody like at kindergarten” and that “they didn’t fully 
understand the role of the investigator”.  The co-opted administrative workers were 
also not happy with the situation because they were not being paid the same amount as 
the college-educated investigators.  One of the organization members who was co-
opted for the investigation work described his feelings about the arrangement in the 
following statement:  
I will talk about myself.  I’m good at writing and understanding, and because of 
that, they said I could assist with investigations.  But I did voice up and said, “I 
may be good at writing reports and analyzing things, but this is not my job.  I’m 
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not being paid for this.  How am I going to fit into this?  You are not paying me 
anything”…  what management did was to take people from other sections like 
administration, even the typing pool staff.  You know someone who is a typist, 
you take him and push and give him instructions... I think that also created 
inefficiencies in the system.  In any case, like me, there was no motivation for 
me… But I said since you cannot promote me, and you cannot pay me an 
allowance for doing this, I’m quitting.  So, that’s how I left it.  But it was after I 
did it for almost five years.  And I can say I was one of the best!  I could really, 
you know, analyze issues.   
The co-optation of typists and clerical workers to help with investigations was a 
stopgap measure to try to attend to the complaints that came in to the office, but it is 
not a sustainable solution.  However, this practice has gone on for many years within 
the office.  The current Investigator General found this co-optation system in place and 
operational when she arrived in the organization in 2004 and has continued the 
practice.  The plans are to phase out the co-opting system when the ombudsman office 
receives more resources and a larger staff establishment for carrying out its 
investigations, which they hope will happen in the near future since the organization is 
going through organizational, structural, and legal reform processes. 
The following section describes the change and reform processes that are 
currently unfolding within the ombudsman office.  It focuses on a period of instability 
and transition within the office, during which alternative logics have been promulgated 
within the organization, which can lead to changes in the way the organization 
operates.  
 
Instability, Transition, and the Promulgation of Alternative Logics 
Research about changes among institutional logics often includes studies that 
focus on periods of transition and instability, which are marked by conflicts between 
competing logics and require a resolution to bring about a new period of stability and a 
new constellation of logics (Reay & Hinings, 2005).  In these accounts, “multiple 
institutional logics are portrayed as battling with each other for supremacy”, and there 
can be “a potentially long period of time of competing logics where different actors 
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continue to hold different logics and where there is no winner” (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011, p. 376).  This section describes such a period of transition or instability within 
the ombudsman institution, in which there has been a “battlefield mentality” and a 
“tension between co-existing logics” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011, p. 102).  This period of 
instability is actually the current state within the ombudsman office since there has not 
been a resolution in which alternative logics have been institutionalized.  More time is 
needed to determine what the eventual outcome will be, but this section provides a 
close-up view of the battles and power plays that will ultimately shape the future 
constellation of logics within the ombudsman institution.   
After the long period of stability in the ombudsman office, which lasted from 
1974 until 2014, a transition period started to take place within the organization.  This 
transition began after a series of cascading events within the political system that 
changed the political environment in which the ombudsman office was operating.  In a 
surprise victory, Michael Sata, a populist running on the opposition ticket, was elected 
president in September 2011.  Among other populist agendas, he promised to revive 
the process of drafting a new constitution and to deliver a “people-driven 
constitution”.  Sata, whose nickname was King Cobra because of his harsh use of 
rhetoric, used the sly campaign slogan, Don’t kubeba!  “Don’t kubeba” means “‘don’t 
tell’ in Bemba… meaning implicitly ‘you are free to accept gifts from other parties, 
just don’t tell them you will vote for us’” (Tobolka, 2013, p. 27).  The presidential 
incumbent, Rupiah Banda, and his party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 
(MMD), had expected to easily win the election.  However, they were surprised to find 
out that the majority of people had actually voted for the opposition candidate and 
simply didn’t kubeba.  Therefore, Sata narrowly won the 2011 presidential election, 
and his populist political party, the Patriotic Front (PF), also won the majority of seats 
in Parliament.  This paved the way for a season of change in the politics and 
administration of the country as well as for the ombudsman office.    
President Sata and his administration took a different tone with the once 
overlooked ombudsman office.  According to interview respondents, President Sata 
was more likely to actually follow the recommendations of the ombudsman to redress 
cases of maladministration, which the previous President, Rupiah Banda, did not do.  
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Furthermore, right after taking office, President Sata and his government appointed a 
technical committee to begin planning for and drafting an amended constitution for 
Zambia.  This new constitutional amendment had the potential to make space for a re-
imagined ombudsman office in Zambia, one that had more professional autonomy, a 
more independent organizational structure, and a stronger, better equipped and more 
professional staff to conduct investigations into complaints of maladministration.  It 
seemed as if a new trajectory would be possible for the ombudsman office in Zambia, 
but it was still too soon to tell.   
Michael Sata was not to be president for long, however.  He became ill in his 
second year in office and was not able to fulfill his duties as president, only appearing 
in public infrequently.  He remained in office as president until he died in October 
2014, just three years after taking office.  A week before his death, in spite of a “lack 
of consensus building from various stakeholders” and the reservations of critics who 
“accused the government of stalling the process”, a draft version of the amended 
constitution was presented to the public (Ndiho, 2014).  Among other changes to the 
governance system in Zambia, the draft constitution had new language related to the 
ombudsman.  Now, the ombudsman would have a new title, Public Protector, instead 
of being called the Investigator General, as he or had previously been called, and he or 
she would have broader legal powers to investigate and take action to redress cases of 
maladministration.   
Some critics and government watchdogs were still concerned that the draft 
constitution was merely a symbolic gesture and would never be implemented.  In 
addition, the draft for the amended constitution only provided a broad outline for the 
work of the ombudsman.  For example, it did not give any details about the structure 
or independence of the ombudsman office.  Those details that would comprise a legal 
framework for the ombudsman office would still need to be developed in a later bill, 
which would then be presented and voted on by Parliament in order to enact it into 
law.  
This scenario presented a window of opportunity for the ombudsman to initiate 
changes within the ombudsman office that she had been requesting from previous 
government administrations, particularly that it should become an independent human 
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rights ombudsman.  There was now also a possibility for the office to have more 
autonomy built into the structure with less authority and control held by the executive 
branch, and it might no longer fall under the centralized hierarchical structure of the 
Public Service Management Division.  This would give the office more autonomy to 
conduct investigations against powerful and well-connected government officials, 
which would make its systems of control more consistent with the professionalism 
logic.  This would also be an opportunity to emphasize serving the poor and needy, 
thus having an external orientation on the public, rather than an internal orientation on 
the central state bureaucracy.  In that way, the operations and the focus of attention of 
the organization could become more consistent with the development management 
logic as well.   
In order to bring about these changes, the ombudsman and her team would have 
to move quickly.  They would need to lobby the government for more autonomy for 
the office to operate as a public accountability organization.  They would also need to 
develop a strategic plan in order for restructuring to take place, which would enable 
them to increase the number of staff and to ensure a higher level of professional 
qualifications for organization members.  Finally, they would need to work with the 
Ministry of Justice to draft a new legal framework for the office to operate 
autonomously and to shift its orientation towards the public, rather than the internal 
bureaucracy of the state.  As the ombudsman and her team worked to bring about these 
changes, they encountered resistance from within the ombudsman office as well as 
from members of the executive branch of government.  The followings sections 
describe these different activities, how they promulgated the development 
management and professionalism logics within the office, and the power struggles 
around these processes.   
 
Drafting the strategic and restructuring plans  
The year 2014 was an important time period in these processes, because that is 
when the ombudsman and a small team of officers from the ombudsman office began 
drafting strategic plans as well as plans to restructure the office.  The ombudsman had 
been requesting the government to allow her office to be restructured since 2005, 
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because it was the only way she would be able to expand and to hire more employees.  
Yet, as previously noted, she had encountered resistance from the two previous 
presidents, Banda and Mwanawasa.  She had formally put her requests for 
restructuring before the government within the ombudsman office’s annual reports, 
both in 2005 and 2008 (Commission for Investigations, 2005, p. 31; 2008, pp. 26-27), 
while later reports remained silent about the issue.  She also wrote directly to the 
president, requesting that he help her to initiate a restructuring process for the 
organization.   
The ombudsman described her appeals to the President and to the Government 
in the following statement:  
I had written to the president, I had said to the president ‘we need to be 
restructured’ and I had also written to the minister of justice.  In fact, the 
minister of justice set up a commission to enquire on legal institutions in 
Zambia because of us - because we agitated so much.  So, he eventually set up 
this commission that is chaired by Justice Choba.  It’s currently having sittings 
right now because we agitated so much and said “We need to be restructured.  
We need to be changed.  We are not operating the way we should operating.”  
The Government gave a positive response to the ombudsman in 2014, and the process 
for restructuring was then able to move forward. 
In order to create a restructuring plan, it was necessary to first create a strategic 
plan on which the restructuring would be based (Mate, 2006).  Both of these plans 
were developed in conjunction with the Cabinet Office.  Notably, this was the first 
strategic plan to be implemented by the ombudsman office in its 40 years of existence.  
There had been previous attempts that were abandoned early, but according to one of 
the interview respondents, there had been “no deliberate effort to use [the strategic 
plans] as a guide” before.  This new strategic plan was viewed differently than the 
previous plans had been, and organization members consider it a major 
accomplishment for the ombudsman office.   
The stated aim of the 2014-2017 strategic plan was “Clarifying the 
organization’s future direction, common vision and purpose” (Commission for 
Investigations, 2014, p. 8), and it emphasized the need to increase the skills and 
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qualifications of organization members.  It also emphasized the need to implement 
“Provincial Sittings” (Ibid, pp. 20-21) in which members of the ombudsman office 
would travel to remote provinces of the country to hear complaints from citizens who 
would not be able to travel the distance to the capital city, Lusaka.  By drafting a 
strategic plan that emphasized the provincial sittings that can “provide relief to 
complainants” of maladministration in the rural parts of Zambia (Ibid, p. 20), this was 
promulgating the development management logic, with its emphasis on serving the 
needs of the disempowered members of society.  By drafting a plan that described how 
it would engage with the Cabinet Office to “recruit suitably qualified candidates” 
(Ibid, p. 8) as well as to implement “programmes for skills enhancement” (Ibid, p. 21), 
this was promulgating the professionalism logic, with its emphasis on professional 
qualifications, methods, and standards.  Finally, the strategic plan culminated with a 
set of “structural implications” (Ibid, p. 36), which led to the formulation of the 
restructuring plan and the restructuring into three specific organizational divisions for 
Investigations, Administration, and Information Services and increasing the number of 
officers within the organization structure.   
 With the strategic plan written, the ombudsman office was then allowed to draft 
a restructuring plan.  They drafted a plan to decentralize the office out into the 
provinces of the country in phases, so complainants outside of Lusaka would be able 
to access to the office more easily, which is consistent with the values and 
organizational structure of the development management logic.  It also set the salary 
scales for new positions in the office at a level that required higher education and 
professional qualifications for candidates.  Therefore, college degrees would become 
necessary for investigations officers, information technology officers, and public 
relations officers, while accounting officers would be able to qualify with either a 
college degree or professional certifications such as from the Association of Certified 
Chartered Accountants (ACCA) or from the Zambian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (ZICA).  These changes in employment practices were consistent with 
the professionalism logic. 
There were institutional defenders in the office who resisted these changes 
because they were worried about losing their jobs or being left behind.  As Battilana et 
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al. (2009) argued, institutional defenders are more likely to rise up to defend the status 
quo and resist changes if the changes threaten their social position or organizational 
privileges.  The restructuring process meant that some employees could lose their 
social position in the organization through demotion, and it also meant that some of 
them hoping for a promotion as the organization grew would not be eligible without 
upgrading their academic qualifications.  As one of the officers involved in the 
restructuring processes noted:  
Of course, there were some people afraid.  Even now some people are afraid for 
the simple reason that the restructuring comes with issues to do with 
qualifications.  You need to have higher qualifications for some positions.  So, 
they could be in one position, maybe previously they were only supposed to 
have a diploma but after restructuring they have to have a first degree in a 
particular field.  So, there was a lot of anxiety.  People were afraid.  People 
were eyeing for certain positions, even the few we recruited for.  Priority was 
first for members of staff who served, but certain people could not get the 
positions.  They applied but they didn’t have the minimum qualifications.  They 
had experience, but of course we couldn’t bend the rules because we had a 
standard that we needed to adhere to, lest we become perpetrators of 
maladministration by practicing favoritism as well… Even now, there is that 
level of anxiety, but people have been assured they will still have a job, but it 
might be at a lower level simply because of qualifications.  You can’t force 
someone to go and upgrade themselves. 
The newly created positions required a bachelor’s degree, which was not easily 
attained.  As one of the officers remarked, “You know a first degree [i.e., a bachelor’s 
degree] in Africa is a major achievement, because education is not readily available.”  
Therefore, some employees in the organization grew frustrated and even afraid of what 
their future might look like in the ombudsman institution.  Some of these institutional 
defenders took matters into their own hands to try to circumvent the process.   
 Some organization members resisted the restructuring process through acts of 
sabotage.  Their hope was that if they could keep the restructuring process from 
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happening, or at least slow it down, their jobs would be secured.  One of the officers in 
the organization who worked on the restructuring team described it like this: 
When we were restructuring, it brought insecurity because if you look at the 
background of the institution, it had less qualified people…. So now it was a 
challenge with our less qualified employees, our fellow workers.  They were 
sabotaging the process, where you do some documentation to seek approval, 
they would not deliver the mail - they would hide files… They were afraid that 
they would lose their jobs.  So, they would hide files, tear documentation.  
When an approval came from cabinet office, if I’m not tracing it, if it lands in 
the registry, they will tear it and say it never arrived.  So, we had to devise a 
strategy where I would ensure that the supervisor of the registry came on board.  
When the letters were typed, I would go with him, get the vehicle, we would 
drive to the organizations where we are doing the deliveries and sit with that 
document.  Then I would be in touch on Facebook and Outlook with the 
relevant organizations with the responsible officers to say, ‘when you are 
sending a response, send a copy, so that in case it gets lost, we can start from 
somewhere’. 
These acts of sabotage were not successful in keeping the restructuring plans from 
moving forward.  By April and May 2016, when the interviews for this case study 
were carried out, the organization had already hired five new officers with higher 
levels of education and professional certification: two investigators, one public 
relations officer, one information technology officer, and one accountant.   
 
Moving to a New Office Building 
During this time of transition, the ombudsman again requested to move the 
institution into a new office building, a request that had been routinely denied under 
previous administrations.  Moving to the new building would mean that complainants 
coming to the ombudsman office would not have to worry about being recognized by 
the crowds of people around the Old Bank of Zambia Building, and the new building 
would also be more open and user friendly.  Rather than being on an upper floor in the 
old building with broken elevators, the offices in the new building would all be on the 
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lower level and wheelchair accessible.  There would also be a large and open waiting 
room and reception area that would make it more comfortable for complainants 
coming to office.  The layout, design, and fresh appearance of the building were all 
characteristics of a development management logic with its emphasis on serving 
members of the public and meeting their needs.      
Surprisingly, some of the employees were resisting the move from the Old 
Bank of Zambia Building to the new office building.  Even though the new building 
was more spacious, bright, and made it easier for complainants to seek redress in 
anonymity, the new building also meant that they would not be able to avail 
themselves to organizational privileges (Battilana et al., 2009) they could get in the old 
building.  As one of the officers noted: “Some people didn’t want to move to the new 
office because they were actually getting money from members of the public for 
speeding up the passport application process.”  These cash payments from passport 
applicants would have added to their meager salaries.  Organization members were 
also able to easily leave the office to take care of their personal business.  These 
informal privileges would not be readily available in the new office building because it 
was situated away from the central shopping districts of the city and away from the 
passport office.  The new building into which the ombudsman office moved stands in 
stark contrast to the old, and images of it follow below:  
 
 




There is an open reception area in the front of the building. 
 
 








Interior courtyard of the ombudsman office building, as seen from the rear of  
the building, which was once a hotel before being converted to an office. 
 
The ombudsman office moved from the Old Bank of Zambia Building to the 
new building pictured above in October 2015, and employees were still getting used to 
the idea of being in the new facility at the time of field interviews in May 2016.  Some 
organization members expressed a positive opinion about being there, while others 
were still ambiguous about it.  The new building is a material expression of the 
development management logic.  It signifies the ombudsman office is becoming 
externally focused on the public, by making itself more accessible and user friendly, 
and in this way, the building acts as “an important extension of” and “a necessary 
condition for” the enactment of the development management logic within the 
organization (Jones et al., 2013, p. 52).  The new building provided a means through 
which members of the ombudsman office could engage with members of the public to 
redress their cases of maladministration, and it also articulated the symbolic gesture 
that the organization has entered a turning point and is becoming more focused on 
members of the public.  The new building has made it safer, easier, and even more 
comfortable for people to visit the ombudsman office face-to-face and to lodge their 
complaints.  In these ways, it is a physical and visible enactment of the unseen 
elements of the development management logic, or as Friedland (2013) characterized 
it, it is a transmutation of the unobservable substance of a logic into an observable 




Writing New Legislation  
Beginning in January 2016 and for a period of four months, a team of officers 
from the ombudsman office worked with drafters from the Ministry of Justice to craft 
the new Public Protector Bill, which would later be voted on in Parliament to then 
become the Public Protector Act.  The Public Protector Act (2016) would provide the 
legal framework for the ombudsman office in Zambia.  Drafting this legislation was 
important for the ombudsman office because it would have the potential to give the 
office more autonomy by making it a parliamentary ombudsman that would answer to 
parliament and would receive its operational funds and other resources through the 
legislature, rather than through the executive branch and its centralized hierarchical 
structure.  This could alleviate the precarious situation of the ombudsman office, in 
which it was investigating cases of maladministration that involved the very same 
branch of government that had control over the financial and human resources for the 
office.   
The new Public Protector Bill was completed in April 2016 and approved by 
Parliament who assented it into law as the Public Protector Act in June 2016.  Many of 
the provisions that the ombudsman wanted in the act were included, but there were 
some instances in which the team from the ombudsman office had met with resistance 
from the drafters from the Ministry of Justice.  In many ways, the act does provide the 
ombudsman office with autonomy from the executive branch, especially as it relates to 
funding.  For example, it states: “The funds of the Office of the Public Protector shall 
consist of such monies as may be appropriated to the Office of the Public Protector by 
Parliament for the purposes of the Public Protector” (The Public Protector Act, 2016, 
section 31).  The new act also stipulates that officers will be employed through the 
Parliamentary Services Commission, rather than through the Public Service 
Commission as before.  It states: “The Parliamentary Service Commission shall, on the 
recommendation of the Public Protector, appoint a Chief Administrator, officers and 
other staff to assist the Public Protector in the performance of the Public Protector’s 
functions” (The Public Protector Act, 2016, section 9).  As the new law stipulated 
greater financial autonomy for the ombudsman office, this had the potential to 
alleviate a problem that interview respondents were complaining about in which 
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organization members sometimes had to investigate complaints lodged against the 
very officials who controlled the budgets of the ombudsman office and the salaries of 
its employees.  In this way, the new Public Protector Act also promulgated values and 
a system of control that are consistent with the professionalism logic, which is based 
on professional autonomy.   
The new legislation also officially makes Zambia’s ombudsman office a human 
rights ombudsman institution, which was another important objective for the 
ombudsman and members of her staff.  They wanted to ensure that the new act 
included language related to human rights, which it does, as it articulates, “the 
function of the Public Protector [i.e., the ombudsman]… to investigate any complaint 
of human rights arising from maladministration or any conduct which the Public 
Protector has reasonable grounds to believe may be connected with, or conducive to, 
maladministration” (The Public Protector Act, 2016, section 6).  The ombudsman 
reflected on this and she noted,  
[W]e have actually had to work very, very hard in the bill to have clauses 
included that include our human rights mandate.  Yes, we investigate 
maladministration, but maladministration is a breach of people’s rights when 
they are trying to access the public service delivery system… And also, there 
was this provision we put in about the vulnerable.  I really wanted it to come 
out that that’s who we are here for.  Of course, we have mentioned the disabled, 
we’ve mentioned children, we’ve mentioned women.  For me, that’s great.  
That provision for me is like the heart of the act.  We haven’t had these people.  
I think civil servants have been over-represented as complainants in the system, 
and the really vulnerable have been totally under-represented.  And they don’t 
even know. 
The new act gives the ombudsman status as a human rights institution, and it 
articulates that it is focused on the citizenry – not only the civil servants of Zambia, 
which is consistent with the development management logic.  It even includes the 
more vulnerable in Zambian society as especially relevant to the mandate, that the 
ombudsman should “provide added protection to vulnerable persons, including 
children, women and persons with disabilities, where a State institution engages in or 
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is about to engage in a maladministration which is a significant and substantial 
infringement of their rights” (The Public Protector Act, 2016, section 35).  This 
language promulgated values of the development management logic, to achieve results 
for society – especially those who are disempowered.   
These provisions also bring the mission of the Zambian ombudsman institution 
in line with current trends, values, and norms of the broader professional community 
of ombudsmen.  Internationally, ombudsman offices are moving toward a new 
expanded model of ombudsman work, which places greater emphasis on human rights 
as opposed to focusing exclusively on maladministration alone (Reif, 2011).  For 
example, the largest professional community of ombudsmen, the International 
Ombudsman Institute (IOI), has recently begun emphasizing the expanded role of 
ombudsmen offices in protecting human rights, which it sees in grand terms as the 
“evolution of ombudsmanship” (Field, 2016; Simbiri-Jaoko, 2016).  In addition, the 
regional African professional community, The African Ombudsman and Mediators 
Association (AOMA), is similarly moving toward the evolution of ombudsmanship, as 
espoused in one of their core values, which declares “the ombudsman’s fundamental 
commitment to human rights and human dignity, and to serving humanity with respect 
and compassion” (African Ombudsman and Mediators Association, n.d.).  In this way, 
the new bill is also consistent with the values of the professionalism logic, as it is 
complying with norms and standards set by the professional community of 
ombudsmen.   
However, some members of the ombudsman office complained that the 
provisions in the act are articulated clearly enough and that they do not provide full 
autonomy for the office.  They complained that during the processes of deliberation 
about the new law, the drafters from the Ministry of Justice pushed to bring the 
ombudsman office under the Ministry of Justice and the Judiciary, by allowing those 
institutions to have the authority to write the rules and regulations for carrying out 
investigations.  This can be seen as an attempt to “claw back” (Chewe-Chanda, 2009) 
independence and autonomy from the ombudsman.  The ombudsman office even 
appealed to members of Parliament for support in the matter.  However, the language 
that drafters from the Justice Department wanted included in the act remained, in 
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which the Minister of Justice would be the one “make regulations for the better 
carrying out of the provisions of this Act” (The Public Protector Act, 2016, section 
43).  This provision makes the ombudsman office dependent upon the Ministry of 
Justice to make the specific rules and regulations for how its investigations are to be 
carried out.  This worried some interview respondents, because they believed that this 
limits the ombudsman office’s level of professional autonomy and that it can 
potentially lead to undue influence from politicians or government ministers since they 
will be the ones to determine how investigations take place.         
However, even though there are limitations in new the legislation, the 
ombudsman has said she is mostly pleased with the new law.  She noted,  
I think what we have now is, I would say almost 90% [of what we want] with 
this bill in its current form, because we have the administrative autonomy and 
we are recognized as a human rights institution, and we have been given the 
right to decentralize right out to the districts.  And we can have hearings in the 
public, which is a big plus, because we like the idea of naming and shaming 
these government officials.  I think that’s going to be a powerful tool in our 
work. 
The Public Protector Act of 2016 helped set the stage for potential change within the 
Zambian ombudsman institution.  It articulated and promulgated elements of the 
development management and professionalism logics, which could then either be 
accepted by actors within the organization and the Government or they could be 
resisted.  As noted previously, the Zambian ombudsman office has now entered a stage 
of potential change, and it is too soon to tell what the long-term outcome will be.  
Thus, the organization can still be seen as a “battlefield” in which competing logics are 
“battling with each other for supremacy” without a resolution (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011, p. 376).  In light of this, the following section discusses the dynamic 
relationships between the institutional logics as well as potential outcomes of the 






Uncertain Outcomes of Recent Processes 
The sections above described a transition period within the Zambian 
ombudsman office, as it began moving toward potential change among the 
institutional logics guiding it with the promulgation of the professionalism and 
development management logics.  Leading up to this transition period, the context of 
the ombudsman office had been mainly consistent with a bureaucratic logic and a 
kinship logic.  Evidence of the bureaucratic logic could be seen in the ombudsman 
office’s internal focus on the central bureaucracy as well as in its bureaucratic systems 
of control and hierarchical structures.  This could also be seen in its centralized 
employment system that was based on seniority and through which employees had 
been transferred into the organization from other public organizations and 
departments.  
Evidence of the kinship logic is seen in the institution’s patrimonial authority 
structures that overlaid the bureaucratic structures as well as in the organization 
members’ descriptions of their fears of reprisal for challenging those systems of 
authority and power.  The kinship logic could also be seen in the ways some 
organization members had been using their social positions within the organization as 
personal fiefdoms for their own benefit and how they used informal exchanges of 
gifts, favors, and cash as a means of getting things done.  That is not to say that all 
organization members “were satisfied with the status quo”, however (Reay & Hinings, 
2005, p. 364).  Some organization members believed that the systems, structures, and 
practices needed to be changed, and they actively worked to change them.  It was only 
recently that their efforts began to gain momentum.   
To use the battlefield metaphor, the kinship and bureaucratic logics are still at 
war with alternative logics, which are the professionalism and development 
management logics.  The three sets of activities that were described in previous 
sections, drafting the new strategic and restructuring plans, moving to the new office 
building, and writing the new legislation, can all be seen as part of a turning point in 
the process of change among institutional logics, or what Reay and Hinings (2005) 
called “promulgating the change” (p. 367).  They promulgated the professionalism 
logic with its emphasis on educational qualifications, autonomy, and on following the 
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norms and standards of the professional field.  They also promulgated the development 
management logic with its emphasis on serving the needs of society, particularly the 
most vulnerable.  These alternative logics are now available for the actors involved to 
either “acquiesce and accept” or to “resist”, which would lead to either change or a 
prolonged state of battle (Reay & Hinings, 2005, p. 369).   
Elements of a professionalism logic were promulgated through the restructuring 
plan and the new ombudsman office legislation.  This is seen in the push for greater 
autonomy for the institution within the new law, which would give it financial 
independence from the centralized state bureaucracy.  Thus, the system of control 
would be based on professional autonomy and guided by international norms and 
standards for ombudsman work.  The investigators and the ombudsman would then 
have authority as professionals to do what needs to be done to bring redress to cases of 
maladministration, and they would not have to worry about how the cases might be in 
conflict with the interests of members of the executive branch and central bureaucracy.  
What remains to be seen however is how Parliament might exercise authority over the 
ombudsman institution, since the new constitution and the new legislation now deem it 
a parliamentary institution.  The new legislation also declares the ombudsman office is 
a human rights institution, which is also in line with professional standards and norms.  
Finally, the restructuring plan also promulgated the professionalism logic within the 
office, as it set the salary scale for its new recruits at levels that require higher 
education and professional qualifications, thus making employment processes more 
consistent with the professionalism logic as well.   
Another alternative logic that was promulgated during the transition period was 
the development management logic.  This was evidenced in the organization’s move to 
the new building, the development of the strategic plan, and the drafting of the new 
Public Protector Act.  Moving the office into the new building may seem insignificant 
in ordinary circumstances, but it had been a major obstacle for the organization, and 
the move had immense symbolic value.  It signified that the ombudsman office was 
there to meet the needs of the public and to make it as easy as possible for them to 
access the institution to complain about cases of maladministration.  This move 
materially articulated the mission of the organization to serve the needs of society and 
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reflected a new external orientation of the organization on the public, which are 
consistent with the development management logic.  Along the same lines, the 
strategic plan set out to build “a common shared sense of purpose” for the ombudsman 
office “to be the lead governance institution dedicated to eliminating bureaucratic 
injustice and maladministration in the public and private sector for the benefit of all 
persons in the country” (Commission for Investigations, 2014, p. 19).  The strategic 
plan also, by its very existence, was an enactment of the operational mode of the 
development management logic, which is about operating in ways that are strategic in 
order to meet the needs of the public.   
Some elements of the professionalism and development management logics 
lend themselves to cooperative relationships with one another at the ombudsman 
office.  There is a facilitative relationship between the development management 
logic’s focus on service to the poor and vulnerable and with the value of the 
professionalism logic to follow the norms of the professional field, which within 
ombudsmanship is the “commitment to human rights and human dignity” (African 
Ombudsman and Mediators Association, n.d.).  Therefore, at the same time the 
ombudsman and her team worked to ensure that the new legislation reflected 
professional norms for ombudsman institutions, their actions also led to legislation that 
reflected the values of the development management logic, which is to empower the 
disempowered.  In that way, the provisions in the law about how the ombudsman 
office should “investigate any complaint of human rights arising from… 
maladministration” and “provide added protection to vulnerable persons, including 
children, women and persons with disabilities” (The Public Protector Act, 2016, 
section 35) dually satisfies demands of both the professionalism logic and the 
development management logic.  The enactment of elements of one logic entails the 
enactment of elements of the other logic.  
Conflicts between the professionalism logic and bureaucratic logic can be seen 
in the struggles between institutional defenders and institutional entrepreneurs within 
the organization.  The team members working on the restructuring plan for the 
organization were acting as institutional entrepreneurs to move the organization 
towards employment practices consistent with the professionalism logic.  Some 
 
 203 
employees who felt they would lose out from the new employment practices acted as 
institutional defenders by working to sabotage the restructuring process by hiding or 
tearing up documentation in the hopes of derailing the proposed changes.   
These battles and power plays are still unfolding in the ombudsman institution, 
and it is not possible to say what will happen in the future.  It is possible, however, to 
speculate, based on theory, what could happen depending on how future events unfold.  
One possible scenario is that the professionalism and development management logics 
will become more influential within the ombudsman institution.  For that to happen, 
the key actors would need to eventually acquiesce and accept the promulgated logics 
of professionalism and development management (Reay & Hinings, 2005, p. 369).  
The change mechanisms that were described in Chapter Two could play a role within 
this scenario.  For example, if the Zambian ombudsman office increased its level of 
interaction with the professional community, i.e., through structural overlap, this 
would have the potential for the “circulation of ideas” (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008) to 
have an impact on the ombudsman office and its members.  More specifically, if they 
engaged with the African Ombudsman Mediators’ Association (AOMA) and the 
International Ombudsman Institute (IOI) for knowledge exchange programs, they 
could be impacted by the imitation of shared identities with the professional 
community and the translation of professional ideas and standards for ombudsmanship 
into the Zambian ombudsman institution.   
Furthermore, if the ombudsman herself were to take a decisive role as an 
institutional entrepreneur by rewarding those who go along with the professionalizing 
processes within the organization and by punishing those who oppose them, this could 
incentivize more organization members to go along with those processes (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2008, pp. 206-209).  This could be done in a similar way to the institutional 
entrepreneurship process in the Office of Auditor General Zambia, in which many of 
the institutional defenders were actually removed from the organization in a 
retrenchment process (as described previously in Chapter Five).  They were either 
retired early or transferred to another public organization.  However, a gentler 
approach might be taken by rewarding those who go along with the changes with trips 
to international conferences and workshops hosted by the professional community as 
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well as by continually supporting and providing educational opportunities to those 
who want to upgrade their qualifications.  This would require increased funding for 
these types of activities, which could potentially come from new partnerships with the 
international community. 
Finally, the ombudsman and her allies could be prepared to act decisively as 
dramatic events continue to unfold in Zambia.  If they are able to continue to push for 
changes in the midst of the transition to a new constitution and new legal framework 
for the ombudsman institution, they can continue promulgating the professionalism 
and development management logics, thus enabling the organization to emphasize 
professional training and standards, a service orientation and focus on the 
disempowered, and to continue pushing for autonomy.  Some tools available to them 
would be the news media who could draw attention to the work of the ombudsman 
office as well as the international professional community, who can lobby the 
government on their behalf.  Likewise, several members of Parliament seem keen to 
support the organization, and they could act as a buffer between the ombudsman and 
the executive branch of government during these tenuous transition processes.   
Another possibility is that there could be a long, extended period of instability, 
in which the power struggles between the actors and unresolved conflicts between the 
logics continue.  The president and executive branch could continue to interfere with, 
or be indifferent to, the work of the ombudsman, or they could at least make it more 
difficult for the ombudsman office to operate.  For example, the rules for conducting 
investigations and administrative proceedings still need to be written and signed by the 
Minister of Justice, who is part of the executive branch, and this presents an 
opportunity for the executive branch and the President to interfere in these processes.  
Furthermore, the members of the ombudsman office who are institutional defenders of 
the status quo could continue to undermine change processes or they could continue 
shirking organizational responsibility if they are not prevented from doing so or are 







This chapter has examined how events at the Zambian ombudsman office 
promulgated change among institutional logics in the organization.  Because these 
events are recent in the organization’s history, the case narrative is able to provide a 
close-up view of how the three different processes have promulgated the 
professionalism and development management logics as well as the ensuing power 
struggles around them.  It showed how drafting the organization’s strategic and 
restructuring plans promulgated employment practices consistent with the 
professionalism logic as well as an external orientation consistent with the 
development management logic.  It also showed how the organization’s move to a new 
office building was a physical expression and an enabling condition for the enactment 
of the development management logic’s external orientation.  Finally, it showed how 
the process of writing new ombudsman legislation that gives the office more 
operational autonomy has promulgated the values and systems of control of the 
professionalism logic.  This also showed how the new law’s language about human 
rights could satisfy the demands of both the professionalism logic and the 
development management logic.  In describing the ways in which the development 
management and professionalism logics were promulgated within the organization, the 
chapter also described the recent and ongoing power struggles that unfolded as a result 
of the proposed changes.  Some of these changes have been met by resistance from 
institutional defenders within the organization who have actively worked to maintain 
the status quo by sabotaging reform efforts.   
 The Zambian ombudsman office has now been re-launched as “the Office of 
Public Protector”.  It has a new name, a new organizational structure, new legal 
framework, and a new office building.  Significant changes in the constellation of 
logics that guide the organization are not guaranteed, however.  It could remain 
operating in much the same way as it has been, with interference from the Government 
and with very little motivation or concern from employees in the office.  Alternatively, 
it could become more professionalized and also have a stronger emphasis on serving 
the needs of the public.  It is still too soon to tell if the promulgated logics will be 
enacted in a sustainable way and become institutionalized within the organization.  
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However, as discussed in the previous section, if the office were to interact more with 
the professional community and if the ombudsman and her team continue to drive the 
changes and to seize the windows of opportunity as they open in Zambia, this could 
lead to sustainable change among the logics guiding the office.  If the office were to 
enact these elements of the professionalism and development management logics that 
are related to meeting the needs of the public and becoming a human rights 
ombudsman institution, then it would begin to become an ombudsman for the Zambian 







This study contributes to theory and research literature on institutional logics as 
well as research on development within the Global South.  It does so in several ways, 
as it contextualizes theory on institutional logics within new organizational contexts 
and a new geographical area, public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, an area 
which received scant attention in previous studies of institutional logics (Johansen & 
Waldorff, 2017).  Thus, it extends the application of this perspective further into new 
areas and fields.  It also contributes to a better understanding of the contexts of public 
organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in Zambia, and in that way it leads to 
a further theorization of context, as called for by Pollitt (2013, p. 585).  The following 
sections argue in greater detail about the specific contributions to research on 
institutional logics and development, as well as empirical contributions related to the 
practice of development in the region.   
 
Theoretical Contributions  
The first way this study contributes to research on institutional logics and on 
development is by constructing and applying a new typology of logics useful for 
studying public organizations in Zambia and within the Sub-Saharan African region.  
The new typology fills a gap in the literature, since institutional researchers have not 
focused their research in the Sub-Saharan region or throughout the Global South more 
broadly (Andrews, 2013, p. 3; Johansen & Waldorff, 2017).  Therefore, this study 
helps move institutional logics research beyond its narrow focus on organizations in 
the Global North, and it demonstrates the perspective’s usefulness in the context of 
public organizations in the South, and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.  By 
extending institutional logics research into this area, this study also responds to recent 
calls by Johansen and Waldorff (2017) “for a broader engagement with the world” (p. 
69), and to move beyond “a rather rationalistic view of organizations and 
organizational actors… by tending also to the informal organization, the chaos and the 
‘muddling through’… and power struggles” (pp. 70-71).  
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One way this study tends to the informal organization is by calling attention to 
the kinship logic, which goes beyond the formal organizational roles, rules, and 
procedures.  It reflects what Friedland and Alford (1991) considered within their 
original conception, that the kinship logic is subversive of the more formal logics, and 
in that way, it transcends the bureaucratic office.  It was through the informal kinship 
logic that individuals could assert themselves and “penetrate state definitions of needs 
and social categories” (Ibid, p. 259).  By empirically demonstrating the way this 
worked in the Zambian public accountability organizations, this study and its new 
typology are “bringing” the kinship logic “back in” to the institutional logics 
perspective (Ibid, p. 232).    
The informal aspects of the kinship logic were especially relevant at the Anti-
Corruption Commission.  There, organizational actors regularly had to manage both 
their informal and formal identities in dealing with how they handled investigations of 
their own tribe members.  This came out as they discussed what they called the 
“problem with issues of tribalism” in Zambia.  It was in those situations that an 
informal identity based on ethnicity or tribe became a factor in the choices that 
organizational actors made (Ekeh, 1975, p. 109).  As one interview respondent aptly 
put it:  
We are investigators, yes, but at the same time, we are human and we have lives 
out there.  For some people, it’s hard to draw the line, “Where do I place my 
loyalties?  Is it with the institution?  With my family?  My friends?”  Because 
either way the backlash is there.  Family - it will be there.  Institution - it will be 
there.   
This quote highlights the informal dimensions of organizational life in Zambia, which 
goes beyond the hierarchy, rules, regulations, and codes of ethics.  The organization 
members have to continually make choices about where they will place their loyalties 
and consider the type of backlash that will come as a result.  There will be 
consequences regardless of the choice they make, but they must continually consider 





Relationships among Institutional Logics  
Using an institutional logics perspective in this context broadens our 
understanding of how multiple sets of organizing principles, practices, and ideas co-
exist and guide action in public organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is a 
vibrant focus of inquiry in the development literature (Andrews, 2013; Evans, 2004; 
Hydén, 2012, 2013b; Jamil, Askvik, & Hossain, 2013).  The institutional logics 
perspective provides a theoretical lens for examining these dynamic relationships, and 
the typology provides categorizations for ordering them in a systematic manner.  
Through this theoretical lens, one can see how an organization and its members 
manage the conflicting values and practices consistent with multiple institutional 
logics in various ways.  For example, practices consistent with different institutional 
logics can be segmented from one another, through which the activities of one 
organizational unit can be consistent with one institutional logic while the activities in 
another unit are consistent with another logic.  Segmentation of logics can alleviate the 
tensions and competition that can exist between the different value systems, practices, 
or foci of attention.  This was evident in the case at the Anti-Corruption Commission, 
as the Investigations Department was guided by principles of the bureaucratic logic, 
with its internal orientation and attention on following the rules and procedures for 
investigations and doing so in secrecy.  Meanwhile, the Community Education 
Department had a different orientation that was consistent with the development 
management logic, which was focused on members of the public, educating them 
about corruption and how to prevent it.  The two organizational units were able to 
work in different ways and have different foci because their work was segmented 
away from one another in the organization.   
Another way the different logics can coexist and enable action is when they are 
complimentary to another and exist within facilitative relationships.  Because of the 
logics’ complementarity, pursuing the goals or following the norms and values 
inherent in one logic facilitates the enactment of another logic.  An example of this is 
found in the case at the Office of Auditor General.  The office and the officers see 
themselves as professionals and as members in good standing in the professional audit 
communities of INTOSAI and AFROSAI-E.  As such. they follow the professional 
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norms, standards, and methods prescribed by INTOSAI and AFROSAI-E.  One such 
standard is ISSAI 12, which states that audit offices should regularly engage with the 
public and empower them to hold their governments accountable.  As the Office of 
Auditor General follows and implements that standard into their own context, they are 
simultaneously following professional standards, which is the enactment of the 
professionalism logic, while they are also orienting themselves and their work toward 
empowering the public, which is the enactment of the development management logic.  
This is seen most evidently in the ways the audit office engages the public through the 
media and, in particular, in their trips to rural areas to explain audit reports in local 
languages.  They are simultaneously enacting the professionalism and development 
management logics through their involvement in these types of activities.   
Of particular note is also how these different logics can be facilitative of one 
another in ways that are subversive to formal organizational modes.  One example of 
this is the way that the hierarchical organizational system consistent with the 
bureaucratic logic can facilitate patrimonial and informal forms of control by powerful 
or well-connected individuals, which is consistent with the kinship logic.  This can be 
seen in situations in which officers from these organizations were intimidated or felt 
afraid to do their work of holding officials accountable because those above them in 
the government hierarchy could abuse the formal system to punish them.  For 
example, they could cause them to be fired or removed from their positions, prevent 
them from being promoted, or they could cut funding to the organization.  In these 
types of situations, the formal power of the central bureaucracy is abused to punish 
organization members for doing their jobs to hold civil servants, ministers, and other 
political leaders accountable.     
This perspective also aids in our understanding of how these different logics 
exist in competitive relationships, which implies that one logic’s win is another logic’s 
loss, and that increases in the influence of one logic corresponds with the decrease of 
another logic (Goodrick & Reay, 2011).  This is seen, for example, in relationships 
between the kinship logic and development management logic.  As organization 
members saw their position in the organization as a personal fiefdom and a way to 
extract money from members of the public, or “tips”, as they called them, it precluded 
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delivery of service to the poor and vulnerable as espoused by the values of the 
development management logic.  This can be seen empirically in the ombudsman 
office, when they were located in the Old Bank of Zambia building together with the 
passport office and some of the officers were taking bribes to help speed up passport 
application processes.  While this informal expediting service might have made the 
lives of some people, particularly those with money, easier by allowing them to get 
their passports faster, it would have conversely make the lives of the poor more 
difficult as their passport applications would move further down the queue below the 
applications of those who paid the extra cash to speed up the process.  In those 
situations, the enactment of the kinship logic and its mode of operation prevents the 
enactment of the development management logic and its operational mode to meet the 
needs of the public, especially those who are poor or vulnerable.   
In addition to exploring how relationships between logics can be competitive or 
complementary and how different logics can be segmented away from one another or 
facilitative of one other, this study also explores another type of relationship in which 
policies consistent with a logic are decoupled away from organizational practices.  The 
case of the Anti-Corruption Commission provides an illustration of policy-practice 
decoupling, in which policies consistent with the development management logic and 
the professionalism logic were adopted symbolically to attain legitimacy, but the 
policies were de-coupled away from the core operation of the organization (i.e., how 
the organization “really works”).  This was seen, for example, in the adoption of the 
international standards that were supposed to give the organization more independence 
and autonomy through the enactment of formal laws, which on the surface was 
consistent with the professionalism logic.  However, in reality, the organization was 
not actually operating independently of the president or those close to him.    
The case of Office of Auditor General Zambia illustrates how means and ends 
can be decoupled, leading to implemented policies while “scant evidence exists to 
show that these activities are linked to organizational effectiveness or outcomes” 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 14).  In that case, the Office of Auditor General had 
implemented a host of professional reforms, standards, and norms, and they had begun 
producing detailed annual audits showing how government agencies had misused 
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public resources.  The quality and quantity of the reports coming from the Auditor 
General’s office have increased.  Yet, very little action is ever taken on these reports 
by Parliament or the Executive, and hence, there has been very little change in the way 
the government handles public resources.  So, in spite of the changes within the Audit 
Office, there continues to be public theft and irresponsible spending within the 
Government of Zambia.  Thus, there is a decoupled relationship between the means of 
holding government accountable through audit reports and the ends of responsible 
handing of resources by the government.   
 
The Materiality of Logics 
This study contributes to our understanding of the materiality of institutional 
logics as physical expressions of the values of the logics.  In a recent article on 
institutional logics and materiality, Jones et al. (2013) argued, that while the roles of 
meanings systems and practices have dominated the research agenda on institutional 
logics in the past two decades, the roles of material objects “have been peripheral” (p. 
53).  To Jones and her coauthors, material objects need more emphasis in institutional 
logics research because they are “important extensions of” and the “necessary 
condition for” the enactment of institutional logics since material objects “not only 
anchor established practices and structures and institutionalize new ones, but are also 
vehicles enabling ideas and symbols to travel across time and space” (Ibid, pp. 52, 55).  
Material objects are the transmutations of the invisible ideas and symbolic meanings, 
according to Friedland (2013), and they “are the means by which practices are 
anchored, affected, and oriented” within organizations (p. 37).   
The ombudsman office’s move from the Old Bank of Zambia Building to the 
new office building illustrates how physical objects, which in this case are the office 
buildings, can be important extensions of, and necessary conditions for, the enactment 
of the institutional logics.  When the office was located in the Old Bank of Zambia 
Building, it was an extension of and condition for the kinship and bureaucratic logics.  
It was located within a building with other government agencies, away from the public 
eye.  The ombudsman herself called the building “maladministration” and noted how it 
was not geared toward effective and efficient service delivery to the public.  The 
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elevators did not work and it was located in an area that did not provide anonymity to 
complainants.  Furthermore, it anchored the practice of accepting bribes from the 
public to speed up passport application processes.  This practice was made possible 
because of the ombudsman office’s location in the Old Bank of Zambia Building along 
with the passport office.  This changed when the ombudsman office moved to the new 
location.  The new location was open and spacious and geared toward public service, 
and in that way, it expressed the values of the development management logic.  It was 
also an enabling condition for changing the practices within the organization away 
from taking bribes and using the office as a personal fiefdom toward public service 
delivery.  In these ways, the move to the new building was the material enactment of 
the development management logic within the ombudsman office.  
 
Change, Structure, and Agency 
Finally, this study has contributed to theory about how change can occur in the 
relationships among institutional logics, which ties in to theoretical arguments about 
structure and agency.  The analytic narrative from the case of the Office of Auditor 
General Zambia offers a unique perspective on the roles of institutional 
entrepreneurship and structural overlaps within these change processes.  Many of the 
changes that took place within the Office of Auditor General revolved around a central 
figure who acted as an institutional entrepreneur, Auditor General Anna Chifungula.  
At the same time, however, structural elements were also important to consider in the 
change processes within the organization.     
Andrews (2013, 2016) provided a critique of institutional entrepreneurship and 
the overreliance on “solitary heroic leaders” or “champions” in institutional reform 
and development initiatives in the Global South.  His critique hinges on the paradox of 
embedded agency that was discussed previously: If actors are embedded in the 
institutionalized rules of the game, how can they imagine any alternatives?  This is 
especially the case with resource-rich actors at the center of social networks.  They 
would likely benefit most from the existing institutional arrangements and would not 
be particularly motivated to deviate from it.  The answer, according to Andrews (2013, 
2016), is to go beyond solitary heroic leaders and towards an understanding of the role 
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of multi-agent leadership in change processes.  In this way, actors on the periphery 
who are less embedded in the principles of the incumbent institutional logics can 
imagine new alternatives, and they can work with the central actors who have the 
resources to enact change to make it happen.  Andrews (2013) contended, “multi-agent 
leadership fosters change, not solitary leaders.  It is unlikely that institutional reforms 
will progress far where such multi-agent leadership is not in place” (p. 96).   
While it is true that the Auditor General did not act entirely in isolation as an 
institutional entrepreneur, she did play a central role from within her unique social 
position, more specifically, her “current position and history of positioning” 
(Cardinale, 2018, p. 141).  Her previous position within the Ministry of Finance 
provided her with “self-evident” courses of action based on the professionalism logic 
(Ibid, p. 142), i.e., the importance of providing professional training to auditors, 
requiring them to become certified, and basing new employment processes on the 
acquirement of professional qualifications.  Therefore, her previous social position 
oriented her towards those courses of action by providing her with “flexible schemes” 
(Ibid, p. 141) based on professionalism, which she could then transpose and apply 
through agentive action after she had acquired her new social position to lead the audit 
office.  According to Cardinale (2018), “Agency is needed… to narrow down possible 
courses of action to one”, and this process of selecting a course of action is based on 
one’s previous experiences and history of social positions rather than being solely 
based on one’s current social position alone (p. 141).   
This perspective provides an alternative to that of Andrews (2013), which is 
that multi-agent leadership is required for change, since the Auditor General was 
actually able to play dual roles deriving from her historical and current positioning.  
She was a resource-rich central actor because of her current role as Auditor General 
and her social capital from the President and Cabinet, but it was her former roles 
within the Ministry of Finance that provided her with a set of schemes to apply in the 
audit office to bring change in accordance with the professionalism logic.  In essence, 
her actions “reflect[ed] a generative process through which actors tackle the present by 
activating the flexible schemes acquired during the past” (Cardinale, 2018, p. 141), 
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and they provide a unique empirical example of a central actor who is simultaneously 
able to imagine new alternatives and drive divergent institutional change.   
Another alternative explanation for the changes within in the Office of Auditor 
General Zambia would be to see those changes as processes of diffusion or the 
translation of ideas coming from the organization’s structural overlap with the 
professional community of state auditors.  The social boundaries of the Office of 
Auditor General intersected with the boundaries of the professional community 
through cooperation with INTOSAI, AFROSAI-E, as well as the Office of Auditor 
General Norway.  This provided the opportunity for the Zambian auditors, as well as 
the Auditor General, to interact with audit professionals from different organizational 
contexts, providing a bridge to exchange ideas about how audits should take place and 
how professional auditors should act, and in so doing, it lowered the barriers to 
change.  In that way, change can be seen as either deriving from normative pressures 
from the professional community towards isomorphic mimicry (Dimaggio & Powell, 
1983), or as processes of translation (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017) of the norms, practices, 
and standards from the international professional communities of INTOSAI and 
AFROSAI-E.  This explanation would support the bold assertion of Scott (2008) that 
transnational communities of professionals have become “the most influential 
contemporary crafters of institutions… and currently claim supremacy in today’s 
secularized and rationalized world” (p. 223).   
Rather than seeing only one of the alternatives as the explanation for change in 
the Office of Auditor General, this study sees change as coming from within the 
interactions of institutional entrepreneurship and structural overlap.  The ideas and 
practices coming from the relationships with the professional community provided 
material and ideational resources for the professionalizing processes that were being 
driven by the Auditor General.  As the Auditor General acted as an institutional 
entrepreneur, removing institutional defenders and rewarding those who went along 
with the project, the professional community of auditors was there with a useful set of 
standards and methods that could be translated into the Zambian audit context, leading 
to change within the organization.  Therefore, the changes in the Auditor General’s 
Office can be understood as coming from the agentive actions of an institutional 
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entrepreneur who was preconditioned toward certain courses of action (Cardinale, 
2018) and through structural processes coming from the overlaps with the professional 
organizations.  Furthermore, from a practitioner perspective, this provides a case for 
looking at how a strong and established professional community can lower barriers to 
change as well as the importance of entrepreneurial leadership to drive change 
processes within organizations.   
 
Empirical Contributions  
In addition to the theoretical contributions above, this study also contributes 
empirically to research on public administration in Zambia in several ways.  One way 
is by providing a historical context of the three organizations from the case studies.  It 
provides this context in light of social developments within Zambia, the Sub-Saharan 
African region, and internationally within the fields or sectors in which the three 
organizations are a part.  For example, very little has been written about the 
ombudsman office in its more than forty years of existence.  A search of literature 
reveals two academic studies focused on the Zambian ombudsman office, and both are 
by legal scholars rather than social scientists (Chewe-Chanda, 2009; Martin, 1977), 
and as such, they are focused on the legal framework of the organization more than on 
its social or political environment.  In addition, there was a legal bulletin written by a 
former senior legal officer who worked at the ombudsman office at that time, which is 
also focused on the legal framework for the organization (Phiri, 1986).  Literature 
searches found no articles or books that focus on the organization from a social 
science perspective, though a few texts do mention the organization in passing 
(Chikulo, 2000) or in relation to similar organizations in the region (Ayeni, 1997).  
This is perhaps because so few people have been aware of the existence of the 
organization since it had always maintained a low profile, at least until recently.   
Therefore, this study contributes empirical analysis and data that can be useful 
in future studies of the Zambian ombudsman office (Layder, 1998, pp. 162-171).  It is 
conceivable that in the near future, new studies will be conducted because, with the 
recent changes to the legal framework and organizational structure for the Zambian 
ombudsman’s office, the organization could become more prominent in its role with 
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accountability and governance processes in Zambia.  This provides a setting in which 
studies of the ombudsman’s office would have a renewed sense of relevance and value 
across the academic disciplines.  More academic studies focused on the Zambian 
ombudsman would be a welcome development, and as more studies are conducted, the 
chapter on the ombudsman office from this study will be useful by presenting a 
contextualized history and social and political analyses of the organization.   
The study on the Office of Auditor General Zambia finds itself in good 
company with recent research by Maria Gustavson (2014) who studied “how African 
public auditors perceive and handle international public audit standards in relation to 
their own context” (p. 21).  Her study, which was focused on the SAIs in Botswana 
and Namibia, as well as AFROSAI-E, found that professional norms and social 
legitimacy within the professional community were key factors in the ways that 
African public auditors approached international standards.  In her study, the auditors 
considered those international standards as legitimate, and therefore, they saw it as 
appropriate for them to take the standards and implement them within their own local 
contexts.  In that way, her study offers an alternative perspective to development 
research, which “argue[s] that Western administrative structures and practices lack 
legitimacy in African countries” (Ibid, p. 170).  This case study on the Office of 
Auditor General Zambia supports Gustavson’s analysis that public auditors in Africa 
view the ISSAIs and other international standards as legitimate and appropriate for 
their own contexts, and it contributes more empirical analyses and theoretical 
perspectives to studies of SAIs in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Therefore, the case study on the Office of Auditor General responds to 
Gustavson’s (2014) call for “widening the theoretical perspectives of African public 
officials to regard them also as professionals… contribut[ing] to a more nuanced 
understanding of African public administrations than what is provided by the existing 
literature” (p. 180).  The professionalism logic from this study’s typology provided an 
ideal type that helped consider how interview respondents were guided by shared 
identity, values, standards, and norms from their professional community.  By seeing 
this professionalism logic in relation to the other three logics, this provides a more 
nuanced understanding of the dynamics within the organizations as organization 
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members drew on multiple institutional logics.  It also provided a systematic way of 
understanding how auditors enact the professionalism logic through their interactions 
with the professional community via processes of imitation and translation of 
professional ideas and identities (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). 
Finally, the case study of change in the Office of Auditor General Zambia can 
contribute to the knowledge and the work of development practitioners and audit 
professionals in the South.  It demonstrates how the audit office’s engagement with the 
professional community of state auditors lowered barriers to change and provided sets 
of ready-made tools, methods, and practices that the Zambian auditors could apply in 
their own context.  It also gives an example of how twinning can be used as a process 
of development when professionals from the North and the South partner together to 
exchange ideas and practices.  Moving forward, the literature on twinning can be 
useful, which began as a dialogue between Jones and Blunt (1999), Askvik (1999), 
and Proctor (2000), and has now seen somewhat of a renaissance in more recent years 
(Bontenbal & Lindert, 2011; Bontenbal, 2013; Van Ewijk et al., 2015).  These works 
could serve as guides for practitioners engaged in twinning, and they could also be 
built upon and expanded in future case studies of partnerships between professional 
organizations from the Global North and South.   
The case study on the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission contributes to 
empirical research on anti-corruption agencies (de Sousa, 2010; Kuris, 2015).  It 
places the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission within the existing frameworks or 
models for anti-corruption agencies by identifying it first as a “multi-purpose model” 
agency that combines preventative and investigative functions (OECD, 2013) and 
secondly as a “guard dog” agency with the “strong teeth” of prosecutorial power 
(Kuris, 2015, p. 127).  This case has also provided an empirical example of Kuris’s 
(2015) counterintuitive assertion, that strong anti-corruption agencies are likely to face 
more political interference in countries with high levels of corruption, like in Zambia.  
In that way, the Anti-Corruption Commission case illustrates the importance of 
political will “from the top” of the Government, which Hatchard (2014, p. 14) has 
argued is vital for the work of anti-corruption agencies (see also de Sousa, 2010; 
Kuris, 2015).  It has done this by demonstrating how members of the Zambian 
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government interfered with the agency, making it less effective than it could have been 
if it were given more autonomy and backed up with strong political will.  Finally, the 
case has shown how, in spite of multiple reform efforts, the mix of institutional logics 
guiding the organization has remained relatively stable.  In this way, the new laws can 
be seen as signals sent to the international community that Zambia is getting tough on 
corruption.  However, the formal laws and reforms have been decoupled away from 
the ways the organization actually works since it continues to be controlled by the 
executive branch in spite of laws providing it with operational autonomy. 
As with the other cases, the case study at the Anti-Corruption Commission also 
offers a contextualized history of the organization, as it relates to Zambian society and 
government and the international community.  It shows how the agency has followed 
the popular Hong Kong Model of having three foci on investigation, prevention, and 
education, but how it also only focused on investigations for its first decade or more as 
an agency and how it attempted to shift its focus in recent years.  It places the agency 
within the Zambian context, in which the presidency is strong and corruption is 
prevalent, and it describes the types of challenges those situations pose to the work of 
an anti-corruption agency.   
 
Final Thoughts 
In the ways described above, this study contributes to literature on institutional 
logics and development, and it provides a rich theorization of context of the three 
organizations, as was urged by Pollitt (2013) in his review of the seminal book by 
Andrews (2013).  The study first presented a typology of institutional logics that 
provides a systematic way of looking at different sets of organizing principles, 
practices, and social structures that can constitute the contexts of public accountability 
organizations in Zambia.  It has also led to a better understanding of how these 
institutional logics relate to one another within these organizational contexts and how 
those relationships can constrain or enable organizational action.  Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly, it has shown how these organizational contexts can change in 
sustainable ways, as demonstrated through the case at the Office of Auditor General.  
This type of research is particularly relevant for public accountability organizations, as 
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they are often the scenes of political power struggles related to the different values, 
systems of control, and modes of operation consistent with different institutional 
logics.   
This research is especially relevant in Zambia today, as the current situation for 
public accountability organizations in the country is becoming increasingly tenuous, 
with a number of observers noting a “convergence of troubling trends” in the country 
(Bratton et al., 2017, p. 1).  A recent report from Afrobarometer warned that “Zambia 
has arrived at a crossroads” (Ibid, p. 1) and that “[t]he country faces a choice of futures 
between democratic deepening and authoritarian backsliding” (Ibid, p. 15).  As an 
example, the most recent presidential elections in 2016 were marred by “incidents of 
violence… harassment of private media, the abuse of public office by government 
ministers, and the application of the Public Order Act in ways that appeared to 
disadvantage the main opposition party” (Carter Center, 2016, p. 1).  The incumbent 
President won the election, but this was overshadowed by acts of oppression and 
voting irregularities, according to the Carter Center (2016, p. 2).  In the months 
following the election, the leader of the opposition party was arrested and incarcerated 
on charges of treason and forty-eight members of his party were suspended from 
Parliament, which further silenced the President’s critics.  Finally, the President 
invoked a state of threatened emergency, allowing him “to restrict movement of 
assembly, implement a curfew, curtail parliament, ban publications, order detention 
without trial, and search any property without a search warrant” (Cheeseman, 2017).  
If these trends continue, the country could once again return to more authoritarian 
forms of government, as it had in previous years, and the rights of members of the 
public will be limited.   
In light of these events, a robust set of capable and independent public 
accountability organizations could help protect the public and act as a bulwark against 
powerful officials who might abuse their office, misappropriate public resources, or 
infringe on people’s human rights.  Even while the analyses in this study have 
demonstrated the difficulties public accountability organizations face and how political 
interference and intimidation can subvert their professional and legal autonomy, it still 
indicates a path forward.  It demonstrates how alternative logics can be promulgated 
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within these organizational environments through reform processes and the important 
role that institutional entrepreneurs play in organizational change, as they imagine new 
alternatives and drive divergent change.  It also demonstrates the supporting role that 
professional communities can play in these development and reform processes, as they 
provide sources of alternative logics for the organizations and organization members 
to draw from as guides for action.   
As more studies on public accountability organizations in this region are carried 
out, it will contribute to a better understanding of the ways these types of organizations 
operate and how alternative logics can be promulgated and enacted within them and 
how they interact with incumbent logics.  This study’s typology and conceptual 
framework will be useful in this future research, as they can be applied to different 
organizational contexts and expanded upon in studies on public organizations within 
the region.  This will lead to a richer theorization of context of public organizations in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and to a better understanding of organizational behavior more 
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 Banking Logic  Development Logic 





Clients are customers and seen as 
more or less risky sources of income 
 
Clients are beneficiaries 
and seen as more or less 




Maximizing profit while 
fulfilling fiduciary 
obligations not only to 
investors but also 
depositors 
Maximizing the impact of 









Institutional logics in the Austrian public sector 




Bureaucratic, legal, and 
professional rationality. 
 
Logic of appropriateness. 
Procedural legitimacy. 
Economic rationality (formal means-end 
rational action). 
 
Logic of consequentiality. 




State as policy maker with superior 
position in society serving public 
interest and citizens. 
Public organizations as provider of 
services achieving specific objectives and 




Legality, correctness, neutrality, 
equity, objectivity, loyalty, 
security, secrecy. 
 
Continuity, and stability 
 
Performance, effectiveness, and 
efficiency.  Prudence. 
 
 





Rules, inputs, responsibilities, 
duties, and rights. 
 
Internal orientation. 
Fixed/single goals, results (outputs, 
outcomes) 
 




Bureaucratic governance based on 
laws, rules, and directives, with 
strict accountability towards the 
sovereign and tight and multiple 
controls of correctness. 
 
Hierarchical, centralized, and 
united system. 
 
Contractual governance based on 
objectives, results, performance 
measurements and management tools 
within a competitive environment. 
 
 
Decentralized and fragmented system 





Sectoral closure, lifetime tenure to 
guarantee neutrality. 
Closed recruitment and career 
patterns based on seniority. 
Sectoral openness based on private sector 
employment laws. 
Flexible and open career patterns based 
on performance  
 







Competing Models of Administration in Africa 





Power Maintenance  Law and Order Development 
Service Rationale 
 




Patriarchal Hierarchical Team-Based 
Operational Mode 
 
Discretionary Mechanistic Organic 
Staff Orientation 
 
Upward Inward Outward 
Career System 
 





Reward and Sanctions Learning  
Lesson 













Bureaucratic logic 4 





The “Economy of Affection”, 
“microrational”, embedded in social 
network, and comprised of 
unwritten rules.6  
Logic of reciprocity.  
Legitimacy by relationship, power. 
7 
Bureaucratic, legal, and 
professional rationality. 
 
Logic of appropriateness. 
Procedural legitimacy. 
Economic rationality (formal 
means-end rational action). 
 
 
Logic of consequentiality. 




State as redistributive mechanism, 
from state coffers to local 
community groups (buying political 
support?) Provide a common good.8 
State as policy maker with 
superior position in society 
serving public interest and 
citizens. 
Public organizations as provider 
of services achieving specific 




Reciprocation, 9 Mutual 
obligation10, Respect and deference 
to leaders11. Status.  
“A helping hand today generates a 





Continuity, and stability 
Performance, effectiveness, and 
efficiency.  Prudence. 
 





Ruler 13 and Duties to provide for 
one’s own group.  
The “management of relations 
rather than rules”. 14  
Upward orientation (to leaders) 15 
Rules, inputs, 








External orientation  
Model of 
governance  
Informal and personalized 
governance16, in which rules are 
dependent on human agency 
(particularly with the leader) and 
based on concrete tangible results 
for local interests. 
 
Patriarchal (leader-dependent) 
based on loyalty and fiefdoms, 17  
subversive. 18    
Bureaucratic governance 
based on laws, rules, and 
directives, with strict 
accountability towards the 
sovereign and tight and 
multiple controls of 
correctness. 
Hierarchical, centralized, 
and united system. 
Contractual governance based on 
objectives, results, performance 
measurements and management 
tools within a competitive 
environment. 
Decentralized and fragmented 
system with managerial autonomy 
Employment 
status  
Favoritist, based on “who you 
know” 
Discretionary hiring practices rather 
than merit-based. 19 
Sectoral closure, lifetime 
tenure. 
Closed recruitment and 
career patterns based on 
seniority. 
Sectoral openness based on 
private sector employment laws. 
Flexible and open career patterns 
based on performance  
 
  
                                               
4 Meyer and Hammerschmid (1996 a/b).   
5 Meyer and Hammerschmid (1996 a/b).   
6 Hyden (2013b), p. 923 
7 Hyden (2013a) 
8 Hyden (2013a) 
9 Hyden (2013b) 
10 Friedland and Alford (1991), p. 259 
11 Andrews (2013), p. 46 
12 Hyden (2013a), pp. 74, 87 
13 Hyden (2013b) 
14 Hyden (2013a), p. 95 
15 Hyden (2013b) 
16 Friedland and Alford (1991), p. 258 
17 Hyden (2013b), p. 927 
18 Friedland and Alford (1991), p. 259 




Field Research Protocol 
Initial purpose 
of the study 
Contextualize Public Accountability Organizations in Zambia.  Develop a 
typology of logics for understanding these organizations and understanding 




Institutional logics – sets of socially constructed organizing principles and 
practices (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) 
Institutional entrepreneurship – actors who leverage resources and drive change 
in the organization or field (Hardy and Maguire, 2008) 
Structural overlap – boundary spanning between the organization with other 
organizations or social groups (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) 
Historical events – dramatic events that shift cultural views and power bases 
(Sewell, 1996; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) 
Competing logics – the presence of competing logics as an “antecedent” to change 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) 
Translation of organizational ideas – institutional ideas move across time and 
space (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) and they are adapted by actors to fit local 
contexts (Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008) 
 
 
First trip to 
the field 
 
1st – 16th of November 2014 
Organizational 
contact 
The Office of Auditor General Zambia 
Stand No. 7951 Haile Selassie avenue, Long Acres, Lusaka  
Louis Mwansa – Director of Planning and Information Directorate  
+260 211 252 772  
 
Goals To use and build upon the preliminary typology 
Determine if changes did actually occur in OAGZ, as espoused by Norwegian 
development partners and evaluation reports.   
If changes did happen, then look for possible explanations as to why.   
“Soak and Poke” – make observations, have informal conversations about the 
organization and its environment. 





(not used as an 
“interview 
guide”, but as 
reminders of 
topics to be 
covered) 
- Establishing a rapport with respondents and understanding their place within 
and their level of knowledge of the organization: 
o Length of time working in organization, position, how they were 
recruited, career path, educational and occupational background. 
- Getting a sense of the way the organization works: 
o Find out what it’s like to work in the organization and how things 
“get done”. 
o Get descriptions of process of working through the organizational 
structure (types of hierarchy – steep, rigid, flat?).  
o How to get ahead (be promoted) in the organization. 
o How organization members interact with others inside and outside 
the organizations (e.g., political actors, members of the public, 
central bureaucracy, international partners).  
o Get an idea of the image of an ideal officer in the organization and 
what happens when members do not live up to those expectations.  
o Find out about evaluation processes within the organizations – 
particularly related to employees. 
o Find out about authority structures – who determines what work is to 
be done and how it is to be done.   
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o Find out the challenges and frustrations of working in the 
organization. 
- Getting a sense of changes in the organization:  
o Ask long-time organizational members to describe the way the office 
operated when they first arrived and compare it to now.  Try to get 
details about timeframes of changes 
o Ask for their opinions about how and why changes took place – who 
the key actors were, what some of the obstacles to change may have 
been.   
N.B. Also check with interview respondents about documentary data, particularly 
if they referred to documents in interviews 
 
Second trip to 
the field 
 





The Office of Auditor General Zambia 
Stand No. 7951 Haile Selassie avenue, Long Acres, Lusaka   
Louis Mwansa – Director of Planning and Information Directorate  
+260 211 252 772  
 
Local researcher and contact person for members of Parliament and Public 
Accounts Committee (Contacted through Njekwa Mate – Lecturer at University of 
Zambia - +260 965 134 617) 
Peter Soko  +260 977 890 825 
 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (Political Party) 
secretariat@mmdzambia.org (after an internal split in the MMD party in 2016, 
with a “Mutati faction” and “Mumba faction”, the MMD website and email are 
not working.  However, individual contact information can be requested from the 
author.  For reasons of individual security, it is not included here.) 
 
Transparency International Zambia  
Stand no 3880, Kwacha Road, Olympia Park, Lusaka 





Get a broader point of view by including interviews with external actors from the 
Zambian Parliament and Public Accounts Committee, Norwegian embassy, 
Transparency International Zambia, and former Vice President of Zambia 
 
 







Continuing with themes from the first trip to the field, and in addition: 
o Getting a sense of what external actors think about the organization – 
how it is to work with it, whether they have seen changes along the 
same lines as organization members. 
o Get the political perspective. 
o Get an up close historical perspective from the former Vice President 
of Zambia, particularly related to the appointment of the Auditor 
General 










23rd of April – 14th of May, 2016 
Organizational 
contacts 
The Office of Auditor General Zambia 
Stand No. 7951 Haile Selassie avenue, Long Acres, Lusaka  
Sally Ross – Director of Planning and Information Directorate (currently holds 
this position, as of April 2017) 
+260 211 252772  
 
Transparency International Zambia  
Stand No. 3880, Kwacha Road, Olympia Park, Lusaka 
Goodwell Lungu – Director  
+260 211 293 649 
 
The Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission 
Anti-Corruption House.  Chachacha Road, Southend, 50486 Lusaka, Zambia 
Christopher Chibanku – Corporate Affairs Manager   
+260 966 548 867 
Timothy Moono – Public Relations Manager  
tmoono@acc.gov.zm  
 
The Office of Public Protector (the ombudsman office) 
Stand No. 4623, Mwaiwena Road, Lusaka (in Rhodes Park area, behind Taj 
Pamodzi) 
Victor Siulanda – Investigations officer 
ksiulanda@gmail.com 
+260 211 228 330 
 
 
Goals Add two additional case studies at the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission and 
the ombudsman office.  Look at similar processes and concepts within these cases.  
 
In addition, secure as many documentary data sources as possible since this will 




of Research  
 
8th – 23rd of November, 2017 
Organizational 
contacts 
Same as listed above 
 
Goals Determine the accuracy and validity of case narratives and concepts.  Get 
feedback from written case reports and presentations of research, get corrections 
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